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                              Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the dynamics of petty corruption in the Indian state of Bihar. It 
illustrates how the problem of petty corruption is manifested in the delivery of welfare 
services to the poor; explains the reasons for the perpetuation of systemic corruption in public 
dealings; investigates the strategies of civil society-led mobilization of the poor against 
corruption; unravels what happens when well-meaning anti-corruption policies and reforms 
hit the ground; and explores the attitudes of future bureaucrats toward bribery and corruption. 
These enquiries become crucial, as in the last few decades, scholars have identified the 
problem of corruption as one of the toughest governance challenges in developing countries, 
wherein welfare services often get trapped in ‘corruption cycle’ (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Debiel et al., 2011; Villoria et al., 2013).  While corruption is widely acknowledged as a 
problem and some attempts have been made to quantify it, there is a dearth of empirically-
grounded research on the dynamics of corruption, its persistence, and the probable solution 
for curbing it. This thesis is an attempt in that direction. Bihar is chosen as the site of 
investigation because it has covered a long journey from being one of the most corrupt states 
in India about a decade back to have become a leading state in undertaking governance 
reforms for curbing corruption  
Research Objectives and Thesis Layout 
The thesis has three broad objectives. First, it probes the potential as well as challenges of 
civil society-led mobilization of the rural poor against corruption. Second, it examines how 
vigilance-focused anti-corruption governance reforms are received, accepted, contested or 
manipulated by the delivery agents providing nutritional services to the poor children. Third, 
it explores what the aspiring civil servants think about bribery and corruption in public 
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services and suggests probable solution for curbing it. All the above stated objectives 
constitute a separate chapter of the thesis (Chapters 2-4). These three empirical chapters are 
clubbed with introductory and concluding chapters (1 and 5 respectively). The study made use 
of direct observation, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with key 
informants, process net-mapping, focus group discussions and experimental games as 
research tools for data collection. The thesis also had its limitations with regards to data 
collection, especially the respondents’ reluctance to provide information freely about sensitive 
topics like bribery and corruption. The selection of subjects, both for experimental (bribery) 
games and delivery centers under the child nutrition programme was also a major challenge, 
and it was determined solely on the basis of volunteerism. 
Chapter Synopses 
Chapter 2: Can grassroots mobilization of the poorest reduce corruption? A tale of 
governance reforms and struggle against rent-seeking in Bihar, India 
In India, corruption, exclusion from welfare schemes, and the denial of rights to the rural poor 
have long been commonplace. Critical accounts of development policy and practice advocate 
the need for pro-poor governance reforms as well as effective mobilization of the poor for 
exercising their rights and entitlements. However, there is a dearth of empirical work which 
may enable us to address the following questions: What are the dynamics of such 
mobilization strategies in the environment of pro-poor governance reforms? How does it 
affect local power relations as well as rent-seeking by the state officials? And what are the 
challenges involved in the sustenance of civil society led struggles for the poorest and 
outcastes against corruption? This chapter addresses these questions in the context of 
mobilization of the poorest and lowest caste group (Musahars) by a grassroots organisation in 
Bihar, called the ‘Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra’ (SSEVK). It explains what has or 
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hasn’t worked (and why) for the poorest and outcastes in terms of their dealings with public 
officials. The findings suggest that pro-poor governance reforms and welfare schemes on their 
own do not yield dividends in the absence of both civil society led mobilization and political 
will of the ruling dispensation. 
 
Chapter 3: Can vigilance-focused governance reforms improve service delivery? The case of 
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) in Bihar, India 
Child undernourishment is a major challenge in India even though the government has, since 
1975, been running the ‘Integrated Child Development Services’ (ICDS), one of the world’s 
largest programmes for this cause. Ever since its inception, this scheme is marred with various 
governance challenges: widespread corruption, absenteeism, and targeting problems; more 
visible in states like Bihar than others. The present ruling dispensation in Bihar has instituted 
major governance reforms to tackle these problems. These include regular inspection of 
service delivery centres, strict monitoring of funds, swift disciplinary action, and vigilance 
through community participation. While these reforms are generally accepted as good in 
theory, research-based empirical evidence of their actual impact on ground is scarce. This 
chapter tries to fill this gap on the basis of an in-depth case study of ICDS in Bihar. The 
findings indicate that contrary to conventional thinking about good governance, the vigilance-
focused reforms along with community based monitoring have not been successful in curbing 
systemic corruption. The study concludes that alternative approaches are required to resolve 
the governance problems in ICDS. These include tackling the problems of understaffing and 
heavy work-load, and providing stronger incentives to the frontline service providers. 
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Chapter 4: What do future bureaucrats think about bribery? A study of civil services aspirants 
from Bihar 
Civil servants play a key role in the implementation of governmental policies and 
developmental programmes. In the Indian context, civil servants are often seen as key 
elements responsible for systemic corruption. Taking recourse to the two dominant theories of 
anti-corruption: the ‘principal-agent’ and ‘collective action’, this chapter explains the attitudes 
of the aspiring civil servants from Bihar toward bribery and corruption. It is a novel attempt to 
analyse the perceptions of future bureaucrats about the issues related to corruption: what 
deters the potential bribe takers from accepting bribes, and what do they think about 
corruption in public life? Bribery experimental games were administrated to examine the 
impact of varying degrees of ‘punishment’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘knowledge about public loss’ 
and their relation to the varying ‘bribery amount’. In addition, focus-group discussions were 
conducted with these subjects to explore the dynamics of corruption. The findings suggest 
that high ‘public loss’ and high ‘severity of punishment’ were able to deter bribery even in the 
situations where bribe amount were high. On the other hand, the impact of high ‘monitoring’ 
was only effective in cases where the bribe amount was low. Focus-group discussions 
attributed the factors of ‘social acceptance’, ‘distorted parameters of successes and ‘no 
punishment for the guilty’ as the major reasons for ever continuing corruption in the public 
sphere. 
Main Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The findings of the thesis contribute to the wider debates on good governance and corruption. 
It takes forward the discourse on corruption, which is largely dominated by the works that 
tend to quantify it, by unravelling the dynamics of corruption as well as presenting the 
narration and explanation for its persistence. The thesis compliments the literature on the role 
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of civil society in preventing corruption by providing empirical evidence on the dynamics of 
civil society-led mobilisation of the poorest citizens in Bihar. It advocates the support of 
international agencies as well as the state in this endeavour, and argues for the nurturing of 
second rung of leadership in the facilitating organisation for the longevity of the movement.       
  
The thesis challenges the present fixation with strict monitoring and vigilance-focused 
reforms in anti-corruption measures. While acknowledging the need for better monitoring and 
accountability, it identifies the entry points for corruption in welfare schemes and suggests 
ways of curbing systemic corruption. It emphasises the need for communicating well to the 
target population the changes in rules and regulations of welfare programmes, alongside 
redressing the problems of poor working conditions and low remuneration of over-worked 
frontline workers. Finally, the thesis, in a novel attempt of its kind, presents the attitudes of 
future civil servants toward bribery and corruption. It argues that the anti-corruption efforts 
should not only focus on stringent action and speedy trial of erring officials but also strive for 
changing the ‘social acceptance’ of corruption through value-based education in wider 
society.     
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Zusammenfassung 
Einführung 
Diese Thesis untersucht die Dynamik von Bagatellkorruption im indischen Bundesstaat Bihar. 
Sie illustriert, wie sich Bagatellkorruption im Angebot von staatlichen Sozialleistungen für 
Arme manifestiert; erklärt die Gründe für den Fortbestand von Korruption im öffentlichen 
Bereich; untersucht Strategien der Mobilisierung der Zivilgesellschaft und der Armen gegen 
Korruption; schätzt die Folgen der Implementierung von gut gemeinten 
Antikorruptionsprogrammen und Reformen ab und untersucht Meinungen zukünftiger 
Bürokraten zu Bestechung und Korruption. Diese Forschungsarbeit ist wichtig, da in den 
letzten Jahrzehnten Forscher das Problem der Korruption als eine der zähsten 
Herausforderungen für Regierungsführung in Entwicklungsländern identifiziert haben, wobei 
Sozialleistungen häufig im 'Bestechungszyklus' gefangen sind (siehe Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Debiel u. a., 2011; Villoria u. a., 2013). Während Korruption als Problem weit anerkannt ist 
und einige Versuche gemacht wurden, Korruption zu messen, gibt es einen Mangel an 
empirisch fundierten Studien über die Dynamik von Korruption, ihres Fortbestands sowie 
mögliche Lösungen zu deren Eindämmung. Diese Thesis ist ein Versuch in diese Richtung. 
Bihar wurde als Forschungsregion gewählt, da es eine lange Geschichte von einem der 
korruptesten Bundesstaaten in Indien vor ungefähr einem Jahrzehnt zu einem der führenden 
Bundesstaaten in Korruptionseindämmung hinter sich hat. 
Forschungsziele und Aufbau der Arbeit  
Die Thesis hat drei allgemeine Ziele. Zuerst werden das Potential sowie die 
Herausforderungen der Mobilisierung der Zivilgesellschaft und der ländlichen Armen gegen 
Korruption untersucht. Zweitens wird untersucht, wie auf Überwachung fokussierte 
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Antikorruptionsprogramme von Anbietern von Ernährungsprogrammen für arme Kinder 
angenommen, akzeptiert, in Frage gestellt oder manipuliert werden. Drittens wird untersucht, 
was zukünftige Staatsbeamte über Bestechung und Korruption bei öffentlichen 
Dienstleistungen denken und es werden mögliche Lösungen zur Eindämmung vorgeschlagen. 
Alle genannten Ziele stellen jeweils ein Kapitel der Thesis (Kapitel 2-4) dar. Diesen drei 
empirischen Kapiteln sind ein einleitendes und ein zusammenfassendes Kapital (1 und 5) 
voran- bzw. nachgestellt. Die Studie benutzt direkte Beobachtung, halbstrukturierte 
Interviews und informelle Gespräche mit Schlüsselpersonen, Prozess-Netmaps, 
Gruppendiskussionen und experimentelle Spiele als Forschungsmethoden für die 
Datenerhebung und -erfassung. Einschränkungen bei der Datenerfassung waren insbesondere 
der Vorbehalt von Interviewpartnern, Auskunft über heikle Themen wie Bestechung und 
Korruption zu geben. Die Themenauswahl sowohl für das experimentelle Bestechungsspiel 
als auch für die Anbieter des Kinderernährungsprogrammes waren ebenfalls eine große 
Herausforderung, und beruhten alle auf freiwilliger Teilnahme. 
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel 
Kapitel 2: Kann eine Mobilisierung der Ärmsten Korruption reduzieren? Eine Geschichte 
über Regierungsreformen und den Kampf gegen Gewinnstreben in Bihar, Indien 
In Indien waren Korruption, der Ausschluss von Sozialleistungen und die Verweigerung von 
Rechten der ländlichen Armen seit Langem gängige Praxis. Kritische Berichte von 
Entwicklungspolitik und -praxis verteidigen die Notwendigkeit von 
Regierungsführungsreformen zugunsten der Armen sowie einer wirksamen Mobilisierung der 
Armen, um ihre Rechte und Ansprüche auszuüben. Es besteht jedoch ein Mangel an 
empirischen Studien, die folgende Fragen stellen können: Wie ist die Dynamik solcher 
Mobilisierungsstrategien bei Regierungsführungsreformen zugunsten der Armen? Wie betrifft 
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es lokale Machtbeziehungen sowie Gewinnstreben durch Staatsbeamte? Und was sind die 
Herausforderungen für die Aufrechterhaltung der zivilgesellschaftlich geführten Kämpfe der 
Armen und gesellschaftlich Ausgegrenzten gegen Korruption? Dieses Kapitel stellt diese 
Fragen im Zusammenhang der Mobilisierung der ärmsten und niedersten Kaste (Musahars) 
durch eine Basisbewegung in Bihar, 'Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra' (SSEVK). Es wird 
erklärt, was und was nicht (und warum) für die Ärmsten und Ausgegrenzten in Bezug auf 
ihren Umgang mit Staatsbeamten funktioniert. Die Ergebnisse sagen aus, dass 
Regierungsführungsreformen zugunsten der Armen und Sozialleistungen ohne eine 
Mobilisierung der Zivilgesellschaft und ohne politischen Willen des herrschenden Systems 
den Armen keinen Nutzen bringen. 
Kapitel 3: Können auf Überwachung fokussierte Regierungsführungsreformen 
Dienstleistungen verbessern? Der Fall der „Integrated Child Development Services” (ICDS) 
in Bihar, Indien 
Kinderunterernährung ist eine der größten Herausforderungen in Indien, wenn auch die 
Regierung seit 1975 die Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), eines der größten 
Programme in der Welt dagegen eingeführt hat. Seit dessen Beginn wird dieses Programm 
durch verschiedene Governance-Problemen beeinträchtigt: weit verbreitete Korruption, 
Ausfälle und Probleme mit Zielgruppen; diese sind in Bihar sichtbarer als in anderen 
Bundesstaaten. Die gegenwärtig herrschende Regierung in Bihar hat 
Regierungsführungsreformen in die Wege geleitet, um diese Probleme anzupacken. Diese 
beinhalten regelmäßige Besichtigungen von Dienstlieferzentren, die strenge Überwachung 
von Geldern, schnelle Disziplinarverfahren und die Überwachung durch die Zivilgesellschaft. 
Während diese Reformen in der Theorie  allgemein als gut akzeptiert werden, sind empirische 
Beweise ihres tatsächlichen Einflusses vor Ort knapp. Dieses Kapitel versucht, diese Lücke 
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auf der Grundlage einer detaillierten Fallstudie des ICDS in Bihar zu schließen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass entgegen dem herkömmlichen Denken über verantwortungsbewusste 
Regierungsführung die auf Überwachung fokussierten Reformen zusammen mit der 
Überwachung durch die Zivilgesellschaft für das Eindämmen von systemischer Korruption 
nicht erfolgreich sind. Die Studie schlussfolgert, dass alternative Vorgehensweisen 
erforderlich sind, um die Governanceprobleme des ICDS zu lösen. Diese beinhalten 
Lösungsansätze für die Unterbesetzung, von zu hohem Arbeitspensum, und die 
Notwendigkeit für bessere Leistungsanreize für Dienstleister.  
Kapitel 4: Was denken zukünftige Bürokraten über Korruption? Eine Studie über Bewerber 
für den öffentlichen Dienst in Bihar 
Staatsbeamte spielen eine Schlüsselrolle in der Erfüllung von Regierungs- und 
Entwicklungsprogrammen. Im Indien werden Staatsbeamte häufig als Schlüsselelemente von 
systemischer Korruption gesehen. Unter Zuhilfenahme von zwei dominierenden 
Antikorruptionstheorien,  'Principal Agent' und 'Collective Action' erklärt dieses Kapitel die 
Meinungen der zukünftigen Staatsbeamten von Bihar über Bestechung und Korruption. Es ist 
ein innovativer Versuch, die Wahrnehmungen von zukünftigen Bürokraten über die mit 
Korruption verbundenen Probleme zu analysieren: was hält die potenziellen Bestechungsgeld-
Nehmer davon ab, Bestechungsgelder zu akzeptieren, und was denken sie über Bestechung im 
öffentlichen Leben? Experimentelle Bestechungsspiele wurden durchgeführt, um den Einfluss 
von unterschiedlichen Graden von Strafe, Überwachung sowie Kenntnisse über den 
öffentlichen Verlust und ihre Beziehung zum unterschiedlichen Bestechungsbetrag. 
Außerdem wurden Fokusgruppendiskussionen zu diesen Themen durchgeführt, um die 
Dynamik von Korruption zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass hoher öffentlicher 
Verlust und hohe Strafen Korruption sogar dann eindämmten, wenn Bestechungsgelder hoch 
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waren. Andererseits war strenge Überwachung nur in Fällen wirksam, in denen das 
Bestechungsgeld niedrig war. Fokusgruppendiskussionen ergaben, dass soziale Anerkennung, 
verzerrte Erfolgsparameter und keine Strafverfolgung die Hauptgründe für eine unverändert 
bestehende Bestechung im öffentlichen Bereich sind.  
Fazit und Politikempfehlungen 
Die Ergebnisse der Thesis tragen zu den breiteren Debatten zu verantwortlicher  
Regierungsführung und Korruption bei. Es bringt die Diskussion über Korruption, die 
größtenteils durch Arbeiten zur Messung von Korruption bestehen voran, indem es die 
Dynamik von Kooperation untersucht sowie die Narration und Erklärung ihres Fortbestands 
präsentiert. Die Thesis ergänzt die Literatur zur Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in der 
systemischen Korruptionseindämmung, indem sie empirische Beweise zur Dynamik der 
zivilgesellschaftlichen Mobilisierung der ärmsten Bürger in Bihar liefert. Sie verteidigt die 
Unterstützung von internationalen Agenturen sowie des Staates in dieser Bemühung, und gibt 
Argumente für die Förderung der zweiten Führungsstufe in der Durchführungsorganisation 
für die Langlebigkeit der Bewegung.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt das gegenwärtige Festhalten an der strengen Überwachung und 
auf Überwachung fokussierte Reformen der Antikorruptionsmaßnahmen in Frage. Indem das 
Bedürfnis nach besserer Überwachung und Verantwortlichkeit anerkennt wird, werden 
Eingangspunkte für Korruption in Sozialleistungsprogrammen identifiziert und Möglichkeiten 
zur Eindämmung vorgeschlagen. Es betont die Notwendigkeit, der Zielgruppe die Regel- und 
Regulierungsänderungen von Sozialleistungsprogrammen zu kommunizieren, sowie das 
Problem von schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen und niedriger Vergütung der überarbeiteten 
Dienstleistungsanbieter zu lösen. Abschließend werden in der Thesis mithilfe einer 
innovativen Methode die Meinungen von zukünftigen Staatsbeamten zu Korruption und 
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Bestechung präsentiert.  Es wird argumentiert, dass sich die Antikorruptionsbemühungen auf 
nicht nur auf drastische Maßnahmen und zügige Verurteilungen der fehlbaren Beamten 
beschränken sollten, sondern sich auch darum bemühen sollten, die gesellschaftliche 
Anerkennung von Korruption durch wertorientierte Bildung in der breiteren Gesellschaft zu 
ändern.  
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RTI                         Right to Information 
RTPS                      Right to Public Services 
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SSEVK                  Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra 
THR                       Take Home Ration 
UPSC                     Union Public Service Commission 
 
1   Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Thus we have governance as a large and comprehensive process, 
governing as an intentional effort to leverage that process and solve 
or ameliorate some of its major problems, and governing coalition as 
the body of people who engage in a concerted effort to impose order 
and direction in what may otherwise be a somewhat chaotic condition. 
The effort is sometimes weak and ineffective, other times robust and 
strong, and probably somewhere in between most of the time. (Stone, 
2004, pp. 3) 
 
1.1  The Governance Conundrum 
 
Governance is defined as an all-inclusive process affecting community’s well-being (Stone, 
2004). It refers to developing institutions and administrative processes which are conducive to 
citizens (Uddin and Joya, 2007). ‘Good governance’ offers accountability, transparency, 
participation and predictability, and therefore creates conducive environment for the reduction 
of poverty (World Bank, 2002). It is argued that through good governance a right balance 
between state’s efficiency and accountability is established, which becomes critical for 
delivering overall development (Gonzalez, 2006; Girishankar et al. 2001). Good governance 
reforms lead to the progress of a country by giving voice to the citizens, establishing rule of 
law and making the government effective in controlling corruption (Uddin and Joya, 2007). 
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The role of political-will is considered important for realising good governance at the 
grassroots level (Leftwich, 1993). Over the last two decades, many developing countries have, 
with varying degrees of political will, initiated governance reforms with the overall objectives 
of achieving transparency, accountability and citizens’ participation in public affairs. These 
reforms have also taken place in the arena of agricultural and rural development as the 
majority of population in developing countries reside in rural areas. Arguably, delivering 
development and poverty eradication cannot be devoid of rural and agricultural sectors 
reforms (Dorward et al., 2004). However, many of these countries have failed to achieve the 
expected outcomes of governance reforms, and continue to remain plagued with petty 
corruption, lack of accountability, and transparency in public dealings (see Debiel et al., 
2011). While poor governance practices affect the entire population adversely, it is evident 
that the poor are the worst victims of bad governance (Grindle, 2004). They are often 
excluded from the welfare schemes meant for them, and in most instances when they do 
access the benefits of welfare programmes, they are required to bribe the public officials (see 
Ciborra & Navarra 2005). Moreover, they are deprived of opportunities for participation in 
governance, and their voices largely remain unheard by development policy makers and 
implementers.    
Undoubtedly, one of the major bottlenecks in establishing good governance in developing 
countries is the problem of corruption. Most developing countries suffer from this problem, 
and it is suggested that every possible effort must be made by the government to curb it 
(Myrdal, 1970). Furthermore, it is also alleged that poor countries often get trapped in the 
corruption cycle where an act of corruption leads to further corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999). The World Bank cited the problems related to corruption as one of the biggest 
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challenges in the delivery of development and poverty alleviation (Ryterman, 2007)
1
. Policy 
planners and well as researchers are now investing considerable energies in understanding 
how corruption affects developmental goals, and the issue of corruption has come to occupy 
the core place in the study of modern public administration (Villoria et al, 2013). In 
developing countries, one of the most prevalent forms of corruption affecting the poor is 
‘petty corruption’, meaning the routine corruption which citizens encounter in their regular 
interactions with the public officials.
2
 This form of corruption has been defined as the ‘Robin 
Hood in reverse’ phenomena, where the relatively rich public officials extract money from the 
poor and marginalized people (Riley, 2010). Arguably, any developmental policy aiming for 
good governance and ensuring welfare for the poor has to consider ways of curbing petty 
corruption.  
For developing countries like India, where the majority of population suffers from chronic 
poverty and malnutrition, the provisions for the welfare mechanism for the poor stand critical. 
As India’s experiment with neo-liberal policies (since the early 1990s) led to economic 
growth, the country infused massive economic investment through some of the largest welfare 
schemes for the poor.
3
 However, these welfare initiatives, like the earlier ones, also got 
trapped into the web of corruption and leakages (see Chandra, 2015; Farman and Gupta, 
2013; CAG Report, 2012-13)
4
. It is alleged that welfare schemes meant for the poor do not 
reach them and if they do, it is only in parts, because of various extractions along the delivery 
                                                     
1
 In the preface to the book titled ‘Many Faces of Corruption’ by The World Bank, Randi Ryterman 
expressed how corruption affected development. 
2http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35958/overview.pdf 
3For example, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (MNREGA) was 
launched in 2005 as the world’s largest welfare program both in terms of the number of beneficiaries 
as well as the expenditure with the overall emphasis on the rural development 
4
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/our_products/audit_report/government_wise/union_audit/recent_r
eports/union_performance/2012_2013/Civil/Report_22/Report_22.html  (Viewed on 7 April 2015) 
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chains (Transparency International, 2005).
5
 It is also claimed that corruption has plagued the 
welfare programmes of India and the market has no remedy for it (see Jenkins, 2006). Many 
scholars view it as a failure on the part of country’s developmental policies and practice (see 
Chatterjee, 2007; Planning Commission of India, 2010), and emphasise the need for a 
continuous research for the identification of the social context in which corrupt practices 
thrive (Jeffery, 2002). The striking feature of the problem of corruption in India is that in the 
past one decade or so, both the state and civil society actors have been trying to address it, 
either through legislative reforms or mass mobilization. Several governance reforms have 
been initiated recently to streamline the delivery of welfare services to the citizens and curb 
petty corruption (e.g. the promulgation of the ‘right to information’ or strengthening of 
vigilance and auditing bodies independent of state control). Additionally, India along with 
many other countries of the world has in the recent times, witnessed civil society 
mobilizations against corruption, lack of transparency and poor governance. In spite of all 
these efforts from time to time, the failure to curb corruption poses a greater challenge for 
researchers interested in governance and development issues, and creates a state of 
‘conundrum’ for the policy makers of the country. 
1.2  Need for understanding the dynamics of petty corruption 
 
Understanding the dynamics of petty corruption is essential for exploring how good 
governance reforms aimed at curbing corruption unfold in specific situations. It is believed 
that good governance can only be effective if what actually works at the ground level is 
evaluated empirically (Grindle, 2004). In lack of this empirically grounded knowledge about 
the dynamics of petty corruption, it is difficult to understand why well-meaning reforms 
                                                     
5The Transparency International’s‘Survey of India’s Petty Corruption’ suggests that government 
spends $8.5 billion annually on rural poor but most of it disappears on the way (Transparency 
International, 2005) 
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aimed at plugging leakages in the delivery of welfare services fail to achieve their desired 
objectives. While these reforms may appear to be adhering to the conventional norms of 
‘good governance’, the reasons for their failure can only be comprehended by unravelling 
what transpires when policies hit the ground. As noted above, civil society led mobilisation 
has also been instrumental in creating awareness against corruption in recent past (see 
Dubochet, 2012). This mobilisation is quite evident among educated urban-dwelling citizens 
connected through social media (see Harindranath and Khorana 2014). Yet, the dynamics of 
mobilization of the rural poor (also lower caste) against petty corruption and exclusion from 
welfare schemes is often neglected both in the mainstream media  and academic research. 
Unravelling the dynamics of mobilisation of the poor against corruption can potentially 
contribute to our understanding of the anti-corruption efforts needed in that direction. 
Moreover, the studies on corruption have mainly investigated the problem from the 
perspective of common citizens or ‘bribe givers’ (see Hanna and Yi-Wang, 2013; Dahlström 
et al. 2012) and have identified factors affecting individuals’ propensity towards bribery (see 
Frank and Schulze, 2000; Abbink et al, 2002). However, there is very little documentation of 
what the public officials or potential ‘briber takers’ think about corruption in public life, and 
how the prevailing socio-political environment of a country shapes attitudes toward 
corruption. Any exploration aimed at unearthing what the delivery agents think about bribery 
could be helpful in identifying the major voids in the anti-corruption policies of a country, 
which are ultimately implemented by the public officials. 
1.3  Rationale of the thesis 
 
This thesis is motivated by a need to explore the dynamics of petty corruption in the delivery 
of public services to the poor in India. This enquiry becomes important as corruption does not 
only entail economic loss to the poor, but also affect their social conditions, perpetuate 
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inequality, and ultimately hamper the achievement of human development goals. In the 
context of India, while there have been some academic works and international surveys on 
identifying the magnitude (quantitative estimates) of corruption (see Fraker et al., 2013; 
Transparency International India, 2005), there is a dearth of empirically-grounded research, 
which explores the dynamics of corrupt practises in welfare programmes with an overall aim 
of comprehending the problem of corruption in a holistic manner. Arguably, the scholarship 
on the issue of corruption in India has received very little attention outside the small group of 
economists, even when it affects the larger social, cultural and political aspects of growth and 
development of the country (Gupta, 2012). This thesis derives its motivation from the above 
identified gaps, and strives to contribute to the overall scholarship on good governance and 
corruption by exploring the dynamics of corruption through in-depth analysis of three inter-
related factors affecting petty corruption.  
First, it probes the potential of civil society led anti-corruption mobilization of the rural poor 
and the challenges therein. It does that by way of exploring the dynamics of mobilization and 
the way it affects the rural poor in their dealings with public officials.  Second, it examines the 
dynamics of anti-corruption governance reforms in the context of delivery of a public 
nutritional programme for children. Third, it aims to unravel both the attitude towards bribery 
and the perception of future delivery agents (public officials) on the prevailing corruption in 
public services, its social context, and the probable solutions to curb it. Overall, this study 
aims to make a contribution to the debates on good governance by undertaking empirically 
grounded research on the dynamics of petty of corruption in welfare programmes, the 
mobilization of the rural poor against petty corruption, and the perceptions of future 
bureaucrats about bribery and corruption in public life. 
1.4 Objectives of the thesis 
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The thesis has three main objectives:  
First, to explore the potential and challenges of civil society-led mobilization of the rural poor 
against petty corruption in welfare scheme.  
Second, the study aims to comprehensively analyze the fate of anti-corruption governance 
reforms in the delivery of nutritional services to the children, and explore how the delivery 
agents and the users respond to these reforms.  
Third, it strives to unravel the perception of the future civil servants towards corruption and 
the way they comprehend bribery in public services. 
All the three objectives constitute a separate chapter of this thesis.   
1.5 Research Questions 
 
There are specific research questions for each of the above stated broad objectives of the 
thesis. 
For realizing the objective of exploring the potential and challenges of civil society-led 
mobilization of the poorest against petty corruption, the research questions are as follows: 
a. How do civil society organizations mobilize the poorest and low caste against petty 
corruption, especially in the environment of ‘good governance’ being created by the 
ruling establishment? 
b. What are the underlying mechanisms of such struggles? 
c. What are the enabling conditions for the initiation and sustenance of these struggles? 
d. How effective are these struggles from the perspective of the village poor? 
e. What are the limitations and challenges involved in such interventions? 
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The research questions for the objective of analyzing the impact of anti-corruption 
governance reforms in the delivery of nutritional services are as follows: 
a. What happens when a poor performing state adopts governance reforms for improving 
the services under its biggest welfare programme, the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS)? 
b. How do frontline workers6 respond to these initiatives? 
c. Can strict monitoring, reporting and inclusion of user-based committees ensure 
effective implementation of the ICDS? 
d. Or are there options for development agents to circumvent the system and still 
misappropriate funds in the new set-up? 
The objective of unraveling the perception of the future civil servants about bribery and 
corruption in public dealings is realized by addressing the following questions: 
a. How do the future civil servants perceive corruption in public services? 
b. Can monitoring and fear of stringent punishment curb bribery? 
c. What impact the knowledge about cumulative public loss has on the bribery 
behaviour? 
d. What are the major causes of corruption in the public services? 
e. What kinds of reforms are necessary for curtailing corruption? 
1.6  Corruption: impressions from the existing literature 
 
‘Corruption’ is considered as a vague concept, difficult to theorize and define in concrete 
terms (Dahlstrom, 2011). However, some scholars have defined it as a deviation from formal 
                                                     
6
Michael Lipsky in his book ‘Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services’ 
emphasised the concept of street-level bureaucracy by arguing their importance in policy implementation. 
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duties and rules of conduct for personal gain (see Sen 1999; Khan 1996; Nye, 1967). The 
World Bank described it as the abuse of public offices for the private gains, and 
acknowledged it as one of the greatest obstacle for delivering development (World Bank, 
1997). It is claimed that corruption does not only jeopardizes public interest but has greater 
connotations (Morris, 1991). It breeds incredibility towards government institutions, and abets 
distrust among the citizens who are now less likely to follow any rules and regulations 
(Villoria et al, 2013). It also potentially kills the spirit of development and makes mockery of 
honest officials (Frisch, 1994). Seligson (2002) through his comparative work on four Latin 
American countries demonstrated how corruption negatively impacted the economy as well 
the polity of a country.  
It is contended that the problem of corruption is more prevalent in developing countries and 
the poorer citizens suffer the most from petty corruption (Gupta, 2012). In the context of 
India, many commentators have for long talked about the prevalence of corruption in almost 
all the spheres of public life (see Kohli, 1975; Vittal, 2012; Gouveal et al, 2013). Several 
studies have demonstrated the negative impact of petty corruption on the efficient delivery of 
services under public welfare schemes (see Webb, 2012; Mane, 2006; Ahluwalia, 1993; 
Arnold et al, 2009). Many have identified the problem of corruption as the major governance 
challenge in contemporary India (see Quah, 2008; Gupta, 2001). Researchers have attributed 
the prevalence of corruption in developing countries to various factors. For some, it is a part 
of the maturation process as every modernizing society in the past was susceptible to 
corruption (see Werner, 1983). For example, the evolution of freedom of press also results 
into an increase in the perception of corruption which might not be a sign of worsening 
governance (see Roca, 2011). However, others maintain that corruption thrives in developing 
countries, as the same actors who are corrupt are also the implementer of its anti-corruption 
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programmes, thus creating a paradox (see Fritzen, 2005). It is argued that when corruption 
gets deeply built into a system, it is very difficult to eradicate it (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999).  
The institutional theorists attribute corruption to the absence of viable institutional mechanism 
and argue that the economic and political institutions determine the extent of corruption in a 
country (Svensson, 2005). As developing countries inherited institutions which were set up by 
their colonial masters for their own benefits, they are more prone to mis-governance 
(Acemoglu etal, 2001; Sverisson, 2005). The new-institutional theorists claim that institutions 
play vital role in shaping individuals behaviour (see March and Olsen, 1989). On the other 
hand, it is also argued that rendering greater importance to institutions has resulted into a 
culture of ‘institutional mono cropping’ where it is assumed that similar set of institution 
could be successful everywhere (Evans, 2004). However, the actual functioning of institutions 
in different country contexts has demonstrated that a similar set of institution might perform 
differently in diverse terrains, and institutions should be understood within the contextual 
specificities of each country (Grindle, 2004). Moreover, some scholars also believe that mere 
presence of institutions is not sufficient by themselves and they have to be supplemented by 
enhanced human capital for the efficient delivery of services (see Svensson, 2005). It is 
further argued that people are intelligent enough to create their own preferences independent 
of institutions (Maravic, 2006). Therefore, ‘actor centered institutionalism’, an approach 
combining the influence of both the institutions and the individual preferences is more 
suitable for understanding the challenges of governance (Scharpf, 2000). In light of these 
arguments, exploring individual’s behaviour on corruption has gained momentum and 
experimental methods are being used for this purpose (see Frank and Schulze, 2000; Abbink 
et al, 2002). However, in the context of India, there is dearth of studies which explore 
corruption from the perspective delivery agents. This thesis aims to fill that gap by exploring 
the attitudes toward bribery and corruption in public life from the vantage point of (frontline) 
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delivery agents in relation to child nutrition programme as well as aspiring (future) 
bureaucrats. 
The scholars who comprehend corruption as a factor of individual decision making behaviour 
rely on two inter-connected theoretical explanations. First is the ‘Principal-Agent Model’, 
which considers corruption as an outcome of information asymmetries where the agents have 
more information than the principals
7
 (Beseley, 2006). While some describe the ‘rules’ as  
‘principals’ and bureaucrats as ‘agents’ (Becker and Stigler 1974), others consider politicians 
and bureaucrats as ‘agents’ and citizens as ‘principals’ (Besley 2006). Second is the ‘Rational 
Choice Theory’ paradigm that attributes the deviations (from following rules) to the lack of 
constraints which prevents the exploitation by public officials (see Nye, 1967; Rose 
Ackerman, 1999; Klitgaard, 1998). It is assumed that public officials’ exploitation is based on 
the substantial discretion enjoyed by them along with low accountability (Riley, 2010). Based 
on the assumptions of the above stated theoretical explanations, several scholars have argued 
in favor of effective evaluation techniques coupled with regular monitoring for curbing 
corruption (see Khullar, 1998; Nayak and Saxena, 2006; Ramachandran, 2005). Grounded on 
these assumptions, there have been some successful examples of curbing corruption. One of 
the most widely acknowledged one is that of Hong Kong, which significantly reduced 
corruption from the public services by instituting anti-corruption mechanisms tools aimed at 
limiting discretion, strict monitoring, increasing accountability, and severe punishment for 
erring public officials (Shah, 2007; Klitgaard, 1998). Researchers have found a considerable 
influence of the ‘Hong Kong model’ on the prevailing global ‘anti-corruption’ efforts 
(Persson et al, 2013; Marquette et al. 2014).  
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 ‘Agents are the ones who perform the work and have the power to make an impact on others. ‘Principals’ are 
basically embodiment of public interest.  
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Critics claim that this model has failed to curb corruption in countries which are infected with 
systemic corruption, as it is a problem of ‘collective action’ that cannot be easily addressed by 
vigilance-focused reforms (Brinkeroff 2000; Johnston 2005; Lawson 2009). They advocate 
for changing the belief among individuals that others are not corrupt by installing an overall 
change in how corruption is perceived in the country (Persson et al. 2013). However, in the 
context of India, there is dearth of academic enquiry which empirically examines how the 
anti-corruption measures unfold at the grassroots level, and how do the (frontline) public 
officials respond to those changes? By empirically exploring the impact of anti-corruption 
tools on the delivery of public services, this thesis aims to fill the void in literature on the role 
of good governance in curbing corruption in Indian context. 
Anti-corruption advocates campaign for the ‘rights’ based approach for better governance and 
reduction in pilferage (see Gragnolati et. al, 2006; Sinha, 2006; Dreze, 2006; Kent, 2006). 
Some of the advocated rights-based tools include: citizens participation through ‘users 
committee,’ ‘social audit’, and legislations ensuring ‘right to public information’ and ‘time 
bound delivery of services’. Additionally, some studies on corruption in welfare schemes 
argue for the involvement of elected representatives and users committees for curbing 
leakages (Gragnolati et. al, 2006; Sinha, 2006). The ‘political will’ of the state is also 
considered as the necessary condition for the efficient delivery of services (see Rajivan, 2006; 
Sudararaman, 2006; Sinha 2006). It is assumed that community participation in 
developmental programmes is crucial for effective delivery of services (see Cleaver, 1999; 
Schneider, 1999). However, not much intellectual energy has been spent on exploring how 
‘community-based’ and ‘users-based’ vigilance work for the poor in the delivery of welfare 
services in India. This research is an attempt to fill that void. 
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Furthermore, in the debates on good governance, it is asserted that an existence of viable civil 
society is a necessary condition for the realisation of ‘rights-based’ tools for the benefit of the 
poor.8 Arguably, there is a shift in the role of civil society organizations from that of service 
providers (in the 1990s) to that of creating awareness about rights based legislations, policy 
advocacy and mobilization more recently (Chandhoke, 2012). It is asserted that any of the 
anti-corruption tools based on the ‘top-down’ approach will not be effective in the absence of 
empowered civil society (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). Advocates of civil society applaud its 
contribution in curtailing corruption (see Themudo, 2013). On the contrary, some scholars 
argue that civil society organisations are prone to corruption themselves (see Maxwell et al, 
2008; Greenlee et al, 2007). The role of political will is considered important for a better 
impact of the civil society organisation on the state bureaucracies (see Evans 1996; Lavalle, 
2006). Furthermore, the role of leadership (of civil society organizations) is considered crucial 
for grassroots mobilization in the context of South Asia (Smillie and Hailey, 2001; Hailey and 
James, 2004; Petras, 1999; Govinda 2009).While individual leaders exhibit great ability to 
mobilize people, they are criticized for dominating the entire organization (Hailey and James, 
2004; Petras, 1999; Govinda 2009). In the Indian context, some scholars in the past have 
analysed the role of civil society organisations in mobilising the poor in their demand for 
better governance (e.g. Kamat, 2002; Sahoo, 2013; Waghmore, 2012) but the dynamics of 
such mobilisation has largely remained unexplored in the context of anti-corruption 
movement. Moreover, there is also very little documentation of the way the poorest people 
interact with the officials after being mobilised by civil society organisations (Singh, 2013). 
This thesis aims to provide an empirical account of the dynamics of a civil society led 
mobilisation of the rural poor against petty corruption. 
                                                     
8
https://www.ndi.org/files/1374_ww_courption_0.pdf accessed on 11.08.2015 
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In the context of India, corruption does not only result in economic losses, it also affects (and 
is shaped by) the social structure. Many studies have highlighted the dynamic role of 
corruption in accentuating caste fault lines, and have explained how upper castes dominate 
state bureaucracy and at the same time exhibit hostility towards agricultural laborers, 
especially the low-caste Dalits and Adivasis (see Roy, 2013; Corbridge et al, 2005). 
Furthermore, they argue that with the prevalence of corruption in welfare schemes, the locus 
of power has shifted further in the favor of the upper caste people (Tsujita etal, 2010; Batni, 
2014). In the context of Bihar province of India, it is claimed that caste-based politics (from 
1990-2005) not only weakened the upper-caste dominated state bureaucracy but also gave rise 
to extra-governmental actors and institutionalised petty corruption (Roy, 2013; Witsoe, 2012). 
However, the present ruling dispensation of Bihar has initiated various governance reforms 
measures to curb corruption, and provide for efficient delivery of public services to the rural 
poor (see Singh and Stern, 2013). The province has also been applauded as the most 
successful in terms of its anti-corruption efforts (see Debroy and Bhandari, 2012). However, it 
is also claimed that the reforms initiated by the present regime (since 2005) targeting the 
lowest caste groups are politically motivated without any significant help to the poor (see 
Kumar and Ranjan, 2009; Gupta, 2010). Further, studies have showed how the Musahars (the 
lowest among all caste groups in Bihar) suffer from institutional discrimination, and have 
been insulated from the benefits of welfare programmes (Hernandez-Agramonte et al., 2008; 
Hassan 2014). In some parts of the state these people have responded to caste-based 
discrimination through adherence to violent ultra-left militant struggle (see Kunnath, 2012; 
Jaoul, 2011). However, there is scarce empirically grounded research on how low-caste poor 
(such as the Musahars) respond to internationally funded civil society endeavors of 
mobilization against petty corruption, and the ways this mobilization is affected by the overall 
political will of the present ruling dispensation. This thesis aims to explore the dynamics of 
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poor people’s mobilization against petty corruption, and in turn, contribute to the debates on 
the role of civil society in curbing corruption.  
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical frameworks which best elucidate anti-corruption tools are those of ‘demand 
and supply sides reforms’ and ‘social accountability’. In the demand-supply framework, the 
demand side reforms pertain to tools which ensure citizens’ empowerment; and the supply 
side reforms aim at creating efficient and responsive governance. On the other hand, the 
‘social accountability’ framework aims to ensure state accountability for better service 
delivery through availability of reliable and adequate information to the citizens (World Bank, 
2004). This framework was adopted by the World Bank for tackling corruption in developing 
countries. Both the frameworks envisage an enabling environment as a necessary condition to 
yield results. It is argued that demand and supply strategies must be aligned to the context 
specificities in order to yield dividends (see Birner, 2007). Therefore it reiterates the maxim 
‘one size does not fit all’. Further, social accountability framework exhibits certain drawbacks 
in the form of unprecedented rise in the expectation of the people, elite capture and 
possibilities of state actors being threatened at times. To overcome these drawbacks, it is 
argued that ‘demand side’ reforms have to be supplemented with ‘supply side reforms’ to 
create an enabling environment for ensuring state accountability.  
However, in the context of India, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to examine how the 
anti-corruption measures unfold at the ground level. Furthermore, an empirical investigation 
becomes more pertinent and stimulating for the areas which are witnessing a process of 
transformation towards good governance after a sustained period of bad governance. This 
thesis is an attempt in that direction. It conducts an empirical investigation in alignment with 
these theoretical frameworks to analyse how governance reforms unfold at the ground level. 
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Overall this thesis aims to understand the dynamics of some of the major demand and the 
supply side governance reforms in curtailing petty corruption, and identify the enabling 
environment for its success. For this thesis, the demand side reforms under the preview are the 
civil society led mobilization, involvement of users committees in effective delivery of 
welfare services, community participation, right to information and public services 
legislation; and the supply side reforms are strict monitoring, severe punishment, and the 
perception of the delivery agents. How these reforms unfold in the context of a state that has 
witnessed political will for achieving the objectives of good governance is the main focus of 
analysis of this thesis.  
1.8  Methodology 
 
The research entailed in the thesis mainly employs qualitative methods of data collection. 
However, for one of its objectives related to the unraveling of the perception of the future 
civil servants from Bihar, it uses the quantitative tool of experimental bribery game. Overall, 
it relies on two sets of data: first, a review of primary and secondary material, which 
comprises the government publications, documents and policy guidelines on transparency and 
accountability in welfare schemes, publications of International Donor Agencies and 
newspaper clippings. Second, primary data generated through direct observation; semi-
structured interviews; informal conversations with key stakeholders; process net-mapping; 
focus group interviews and experimental games. 
For the first objective of examining the role of the civil society organization in mobilizing the 
people against petty corruption in rural Bihar, the research comprised an in-depth case study 
of a grassroots organization. Case-study method is chosen as it helps in capturing the 
complexity of the object of study (Stake, 1995). The selection of the grassroots organization is 
contingent upon two major aims of enquiry.  First, the mobilization must be of the poorest of 
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and traditionally deprived caste groups in rural areas. Second, the mobilization must aim 
against petty corruption in welfare schemes and, in turn, ensures effective delivery of public 
services. In keeping with these aims, an NGO working with Musahars (the poorest and the 
lowest caste group in Bihar) and leading a collective struggle against petty corruption was 
chosen. The selected NGO has been active in the rural areas in Motihari district of Bihar since 
2003.The data is collected from a field study conducted in nine Musahar tolas (or hamlets); 
six of the nine tolas are purposefully selected based on the suggestions of the NGOs 
volunteers as the most effective examples of grassroots mobilization. Three additional tolas 
are randomly selected. Given the nature of the subject in question, the identity of the 
respondents is withheld and pseudonyms are used for the names of the villages. The data 
collection involves informal conversations and semi-structured interviews with 87 (Musahar) 
villagers across these nine hamlets, individually as well as in groups. Additionally, 
information is gathered from NGOs volunteers and ex-members of rural local bodies on the 
flow of funds in welfare schemes. The methods of direct observation and semi-structured 
interviews are used as enquiries pertaining to corruption are very difficult to obtain. It is 
common understanding that stakeholders are very reluctant to provide any information about 
bribery and embezzlement. Therefore, in the past, data pertaining to corruption involved 
people perception surveys (see Transparency International Report; Centre for Media Studies 
findings). Yet, to understand the dynamics of corruption, critical information from the 
stakeholders is required. Hence, rapport formation followed by in-depth interviews with the 
key informants and participant observation are used for the purpose of this thesis. The 
conversations were not recorded but notes were taken immediately after the interviews. 
However, on some occasions the author is also able to take notes during the conversations. 
Many of the incidents narrated by the respondents are based on their memories. The thesis 
acknowledges the limitations of methodology involving ‘recalling of the events from the past’ 
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(Patai 1998). Further, as a large network of functionaries are involved in the delivery of public 
programmes, identification of key delivery agents and their relative importance is crucial 
before proceeding with the in-depth interviews. For this purpose, process net-map is used. 
Process net-mapping is also vital for identifying the informal process which does not find any 
mention in the official books. It also helps in locating the point of leakages and facilitates the 
respondents in explaining its attributes in greater details; which becomes very crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of corruption. With the help of it, the relative influence of various 
actors along the delivery chains and possible loopholes in delivery mechanisms are identified.  
For the second objective of exploring the dynamics of anti-corruption reforms at the 
grassroots level, the delivery of services through the Integrated Children Development 
Schemes (ICDS) under the governance reforms is examined. This scheme is chosen as it is the 
largest public nutritional programme of the state. The choice of the district was dependent on 
two factors. First, the nutritional status of children in this district was close to the state 
average. This was ascertained on the basis of the district household survey (2002-04) on 
reproductive and child health. Second, the familiarity of the author in terms of area and local 
dialect, which proved crucial in establishing rapport with frontline workers, government 
officials and members of rural and urban local bodies. The names of the district, villages, and 
localities have been withheld to protect the identity of the respondents. A total of 10 delivery 
centres (7 urban and 3 rural) were selected purposefully on the basis of the frontline workers’ 
willingness to share information and insights into the functioning of the ICDS. The method 
includes semi-structured and conversational interviews with different stakeholders, direct 
observation of delivery centres, and participatory mapping with key informants to understand 
the flow of funds as well as power relations among stakeholders.  Though a small sample size 
of 10 delivery centres are too low from making any generalised observation, close encounters 
with the respondents helps in unravelling the dynamics of service delivery under the reformed 
                                   
  
 
38 
 
system. Further, wherever possible, the information is verified using triangulation for quality 
assurance but the author recognizes the limitation of gathering data on sensitive topics such as 
misappropriation of funds, corruption or dynamics of senior-subordinate relationships in 
governmental programmes. The author acknowledges both the reluctance of respondents to 
speak freely about some of these issues and the problems in cross-checking the information 
provided by the respondents solely on the basis of official records or registers (which are 
often forged).  The use of formal interview schedules is avoided as government functionaries 
are either afraid of putting anything on record or tend to give set (readymade) answers to 
questions posed to them in a formal manner. 
For the third objective of exploring the perception of the aspiring civil servants ( future 
bureaucrats) on corruption, the tools of experimental bribery games and focus group 
interviews aware employed. Experimental bribery game is used for its advantage of stealthy 
approach; the participants do not perceive it as a real life situation and play on the basis of 
their instincts and calculations. Further, it also allows an empirical examination of the bribery 
behaviour. Through this experimental game, the impacts of the most prevalent components of 
the anti-bribery tools are examined on the bribery behaviour of the future bureaucrats. For 
these games, 36 candidates were chosen from two different preparatory centres for the civil 
services.  These centres are from Delhi, as it is the most sought after city for the preparations 
of the civil services examinations. Further, for the close approximation, the candidates who 
passed their first level of screening test for the civil services examination were chosen. It was 
very challenging to persuade the coaching institutes and the candidates for participating in the 
experimental games. Therefore, the selection of the coaching institutes is solely based on their 
readiness and the selections of the candidates are based on their voluntarism. Further details 
on the games are presented in the third chapter of this thesis. 
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In addition to the experimental bribery game, focus group discussions were also carried out 
because of the following advantages: First, it provides the opportunity to find information 
based on interactions among the members. Secondly, these discussions provide 
comprehensive knowledge about what, why and how people think over an issue (Kitzinger, 
1995). Thirdly, it does not only provide useful information about people’s attitude and 
perspectives but also provide with opportunities to seek clarifications on it (Kreuger, 1995). 
Fourthly, it also explains why individuals behave in a particular way (Rabiee, 2004). The 
theme of the Focus-group discussion was ‘corruption in the civil services’. Deliberations were 
made on the broad topic of ‘why’ and ‘how’ of corruption.  Notes were made by the 
‘observers’ during the course of discussion.The data collection for all the conversations took 
place in the language in which the responds were versed with. Therefore, Hindi, Bhojpuri and 
English were used. All are translated into English before quoting in the thesis. 
1.9  Why Bihar?  
 
Bihar was chosen as the site of enquiry on account of its unique governance environment. Not 
a long time ago, the state was considered as one of the most backward and ill-governed states 
in India. It was also identified as the most corrupt state in India in terms of petty corruption 
(Transparency International India, 2005).
9
 For many observers, the governance situation in 
Bihar characterized utter lawlessness, extreme poverty, and rampant corruption in public 
dealings (see Polygreen, 2010)
10
.  Not only that, it also ranked at the bottom of the table in 
terms of human and economic development indicators (Dreze and Sen, 2013). This poor 
governance largely affected the poorer citizens as over two-fifths of its total population was 
                                                     
9http://archive.transparency.org/regional_pages/asia_pacific/newsroom/news_archive2/india_corruptio
n_study_2005.  (Accessed 12 September 2014) 
10Polygreen, Lydia (2010) ‘Turnaround of India State could serve as a Model’. The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/world/asia/11bihar.html?_r=0 (Viewed on 7 April 2015) 
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below the official poverty line in 2005 coupled with worst figures in terms of literacy, 
student-teacher ratio, immunisation and electrification in the entire country.
11
  
However, in 2005, with the change of regime in Bihar, ‘good governance’ emerged as the key 
strategy and goal for the new political establishment headed by the Chief Minister, Nitish 
Kumar. Among the several governance reform initiatives, curbing corruption was determined 
to be the most important strategy for ensuring good governance. In its effort to curb 
corruption, the regime instituted several governance reforms with the overall aim of providing 
transparent, effective and responsible governance in the state (see Stern and Singh, 2013). 
These reforms include the provisions for stringent punishment, speedy trials of cases 
involving corruption and promulgation of laws ensuring timely delivery of public services. 
Further, these efforts of the provincial government of Bihar were also complemented by some 
recent federal level legislations (e.g. ‘Right to Information’) enacted by the central 
government in order to ensure transparency and accountability in public dealings. 
Furthermore, international development agencies, such as the UK’s Department for 
International Development, (hereafter DFID) also supported the good governance reforms 
initiatives with the mission to minimize corruption in Bihar. As a result, the state is conferred 
the top-most position among all the other states in terms of anti-corruption efforts (see 
Bhandari and Debroy, 2011). It is claimed that the state has made a swift transition from 
being an epitome of ‘misgovernance’ to an emerging model of ‘good governance’ (Singh and 
Stern, 2013).  The claims of this journey from that of the most corrupt to being one of the best 
governed states makes it an ideal site for the enquiries of this thesis. 
1.10 Significance of the study 
 
                                                     
11 http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/unpacking-the-bihar-story/1177443/. (Accessed 24 April 
2014) 
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The relevance of this study rests on the following points: 
First, the debates on anti-corruption struggle in India are largely middle class-centric, and 
have been comprehensively covered by the print and the electronic media (Harindranath and 
Khorana, 2014). On the other hand, the plight of the rural poor in relation to rent-seeking by 
local bureaucrats has received little attention either in the mainstream media or in academic 
literature. While the commentators on Bihar have claimed the success of the governance 
reforms in creating an enabling environment for the efficient delivery of public services (see 
Mukherji and Mukherji, 2012; Singh and Stern, 2013), there is very little documentation on 
the ways the poor people are mobilised to respond to the illicit demands of the government 
officials (Singh, 2013).The case of examining the dynamics of a civil society led anti-
corruption mobilization among the poorest citizens in Bihar would contribute to the scant 
literature on how rural poor mobilize themselves  against petty corruption in India. 
Second, it is well acknowledged that nutritional support programmes have failed to deliver in 
India on account of the prevalence of leakages and petty corruption (Fraker, Neil, & Ronald, 
2013; Nayak and Saxena, 2006). As Bihar is home to the largest number of malnourished 
children in the country, it becomes imperative to explore how the recent governance reforms 
have impacted one of the biggest public programmes (ICDS) in delivering nutrition to 
children. There is scarcity of studies that explore how the street level bureaucrats or frontline 
workers have responded to these governance reforms and to what extent they are able to 
circumvent new laws and legislations (see Rodgers and Rodgers, 2011). By exploring the 
dynamics of corruption at the delivery level of this nutritional programme, this thesis aims to 
contribute to the overall literature on fighting malnutrition through good governance reforms. 
Third, while the public discourse in India recognises the widespread corruption in public 
services, there is a lack of academic exploration of ‘what’ and ‘how’ of corruption from the 
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sole perspective of civil servant or the ‘bribe takers’. Furthermore, there is dearth of studies 
which examine the attitudes of the civil servants on the issues of bribery and corruption. This 
gap acquires critical status; given the fact that the success of any anti-corruption reforms is 
contingent upon the kind of impact it has on the mind-set of the delivery agents. Therefore, it 
becomes important to understand and explore the attitudes of the aspiring civil servants 
towards corruption as it would be instrumental in redefining the anti-corruption endeavours of 
the country. By exploring the attitude of the future civil servants towards corruption and 
empirically examining their bribery behaviour, this thesis is probably the first study of its kind 
to undertake such an enquiry in the context of India.  
1.11  Thesis Layout 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
presents an in-depth case study of a civil society led mobilisation of the poorest against petty 
corruption in Bihar province. Chapter 3 explains how governance reforms unfold at the 
ground level in the delivery of services under the ‘Integrated Child Development Schemes’ in 
Bihar. Chapter 4 presents the findings from the experimental bribery games and focus group 
discussions with the civil services aspirants from Bihar and analyses their perceptions on 
bribery and corruption. The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 5 discusses the overall results 
from the previous three chapters, and outlines the main conclusions of the study. It further 
elucidates what happens when a poor performing state like Bihar adopts governance reforms 
for improving the services, and presents some policy recommendations on curbing corruption 
in public dealings in India. 
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2 Chapter Two: Can pro-poor governance reforms reduce corruption 
for the poorest? A tale of grassroots mobilization against rent-seeking in 
rural Bihar 
 
ABSTRACT 
In India, corruption, exclusion from welfare schemes, and the denial of rights to the rural 
poor have long been commonplace. Critical accounts of development policy and practice 
advocate the need for pro-poor governance reforms as well as effective mobilization of the 
poor for exercising their rights and entitlements. However, there is a dearth of empirical work 
which may enable us to address the following questions: What are the dynamics of such 
mobilization strategies in the environment of pro-poor governance reforms? How does it 
affect local power relations as well as rent-seeking by the state officials? And what are the 
challenges involved in the sustenance of civil society led struggles for the poorest and 
outcastes against corruption? This paper addresses these questions in the context of Dalit 
mobilization by a grassroots organisation in Bihar, one of the poorest provinces, which has 
recently initiated pro-poor governance reforms. It explains what has or hasn’t worked (and 
why) for the poorest and outcastes in terms of their dealings with public officials. The paper 
argues that pro-poor governance reforms and welfare schemes on their own do not yield 
dividends in the absence of both civil society led mobilization and political will of the ruling 
dispensation.  
Keywords: Musahars, Good Governance, Petty Corruption, Civil Society 
Organizations, Bihar 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Corruption has emerged as an important element of the current political discourse in India.  It 
is considered as the biggest challenge in terms of governance in contemporary India (Quah, 
2008; Gupta, 2001). Commentators of Indian polity have for long talked about the prevalence 
                                   
  
 
51 
 
of corruption in almost all the spheres of public life (see Kohli, 1975; Vittal, 2012; Gouveal et 
al, 2013). In popular understanding, while corruption in general refers to the abuse of public 
offices for personal gains (Johnston, 1996), ‘petty corruption’ refers to the street-level or 
routine corruption which citizens encounter in their regular interactions with public officials, 
and where in the sums involved are rather modest (Riley, 1999).
12
 There is a common 
perception that petty corruption in India is deeply ingrained into the system of governance, 
and that rent-seeking by governmental machinery has become the rule rather than the 
exception.
13
 The problem of petty corruption is also deeply interlinked with the caste system, 
especially in rural areas. The poor, low-caste and vulnerable seem to be most affected by   
petty corruption in India as they are most likely to be pressurized into paying bribes and least 
likely to receive returns from doing so (Batni, 2014). Significantly, governmental welfare 
schemes meant for these communities very often do not reach them and if they do, it is only in 
parts as a result of various extractions in delivery chains.
14
 Moreover, the socio-economic 
structures prevailing at the village level determine the distribution of benefits of public funds 
and are likely to perpetuate inequality (Tsujita et al, 2010). Thus the prevalence of petty 
corruption, especially in the welfare schemes for the poor and its intrinsic relationship with 
                                                     
12
 The focus of this paper is restricted to the problems of petty corruption faced by the rural poor in 
their dealings with public officials. For a general discussion on the definitions and forms of corruption, 
see Jain (2001) and Johnston (1996). 
13
 In political economy approaches, rent-seeking implies to extraction of uncompensated value from 
others without making any contribution to productivity (see Kreuger, 1974). The authors in this paper 
use the term rent-seeking in common parlance, and interchangeably with petty corruption. This may 
include simple bribery and remuneration that bureaucrats demand for performing the tasks that they 
are supposed to do, especially in welfare schemes.   
14
 The Transparency International’s ‘Survey of India’s Petty Corruption’ suggests that government 
spends $8.5 billion annually on rural poor but most of it disappears on the way (Transparency 
International, 2005) 
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the local power relations, often based on caste system, pose considerable challenge for 
developmental actors.
15
  
While the problem of petty corruption is a pan-Indian phenomenon, certain states are 
considered to be the most affected─ Bihar being one of them. For many observers, the 
situation in Bihar, until recently, was characterized by ‘jungle raj’ (or utter lawlessness), 
extreme poverty, and rampant corruption in public dealings (see Polgreen, 2010). Just a few 
years ago, Bihar was adjudged to be the most corrupt state in India in terms of petty 
corruption (Transparency International India, 2005)
16
.  Not only that, it also ranked at the 
bottom of the table in terms of human and economic development indicators (Dreze and Sen, 
2013). Over two-fifths of its total population was below the official poverty line in 2005, 
coupled with worst figures in terms of literacy, student-teacher ratio, immunisation and 
electrification in the entire country.
17
  It is puzzling whether to attribute high corruption to low 
development or vice versa. What is clear is that it is the poorer citizens who suffer the most 
from rent seeking by state officials (Gupta, 2012).  
In 2005, with the change of regime in Bihar, ‘good governance’ emerged as the key strategy 
and goal for the new political establishment headed by the then Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar. 
Among the several governance reform initiatives, curbing corruption was determined to be the 
most important strategy for ensuring good governance. The efforts of the provincial 
government of Bihar are complemented by recent federal level legislation (e.g. ‘Right to 
Information’) enacted by the Indian government in order to ensure transparency and 
accountability in public dealings. International development agencies, such as the UK’s 
                                                     
15
 In rural Bihar, 64 per cent of the Scheduled Caste (SC) (or former ‘untouchables’) population falls 
below the official poverty line- the highest among all the states in India 
(http://socialjustice.nic.in/socialg0405.php) (Accessed 8 February 2015) 
16http://archive.transparency.org/regional_pages/asia_pacific/newsroom/news_archive2/india_corrupti
on_study_2005.  (Accessed 12 September 2014) 
17 http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/unpacking-the-bihar-story/1177443/. (Accessed 24 April 
2014) 
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Department for International Development, (hereafter DFID) are also supporting good 
governance reforms with the mission to minimize corruption in Bihar─ a state that is 
considered to have recently made a swift transition from being an epitome of  ‘jungle raj’ or 
‘misgovernance’ to an emerging model of ‘good governance’ (Singh and Stern, 2013). Yet, 
there is a dearth of empirical studies that can trace the impact of governance reforms and 
enabling legislations on petty corruption, especially from the perspective of the poorest 
citizens in one of the poorest regions of India. This paper is an attempt in that direction.  
In the overall debates on corruption and good governance, it is imperative to question whether 
civil society organizations, especially the ones working towards the mobilization of the poor 
and the low caste can play a catalytic role in the fight against petty corruption in welfare 
schemes. It can be argued that the new (welfare) regime in India, which began in 2004 with 
the left-front supported coalition government at the center, the unfolding of the state 
sponsored rural employment schemes (e.g. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) 
as well as universal health and education schemes (e.g. National Rural Health Mission and the 
‘Right to Education’) have limited to some extent the role of NGOs as developmental service 
providers. We can observe that a shift in the role of civil society organizations is taking 
place─ from service providers in the 1990s to that of creating awareness about rights based 
legislations, policy advocacy and mobilization more recently (Chandhoke, 2012). As 
Waghmore (2012) notes, international civil society actors have also started to engage directly 
with Dalit (former ‘untouchable’ castes) movements at the grassroots. Moreover, civil society 
has gone beyond its traditional role of watchdog to holding the government accountable by 
means of social auditing, mass mobilization and awareness building. Petty corruption being 
one of the biggest challenges to ensuring good governance for poorer citizens, the new role of 
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civil society organisations is also directed towards checking rent-seeking by local officials.
18
 
Indeed civil society was instrumental in creating pressure for the landmark ‘Right to 
Information Act’ in 2005 (Dubochet, 2012). While the impression is gaining ground that a 
strong and vibrant civil society is instrumental in curbing corruption, there is a lack of 
sufficient empirical work to unravel the potential of civil society organizations in curbing 
petty corruption in the countryside. Furthermore, and as Themudo (2013) argues, we have 
only a limited understanding of the actual mechanisms by which it can engage in effective 
mobilization of the poor against rent-seeking. This paper sets out to provide an empirical 
account of such an intervention by a civil society organization in the villages of Bihar. While 
scholars have in the past analysed the role of civil society organisations in mobilising the poor 
in different provinces of India (e.g. Kamat, 2002; Sahoo, 2013; Waghmore, 2012), this issue 
has largely remained unexplored in the context of contemporary Bihar, which is witnessing 
governance reforms led by a political leadership striving to reduce petty corruption in public 
dealings. 
How do civil society organizations go about mobilizing the poorest of the poor against petty 
corruption, especially in the climate of ‘good governance’? What are the underlying 
mechanisms of such struggles? What are the enabling conditions for the initiation and 
sustenance of these struggles? How effective are these struggles from the perspective of the 
village poor? What are the limitations and challenges involved in such interventions? These 
are some analytical questions addressed in this paper on the basis of an in-depth case study of 
a grassroots organization called the Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra (hereafter SSEVK), 
active in Motihari district of Bihar. The organization is active since 2003 and is specifically 
working with the Musahar caste group, considered as village outcastes. The paper analyses 
                                                     
18 Recently, a political party called the AAP (Aam Admi Party) has emerged from a civil society led 
anti-corruption movement, which has brought the issue of corruption to the centre-stage of politics in 
India. 
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the anti-corruption initiatives of the organisation, the strategies adopted for mobilizing the 
poor and low castes against rent-seeking by local bureaucracy, and the effects of such 
interventions on both the overall dynamics of corruption and local power relations. It suggests 
that the SSEVK has played an important role in reducing the plight of the Musahars to some 
extent by means of collective mobilization. The paper identifies the challenges involved in the 
prolonged fight against rent seeking and reduction of corruption, especially because of the 
local officials’ ability to circumvent the system as well as the absence of second rung of 
leadership in the activist organization. It argues that good governance reforms and pro-poor 
welfare schemes on their own do not yield dividends in the absence of both civil society led 
mobilization and political will of the ruling dispensation.  
The relevance of this study rests on two significant points. First, the debates on corruption in 
India are largely urban-centric. The role of urban civil society especially that of the ‘India 
Against Corruption’19 (commonly known as Anna Hazare movement) has been 
comprehensively covered by the print and the electronic media. Some have highlighted the 
urban middle-class nature of anti-corruption struggle (Harindranath and Khorana, 2013). 
However, the plight of rural poor in relation to rent-seeking by local bureaucrats has received 
little attention in either the mainstream media or in academic literature. Second, the present 
regime in Bihar has instituted reforms for ensuring transparency and accountability by means 
of rights based legislations and stringent anti-corruption measures, which in turn, have created 
an enabling environment for civil society organizations to fight against corruption on the 
behalf of the poor. These two issues motivate us to explore the potential as well as challenges 
of civil society activism in curbing rent-seeking in the countryside of supposedly one of the 
most ‘corrupt’ and ‘backward’ states in India.  
                                                     
19 ‘India Against Corruption’ became a very popular urban civil society movement in 2011-2012. It 
was led by a veteran Gandhian, Anna Hazare for a strong anti-corruption legislation. 
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The paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides a short note on methodology 
and data collection. The second section gives the background to the study, which includes a 
discussion on the caste dynamics of rural Bihar, the plight of the Musahars, and the anti-
corruption efforts of the present regime. The third section presents the case study of the 
SSEVK, its inception and expansion, strategies used for mobilizing the Musahars through 
creation of a community based organization called Musahar Vikas Manch (hereafter MVM), 
the changing dynamics of caste relations at the village level, and the overall effect of this 
mobilization in curbing rent-seeking by local officials. The fourth section explains the 
limitations and challenges of anti-corruption struggles in rural Bihar, the strategies used by 
the local officials to circumvent rules and regulations governing transparency in welfare 
schemes, the challenges of the civil society movements and the problems ahead as seen in the 
case of the SSEVK. The main findings from the case study are presented in the concluding 
section. 
2.2  Methodology and Data Collection 
 
The data was collected from a field study conducted in nine Musahar tolas (or hamlets) of 
Motihari District of Bihar over five months in 2013.
20
 The authors primarily relied on two sets 
of data for this paper: first, a review of primary and secondary material, which comprises the 
publications of the SSEVK, and Actionaid India and DFID (the sponsoring agencies), 
newspaper clippings, and government publications, documents and policy guidelines on 
transparency and accountability in welfare schemes. Second, primary data was generated 
through direct observation, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with key 
stakeholders. In-depth interviews were conducted with the leader and six volunteers of the 
                                                     
20
 In rural Bihar, village neighbourhoods are generally divided along caste lines and Dalits are 
segregated from the areas inhibited by the ‘upper’ as well as ‘middle’ caste groups. A Musahars tola is 
normally located at the fringe of a village. The SSEVK is active in about 125 Musahar tolas of 
Motihari. 
                                   
  
 
57 
 
SSEVK, the president and secretary of the MVM, two (Musahar) ex-members of Panchayat, 
and five government officials (two Vikas Mitra, two Block Development Officers and one 
District Panchayat officer) in Motihari. Informal conversations and semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with 87 (Musahar) villagers across the nine hamlets individually as well as in 
groups. The conversations with villagers did not start with a fixed set of questions. New 
questions emerged from within on-going conversations; from previous conversations with the 
respondents in other tolas; from conversations with the SSEVK staff, and from the 
information gathered through other sources (reports, newspapers, publications etc.). The first 
author also attended the ActionAid organized ‘feedback session’ at the SSEVK office in 
October 2013. Additionally, information was gathered from the SSEVK volunteers and ex-
members of Panchayat on the flow of funds in welfare schemes, the relative influence of 
various actors along the delivery chain and possible loopholes in delivery mechanisms, with 
the help of participatory mapping tools. All the conversations took place in Hindi and 
Bhojpuri and have been translated into English before quoting in the paper.  
The authors purposefully selected six of the nine tolas for study in order to understand the 
effectiveness as well as the challenges involved in mobilization against rent-seeking. These 
six tolas were suggested by the SSEVK volunteers for they considered them to be the most 
effective examples of Musahar mobilization. Three additional tolas were randomly selected 
by the authors. The first author made several visits to all the study hamlets. Initial visits to the 
tolas were made along with the SSEVK workers but later on the first author on his own made 
subsequent visits and talked to the key informants. Many of the incidents narrated by the 
respondents were based on their memories. The conversations were not recorded but notes 
were taken immediately after the interviews. However, on some occasions the author was able 
to take notes during the conversations. The paper acknowledges the limitations of 
methodology involving ‘recalling of the events from the past’ (Patai 1998). Given the nature 
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of the subject in question, the identity of the respondents is withheld and pseudonyms are 
used for the names of the villages.  
2.3  Background: caste dynamics, civil society and governance 
reforms in Bihar 
 
Bihar, one of the most highly populated and economically backward states, is situated in 
eastern India. Approximately 89 percent of the population in the state resides in villages 
(Census of India, 2011)
21
. In rural Bihar, local power relations are deeply intertwined with 
caste hierarchies, and power and dominance is linked with the issue of rights over resources 
like land and water (Kunnath, 2012). The distribution of land is highly skewed in favor of 
traditional ‘upper castes’ and some agrarian caste groups (e.g. Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris), 
which are also the ‘middle castes’, vis-à-vis Dalits (former ‘untouchables’) and upper 
(general) castes.
22
 There is, indeed, a great impact of this skewed distribution of land on the 
social, cultural and political life of rural Bihar (Yang, 1998). Traditionally, Dalits have not 
only experienced deprivation in terms of natural and physical endowments but have also 
suffered social and political exclusion (Bhatia, 2005). However, within the broad category of 
Dalits, there are internal differentiations. Some of the caste groups within the Dalits have 
remained more vulnerable than others. Musahars, whose traditional occupation is agricultural 
labor, is one such caste group. They are described as ‘Dalits among Dalits’ (Kumar, 2006), 
and they face greater subordination than some of the other Dalit castes (Kunnath, 2012).  
                                                     
21 http://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/bihar.html. Accessed 24/03/2014. 
22
 The official classification of castes in Bihar stands as following: the upper castes are referred as 
‘general’ castes, the middle castes are referred as the ‘Other Backward Classes’ (with an internal 
differentiation of ‘backward’ and ‘most backward’), the former ‘untouchables’ are referred as 
Scheduled Castes (with an internal differentiation of ‘Dalits’ and ‘Mahadalits’). The SC population 
constitute more than 70 per cent of all landless agricultural labourers in Bihar, and the SC land holders 
are largely petty cultivators having the average size holding of 0.4 hectare (Prasad, 2007)  
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The general perception in Bihar is that the state bureaucracy and police are not just dominated 
by upper castes; they also favor the landowning communities, and exhibit hostility towards 
the agricultural laborers, especially the Dalits and Adivasis (Roy, 2013; Corbridge et al, 
2005). An important factor in the caste dynamics of Bihar is the phenomenal rise of backward 
caste politics, most prominently signified by the election of Lalu Prasad Yadav, a backward 
caste leader who became the Chief Minister of the state in 1990 and (with intermittent rule by 
his wife Rabri Devi) remained in power till 2005.  There began a serious attempt to weaken 
the largely upper-caste dominated state bureaucracy by means of bolstering middle-men and 
local bahubalis (literally, henchmen), devoted to the ruling party (Roy, 2013). As a result, 
there was rise of extra-governmental actors in and around government offices. These 
intermediaries and brokers offered to expedite clients’ paperwork; payment for this service is 
later shared with the relevant officials who are complicit in the scheme (Witsoe, 2012a). Such 
practices contributed to the institutionalization of petty corruption with officials feeling more 
or less secure under a system dominated by influential middle-men closely connected to the 
ruling party. In addition, the power of the local bureaucracy was curtailed at the cost of 
strengthening of democratically elected rural local bodies or Panchayats (Witsoe, 2012b). The 
ruling party gave the slogan of ‘Vikas nahin samman chahiye’, which can be translated as 
‘Respect first development later’ (cited in Desai, 2013). Interestingly, while the backward 
castes got political representation and voice, not much changed for the Dalits in the state. In 
fact, with the economic and political ascendency of backward and mainly agrarian castes 
(especially, Yadavs), the poverty and exploitation of Dalits intensified (Kunnath, 2012). 
With the change of regime in 2005, the situation of Dalits began to improve. Nitish Kumar, 
the new Chief Minister of the state, while himself belonging to a backward caste (Kurmi), 
created special incentives for the Dalits. He classified 21 out of a total of 22 Dalit 
communities in Bihar as ‘Mahadalits’ (literally, most oppressed), and initiated welfare 
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schemes specifically for them. In part, these moves by the Chief Minister can be seen as 
tactical: while dividing Dalits for political benefits they were intended to increase his support 
base among the Scheduled Castes (see Kumar and Ranjan, 2009).
23
 The government of Bihar 
in 2007 conceptualized an initiative to make special projects and earmark special funds for the 
overall development of Mahadalits. It decided to constitute a commission known as the ‘State 
Mahadalit Commission’, to devise schemes for their economic, social and political 
empowerment. However, it is also argued that the new regime has just tried to reconcile the 
conflict between the traditionally upper caste and the backwardly mobile caste, and very little 
has been done for the downtrodden and the poorest citizens in the rural areas (see Das Gupta, 
2010). More recently, in May 2014, Nitish Kumar has resigned from the post of Chief 
Minister and has appointed Jiten Ram Manjhi, a Musahar leader as the Chief Minister of the 
state. Manjhi is the first Chief Minister from the Mahadalit community in Bihar. Presented 
below is a synoptic description of Musahars in rural Bihar. 
2.3.1 The Plight of Musahars 
 
Historically, Musahars (literally, rat catchers) have remained the poorest caste group among 
the Dalits in Bihar, caught between survival and despair (Hassan 2014). Their destitution can 
be understood from the fact that they were left to eat mice for survival, in the fields where 
they worked as agricultural labourers. The Musahar caste group symbolises a set of 
characteristics embedded with deprivation and social backwardness (Roy, 2013). Socially, 
they are considered as ‘untouchables’ as they often worked as scavengers. Economically, they 
are solely dependent upon the landed class for their survival as they possess either very little 
or no land (Hassan, 2014). Their economic impoverishment is accentuated by perpetual 
                                                     
23 Moreover, in the interviews conducted for this paper, one could sense the animosity these groups 
had with the single left out group from the category of Mahadalits, the Paswans, who have long been 
politically well represented. 
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indebtedness to local landlords and money lenders (Kumar, 2006). Politically, they have not 
been well represented unlike some other Dalit castes in the state (Majid, 2012). In addition, 
they also suffer from institutional discrimination, which insulates them from the benefits of 
various welfare programmes (Hernandez-Agramonte et al., 2008). As a result, not much has 
changed in the economic conditions of Musahars in spite of various welfare schemes 
sponsored by the state (Hassan, 2014)  
It is stated that this miserable situation of the Musahars is on account of their self-image 
which stands constructed by their historical experiences of deprivation and marginalization 
(Singh, 2013). While members of Musahar community have engaged in agitation on the 
questions of caste discrimination, wages and land rights (often with the support of ‘ultra-left’ 
groups) in some parts of Bihar (see Kunnath, 2012; Jaoul, 2011), in Motihari we do not find 
instances of their collective action in the recent times. In the last few years some grassroots 
organizations have taken up the cause of Musahars in Bihar. Some of them run schools for 
their children while others, such as the SSEVK, strive to deconstruct the self-image of 
helplessness by mobilizing them and building awareness about their rights and privileges 
offered to them by the state. It is important to note that the NGO led development in Bihar is 
marred by corruption and misappropriation of development funds. For instance, in 2005 Bihar 
recorded the highest number of blacklisted NGOs in India.
24
 Given the situation, the 
mobilization of Musahars by SSEVK offers a good example for investigating the debates on 
the role and effectiveness of civil society in reducing petty corruption for the poorest citizens 
in rural settings. Before presenting the case study of SSEVK, it is also pertinent to note the 
changes in the governance system that Bihar has witnessed in the past few years.    
                                                     
24 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Bihar-tops-list-of-blacklisted-
NGOs/articleshow/1331810.cms. Accessed 30/05/2014. 
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2.3.2  Bihar: Instituting ‘Good Governance’? 
 
 As mentioned in the introductory section above, the present regime in Bihar after assuming 
office in 2005, has initiated governance reforms and brought about additional legislations for 
time bound service delivery, such as the Right to Public Service’. The government has shown 
intent to tackle corruption in stringent manner by establishing fast-track courts and 
confiscating properties of the erring officers. Moreover, by instituting Chief Minister’s Janta 
Darbar (public hearing of complaints against government) and establishing a telephone 
helpline for accepting applications under the Right to Information Act, the present regime has 
portrayed its seriousness to check corruption in public dealings. In fact, in a recent study on 
corruption in India, Bihar has claimed top position among all the states in anti-corruption 
efforts (Bhandari and Debroy 2012).  
Undoubtedly, these governance reforms have created enabling conditions for reducing 
corruption. However, it is not yet clear exactly how the new rights based legislations and 
administrative reforms are serving the needs of the poorest of the poor. There is also very 
little documentation on the way the poorest people interact with the officials and respond to 
these new developments (Singh, 2013). Furthermore, while the recent governance 
interventions in Bihar have an impact on widespread corruption, it is not known how the 
street level bureaucrats have responded to these governance reforms in Bihar villages and to 
what extent they are able to circumvent new laws and legislations (see Rodgers and Rodgers, 
2011). Arguably, if there is only supply of the tools of good governance (new laws, 
regulations etc.) but the absence of demands (assertion of rights by the beneficiaries); the 
initiative may not yield positive results in terms of reduction in corruption. The poorest 
citizens are likely to be illiterate and unaware of their rights. So how can they exercise their 
rights and avail the benefits of welfare schemes? Here the role of grassroots organizations 
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becomes crucial because they can act as catalysts in mobilizing the village poor and thereby 
put pressure on the local state. The next section explains how SSEVK has worked to mobilize 
the Musahars in Bihar villages and with what results in the struggle against rent-seeking. 
2.4  Grassroots Mobilization and the Fight against Rent-Seeking 
 
Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra (literally, Social Research and Development Centre), a 
grassroots organization situated in Mehsi block of Motihari district of Bihar has been working 
for the empowerment of the Musahars since 2003. The organization is led by Amar Singh, a 
social activist from Motihari district along with a small team of volunteers. The SSEVK in 
2003 received financial support from ActionAid India under the UK’s DFID-sponsored 
Poorest Areas Civil Society Programme (hereafter, PACS), initiated in 2001 with the overall 
objective of reducing poverty by promoting the active role of civil society organisations.
25
 
The programme was to be managed by small civil society organizations (hereafter, CSOs), 
either individually or in co-operation with and under the guidance of a larger CSO. The larger 
CSO was to be referred as the lead and the smaller one as its network partners. In this case, 
the SSEVK acted as the network partner of ActionAid India, the lead organization for the 
PACS. The organizational structure of the PACS is provided below (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Organisational Structure of the Poorest Area Civil Society (PACS) project of DFID, UK   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
25
 Amar Singh established the SSEVK in 1993 with the sole purpose of fighting for the cause of the 
rural poor.  Before getting associated with the ActionAid’s PACS programme, the SSEVK was 
working for the welfare of poor by engaging in activities like health and education in Motihari. 
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Source: Authors’ own illustration 
The PACS’s main strategy was the formation of community-based organisations (hereafter, 
CBOs) which could be trained to create awareness among its members, who in turn, could 
exert sufficient pressure on the government machinery to ensure the effective delivery of 
welfare schemes.  For the implementation of the programme, the SSEVK engaged in 
formation of a CBO among the Musahar community. The idea behind this was that the poor 
themselves should lead their struggle for empowerment. In order to realize this, the SSEVK 
under the guidance of Actionaid, began to mobilize the Musahars under a CBO named 
Musahar Vikas Manch (literally, Musahar Development Forum; hereafter MVM).  
2.4.1  MVM: Mobilising the Musahars 
 
Instituting an organisation for the Musahars was difficult as the community were largely 
reluctant to co-operate with the SSEVK in the beginning. The SSEVK volunteers informed us 
that initially the women seemed more willing to co-operate than their male counterparts. In 
the preliminary surveys conducted by the SSEVK in 2003, the Musahar women cited the 
problem of alcoholism among the males as their main cause of worry because it consumed a 
major portion of their household incomes. Based on this information, the SSEVK workers 
decided to mobilize the women in anti-alcohol campaign. Women were encouraged to form 
groups and help each other in controlling the consumption of alcohol of the Musahar men. 
They started with breaking alcohol bottles bought by their husbands and collectively beating 
their husbands if they returned home drunk. Gradually many more women started joining the 
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groups and SSEVK became a household name among Musahar women in about twenty 
villages of Motihari. In fact, the anti-alcohol campaign became such a success that one of the 
group leaders, Girija Devi was invited to address the 50th convection of the United Nation’s 
Women Empowerment Development Organization in 2006 at New York.
26
 During the course 
of anti-alcohol campaigns women were also convinced to bring their husbands to the SSEVK 
camps in their villages on the pretext that they would be given support to avail the benefits of 
the various welfare schemes of the government without paying bribes. The success of the anti-
alcohol campaign and the incentive to get rid of petty corruption brought many more people 
to attend the camps organized by the SSEVK.  
The initial camps culminated into a mass mobilization on April 14, 2004 when thousands of 
people from the Musahar community in Motihari were invited for a meeting organized by the 
SSEVK and attended by the representatives of ActionAid India (Philipose, 2013). A 
resolution was passed in this meeting to form a CBO, namely Musahar Vikas Manch (MVM), 
which was to be managed by a three tier committee, one each at village, block and district 
levels. After the formation of the MVM, the next task was to educate and train members about 
their rights and the various enabling legislations, especially the Right to Information and the 
Right to Public Services. Moreover, in various committee meetings, it emerged that 
corruption was a major hindrance in accessing the benefits of various welfare schemes. For 
this purpose, efforts were made to engage Musahar youths as volunteers, who were to be 
trained in making use of the various rights based legislations for the benefit of the community. 
Later, these trained youths were to help other members of the MVM with anti-corruption tools 
as well as practical solutions to fight rent-seeking by officials. The training was jointly 
imparted by the members of the SSEVK and Actionaid. The training exercises imbibed the 
volunteers with confidence and enthusiasm and served two basic purposes for the Musahar 
                                                     
26 (Hindustan Times, 11 February 2006 ) 
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community. First, the youths of this community got mobilized to assert their rights, and 
secondly it generated trust among the Musahars towards the SSEVK.  
 From the story of the genesis of the MVM presented above, we can observe that the efforts 
made by the SSEVK resemble the creation of linkages between the micro-tasks of capacity 
building and the macro-tasks of mass mobilization (Fowler, 1997). It also relates to the 
‘second wave of anti-corruption activism’ focusing on petty corruption in anti-poverty 
programmes (Jenkins, 2007). Further, it allows us to examine the potential role of civil society 
in the struggle against corruption in India. It is suggested that civil society organization may 
fail to curb corruption for the poorest and socially excluded because of systemic nature of 
corruption and people’s unwillingness for confrontation (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). Contrary 
to this assertion, in the case of the SSEVK initiated MVM, we see that the poor are willing to 
confront the state as well as engage head on with social evils (e.g. alcoholism) in an enabling 
environment provided by a grassroots organization. Also, that effective mobilization by a 
CBO is possible along caste lines (Musahars in this case). Below we discuss the dynamics of 
petty corruption and assess the extent of positive change brought about by the SSEVK from 
the perspective of the Musahars.   
2.4.2 Corruption stratagem, anti-corruption legislations and SSEVK’s struggle 
 
In order to understand how the volunteers of the SSEVK perceive the problem of corruption 
in various welfare schemes, the authors used a participatory mapping tools which helped in 
identifying the role of key actors involved in the service delivery chain of a rural housing 
scheme called Indira Awas Yojana (hereafter IAY). The leader of the SSEVK, Amar Singh 
informed the first author that in IAY the money is being siphoned off by the officials and 
Panchayat representatives at different stages. Under the new mechanism to prevent leakages, 
the money is to be paid directly into the bank account of the beneficiary. Yet, bank officials 
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demand bribes from beneficiaries to allow the withdrawal of money from their account. 
Without a bribe they refuse to give out the money on the pretext of ‘identity verification’. The 
office of the Block Development officer (BDO) extracts money while allocating funds to the 
beneficiaries and Vikas Mitra
27
 demands bribes for the inclusion of name in the beneficiary 
list. The Mukhiya (elected leader of the village) demands bribes at the time of making the list 
of ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) families in the village. Thus, every actor had their share at 
various stages of the scheme.
28
 A similar kind of situation exists in all the other welfare 
programmes. This was aptly summarised by Amar Singh in the following words: 
The officials demand bribe from poor Musahars in all welfare schemes- be 
it Indira Awas Yojana, Old Age Pension or Public Distribution System.  
[…] The laws made to prevent corruption won’t be effective. If the 
government is really serious about it, they could have brought a 
fundamental change in delivery mechanism. For example, in Indira Awas 
Yojana, they could have built houses for the poor instead of doling out 
money. […] Corruption persists whenever money changes hand.29  
As we can see the issue of rent seeking is pervasive in different welfare schemes for the poor 
and it involves various different actors along the delivery chain. This posed a challenging task 
for the SSEVK when it decided to mobilize the Musahars against petty corruption. To begin 
with, two volunteers were identified from each village by the SSEVK workers for the purpose 
of training in writing applications, information dissemination about various welfare schemes, 
filing complaints, organizing meetings and so on. These volunteers were available for 
                                                     
27Person appointed by the present state government, to be placed at the Panchayat level to act as a 
bridge between the Mahadalits and the Government functionaries 
28
 This problem of corruption in IAY in Bihar has also been taken into cognizance by the Supreme 
Court of India on the basis of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India Report of 2011. 
29 Interview, 6 June 2013 at Mehsi 
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providing constant support to the people in their respective villages so that they need not 
travel to the SSEVK office (situated in Mehsi block). Thus, the presence of volunteers on a 
permanent basis was crucial in providing support and, in turn, in gaining people’s confidence. 
Also, in the beginning they were very cautious as they worked behind the curtains in cases 
involving direct allegations or complaints against any local officials in corruption matters. 
There were frequent meetings with the SSEVK workers to discuss the ways to empower the 
members and keep them moving as a united organisation, as it was realised that many locally 
influential people in the villages were trying to malign the image of the SSEVK and 
undermine their organisation. To keep the morale of the workers and volunteers high, it was 
decided to sing emotive songs both at the beginning and at the end of all the meetings.  
As expected, the initial mobilization efforts met with resistance from many landlords 
belonging to upper castes and agricultural middle castes. They threatened to dismiss Musahar 
labourers from work if they attended the meetings of MVM and SSEVK. Despite these 
challenges,  SSEVK continued to hold frequent meetings in the selected villages and infuse a 
feeling of unity. In these meetings the majority of the time was spent on discussing the 
problems faced by Musahars in availing the benefits of welfare schemes. In one such meeting 
at Kanhi Tola in 2005, the issue of corruption in the housing welfare scheme was discussed. 
Here, it was decided to lodge police complaint against a middle-man, who extracted 30 per 
cent of the allotted money on the pretext of the ‘cut’, for the BDO and Panchayat Sewak 
(Dalit Pahari Special, 2007).  As the accused was very influential, the members of the MVM 
were threatened against filing any complaint against him. With the active support of the 
SSEVK, not only police complaint was filed but attempts were also made to involve the 
media. It exerted considerable pressure on the accused and he returned all the bribe money. 
This incident acted as a watershed, thereby infusing the members of the MVM with new 
found confidence and they began to realise the power of being united. 
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Around the same time (2005) the government also enacted the Right to Information Act 
(RTI). This strengthened the efforts of the SSEVK against rent seeking. They thought they 
could use the new legislation as a potent weapon against the corrupt local officials. In the 
beginning the officials declined to accept the applications filed by the SSEVK volunteers. 
Moreover, these officials were strong and united enough to suppress the demands of the poor 
Musahar villagers. Another important legislation which was passed alongside RTI was the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), which promised 
100 days minimum wages to the rural poor in exchange for labor in public works. This 
legislation brought hope to the Musahars, who were largely unemployed during the lean 
agricultural season and largely underpaid by the local landlords during harvesting period. 
However, Musahars faced challenges in seeking employment under MNREGA scheme. 
Wealthy landed people were against Musahars getting work under MNREGA as they 
correctly believed that, if successful, the scheme would prevent the Musahars from working 
for lower wages in their fields when compared to legal minimum wages being offered under 
the new scheme. As a result, there was a deliberate effort by the landlords in collusion with 
local officials to deprive Musahars of the job cards, essential for seeking employment under 
MNREGA. On top of that there were also incidences of issuance of fake job cards against 
which the officials could siphon off money. This malpractice in MNREGA has also been 
noted in studies on other parts of the country (see Khera, 2011). 
The initial challenges involved in the exercise of both the RTI and MNREGA as outlined 
above instigated the volunteers of SSEVK to initiate a mass action. This involved awareness 
building about filing RTI applications and issuance of job cards. Furthermore, a ‘cycle rally’ 
was organized by 40 volunteers of the SSEVK to spread the message of RTI and MNREGA 
in the villages of Motihari in 2006. They explained to the people what to do when an RTI 
application is not accepted by officials, as well as how to go about seeking employment under 
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MNREGA. These events received attention from the local media as it was reported in all the 
important newspapers of Bihar, thereby infusing the Musahars with enthusiasm and self-
belief. This also reasserted the importance of independent media in anti-corruption efforts, as 
maintained by some scholars (see Themudo, 2013). 
A notable impact of the mass awareness programme, according to the president the MVM was 
that it also bolstered the confidence of the members of the SSEVK and the volunteers of the 
MVM. Rather than acting in guarded manner as in the beginning, they now came out more 
openly in fighting for the cause of the Musahars. An ex-member of Panchayat from the 
Mushar tola of Palsi informed us that the Musahars also began participating in the meetings of 
the Gram Sabhas (rural local bodies) in some villages. They would now openly voice their 
concerns and vote collectively if required. Indeed, it had a reactionary effect in these villages 
as the people of the other castes, including other Dalits, became polarised against the 
Musahars. The effect of this polarisation was not only restricted to the meetings of the Gram 
Sabha but went beyond. In an interview, a Musahar woman recalled an incident from 2007: 
 A member of the [MVM] from my village was arrested by the police 
on a complaint lodged by a person belonging to Mallah
30
 caste. The 
members of the [MVM] surrounded the police station for several 
hours and chanted slogan: Mallah jail aur Musahar Bail (literally, 
grant bail to the Musahar and send the Mallah to jail). When police 
did not respond to their demand, they blocked the train traffic on the 
Delhi-Muzaffarpur route. The incident escalated further as other caste 
groups from the village rallied behind the Mallah and it converted into 
a localised rift between the Musahars and the other castes. It provided 
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the other castes with the opportunity to be united but their unity could 
not sustain for long due to internal differences. On the other side, the 
united efforts of the [MVM] got their member out of the police 
custody.
31
  
This incident brought the aggressive side of MVM to the forefront, which was manifested 
again in an incident where the Musahars ransacked the office of the BDO to demand batteries 
meant for distribution alongwith the radio-sets as part of a government sponsored awareness 
building project devised for the Mahadalits. Furthermore, the SSEVK also decided to 
distribute bags (with MVM printed on them) to the members of the MVM, which they can 
carry while visiting government offices so as to assert their power symbolically. Now 
Musahar women could go with these bags to meet the BDO or even the District Magistrate 
(DM) and they would not be stopped and harassed by the gatekeepers and peons in these 
offices. This is a significant change from the perspective of the poorest and most deprived 
citizens in Bihar because they have for long witnessed harassment and discrimination in 
governmental offices (see Corbridge et al, 2005). Savitri Devi, a Musahar resident 
summarised this change in the following words: 
The behaviour of the police has now changed. They are cautious of 
entering our hamlets. In other governmental offices too no one 
harasses us any longer.
32
 
Alongside the aggressive campaign led by the MVM with the support of the SSEVK in an 
enabling environment provided by rights-based legislations (e.g. RTI), a crucial factor which 
worked in the favour of the SSEVK and Musahars in general was the welfare policy for 
                                                     
31 Excerpts from interview, 22 August 2013 at Chipuliya village. 
32 Interview, 22 July 2013 at village Sirsa. 
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Mahadalits initiated by the Nitish Kumar regime. It is believed that the party in power was 
trying to secure Dalit votes, which were previously consolidated in favor of rival political 
parties. As a result of this change in strategy by the political leadership, the officials also 
avoided directly confronting with Mahadalits, including Musahars. To add more teeth to the 
anti-corruption efforts, the government also instituted the Right to Public Services (RTPS) 
legislation in 2011, guaranteeing citizens a time bound delivery of essential public services. 
But unlike the RTI Act where the Musahars had to resort to mass mobilization for its effective 
usage, RTPS was gladly delivered to them as the officials learnt from their past experiences of 
aggressive confrontation vis-a-vis Musahars.  
Over the years the MVM continued to gain organisational strength on account of constant 
support provided by the SSEVK and funding from ActionAid India. Arguably, the 
empowerment of Musahars was a result of a combination of ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. The 
government provided the ‘pull’ in the form of governance reforms for more transparency and 
accountability as well as by providing incentives for Mahadalits. The SSEVK provided the 
‘push’ by mobilizing the Musahars under the banner of the MVM. On their part, the DFID 
and ActionAid proved instrumental in funding the governance reform initiatives in Bihar and 
at the same time sponsoring programmes like the PACS which enabled the SSEVK and MVM 
in empowering the Musahars in Bihar villages. However, even mobilization strategies 
combined with rights based legislations may not be able to overcome all forms of rent-seeking 
at the local level. Below we present some of the challenges in this regard.  
2.4.3  Why ‘good governance’ reforms and mobilization of the poor may not 
be sufficient in reducing petty corruption? 
 
It is argued, corruption when built into a system is difficult to eradicate (Jenkins and Goetz, 
1999a). We find evidence of systemic corruption in some of the most important welfare 
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schemes meant for the poor. The Public Distribution System (PDS), the flagship programme 
of the government to provide subsidized food grains to the poor is one such programme. 
Under this programme, food grains are distributed through ration shops. It is well established 
that most ration shops do not supply the designated food grains to the targeted population but 
often sell it in the open market (Webb, 2012; Mane, 2006; Ahluwalia, 1993). In order to 
ensure transparency in food distribution, the government may suspend the license of the shop-
keeper if complaints are made by beneficiaries. Consequently the shop remains closed until 
the probe is completed. But as probes usually take three to four months, there is no supply of 
food grains during this period. Our respondents informed us that in many cases the shop 
keeper is reinstated and even if a new dealer is given the license, the food grain for the 
backlog period (when the shop remained closed) is never distributed. Hence, if there is any 
complaint, the poor tend to lose the ration supplies for at least three to four months. It acts as a 
big disincentive for filing complaints against the ration shop dealers and the dealers often 
exploit this situation to their advantage. Sabri Devi, a Musahar resident of village Basman 
informed us: 
The ration shop owner asks us to be contented in whatever little grain we 
are getting. If we complaint against him, we won’t get anything for four 
to five months. He also says that he needs to pay bribes to the higher ups 
in order to get food grains for us.
33
 
Not only in the above stated case of PDS, there are also design deficiencies in other welfare 
schemes. In the MNREGA, there is a provision for tree plantation on public lands. Our 
respondents informed us that the saplings which are provided to the workers are generally of 
very inferior quality and they have very little chance of survival. On top of that there is a 
                                                     
33 Excerpts from interview, 26 June 2013. 
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provision for inspection after three months to check the survival of the planted saplings. 
While these inferior quality saplings have very little chance of survival for three months, even 
if they survive, they are often destroyed due to open grazing by cattle. Moreover, there is no 
provision in the scheme for tree guards or protection. Ironically, the workers are paid for their 
labor only after the inspection is over. As a result, the workers take whatever money is given 
to them. This suggests that there are loopholes in the delivery of schemes which are exploited 
by the corrupt officials and other influential actors. In such situations, even stringent laws or 
effective mobilization of the poor may not be sufficient in tackling corruption. Below we 
discuss some of the challenges involved in mobilization of the poorest against rent seeking in 
rural Bihar on the basis of our study of the SSEVK.  
2.5 The Challenges Ahead  
 
As noted earlier on, with the change of regime in Bihar in 2005, several administrative 
reforms have taken place for effective delivery of public services. With regards to the delivery 
of welfare schemes in rural areas, the office of the BDO is very important. Owing to their 
crucial role the present regime has restructured the offices of BDO by creation of a new cadre 
of service named ‘Bihar Rural Developmental Services’ (BRDS). Until the time the first batch 
of the new BRDS are recruited, the state government has posted the officials from other 
departments for a limited tenure to perform the duties of the BDOs. Although these changes 
seem very promising, their effect is yet to be seen. Moreover, many of the BDOs in the wake 
of likelihood of returning back to their parent departments are trying to siphon off funds as 
quickly as possible. A volunteer of the SSEVK informed us: 
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Some BDOs are trying to make as much money as possible before they 
return to their parent departments where the chances of rent seeking are 
very limited.
34
  
Another change that has taken place recently is the re-strengthening of local bureaucracy vis-
a-vis democratically elected rural local bodies (Panchayats). As mentioned earlier in the 
paper, under the previous regime, deliberate efforts were made by the ruling party to weaken 
the power of local bureaucracy and to strengthen the powers of the Panchayat representatives. 
During that time the villagers always approached the Panchayats for availing the benefits of 
welfare schemes. However, with the new regime’s efforts towards good governance, 
transparency and accountability, some of the additional powers that Panchayats gained earlier 
on (for example, in influencing the processes identification of beneficiaries or disbursement of 
developmental funds) have been streamlined. Now the local officials deal with the 
beneficiaries through Vikas Mitras and not Panchayats. In our interviews with local officials, 
they suggested that the Panchayat representatives are unhappy with these changes as they are 
devoid of their influence. As a consequence, the Panchayat representatives have started to 
blame the present regime of spreading afsarshai (literally, officialdom). The growing tension 
between officials and Panchayats is certainly problematic for the efficient delivery of services 
to the village poor. 
Apart from the problems identified above, there are also certain challenges on the part of the 
SSEVK and MVM in terms of their functioning. Some of these challenges were identified in a 
feedback session with the Actionaid in 2013 that the first author also attended. The Actionaid 
workers indicated that the SSEVK is fully identified with its leader Amar Singh and there is 
                                                     
34 Interview, 2 August 2013 at Chakiya block. This viewpoint is also corroborated by newspaper 
reports which suggest that out of 534 BDOs posted across Bihar, 181 are currently under probe, 
mostly for alleged misappropriation of funds for the IAY (India Express, 10 December 2012) 
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no second rung of leadership. Another problem is that the MVM volunteers, especially at the 
district level, are exhibiting authoritarian behaviour, and there is lack of participatory decision 
making, both within the MVM and the SSEVK. The ActionAid team found in the feedback 
session that, with the growing membership of the MVM, leaders have started feeling more 
indolent and are not that serious about the village meetings when compared to earlier times. 
The procedures of the meetings are also not recorded so the volunteers do not have a clear 
perspective on the decided course of action and consequently, in the next meeting, the 
members do not have any basis to compare their progress with regard to their work. 
Furthermore there is also a need to focus more on the skills development of the members as 
solely relying on the entitlement and the welfare measures of the government is insufficient 
for their empowerment. In addition, the unduly aggressive behaviour of the members of the 
MVM might turn out to be detrimental in the long run especially if the new regime is not as 
sympathetic to their cause as the present one. An official at a BDO office warned us about the 
fate of Musahars in the following words: 
The present government is very sympathetic towards the Mahadalits. 
When this government gets out of power, the Musahars might have to 
pay heavy price for their assertiveness […]35 
We also noticed an over dependence of the MVM on the SSEVK for all their work, which in 
turn is dependent on the funding from the Actionaid. It is a concern especially after the 
funding from the donors dries-up. So, if the MVM does not become self-sufficient in decision 
making and paying honorarium to volunteers, it will face considerable problems after the 
support from the SSEVK comes to an end. Further, there is a need for the MVM to connect to 
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other institutions like the Bihar State Mahadalits Commission and National Commission for 
the Scheduled Caste for highlighting the cause of the Musahars. 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
This paper has tried to fill the void in the literature on corruption and civil society activism in 
India by analysing exactly how grassroots mobilization and good governance reforms may or 
may not result in rent-seeking from the perspective of the poorest citizens in the countryside. 
The following points can be emphasized from the case study presented in the paper. 
First, we find that the current international development policy environment (e.g. DFID’s 
PACS) as well as rights based legislations (e.g. RTI) are prompting active role for civil 
society organizations fighting for the cause of the poor. In fact, the impoverished Musahars 
with the help of the SSEVK are forging the civil society in Bihar, wanting us to recognize that 
civil society is not merely an elite space.
36
 However, the task of mobilizing the poor is neither 
easy nor quick. The SSEVK identified the problem of alcoholism as a way of bringing 
together the womenfolk of the Musahar community in the initial years. This proved crucial for 
the SSEVK in its quest for gaining roots among Musahar communities. Moreover, working 
with a single caste group made the task of mobilization easier to some extent but it also has its 
flip side. Other Dalit caste groups in the villages feel deprived and sometime express hostility 
towards Musahars.   
Second, we observe that direct confrontation with the state is necessary to some extent for the 
poorest people to avail their rights. The Musahars, under the umbrella of their community 
based organization (MVM) and with the active support of the SSEVK have confronted the 
                                                     
36
 Waghmore (2012) makes a similar argument in the case of international NGOs supporting Dalit 
mobilization in Maharasthra.  The point about the widening space of civil society is also supported by 
instances of grassroots mobilization in rural Rajasthan against corruption in welfare schemes, led by 
an activist organization called the MKSS (see Foresti, 2004). 
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state on several occasion, and also resorted to violent protest. This has consolidated their 
power and creates fear within the local bureaucracy, which has resulted in avoidance of 
harassment of the Musahars at the hands of street-level bureaucrats. The symbolic power 
manifested in the MVM bags supplied by the SSEVK has given confidence to Musahars in 
their dealings with local officials.  
Third, although the SSEVK led movement helps the Musahars to get rid of petty corruption to 
an extent, it also allows the officials to be selective in their bribery preferences and to 
circumvent laws wherever possible. They continue to extract rent from other caste groups 
which do not pose the threat of direct (violent) action as the Musahars. It reflects that there is 
no ‘horizontal movement’ of the anti-corruption reforms─ the bribe taking behaviour of the 
local officials changes only for the Musahars but not for other (and equally vulnerable) caste 
groups. The findings from this case study also support the assertion made by Klitgaard (1998) 
that corruption thrives on account of the easy way out with minimum risk.  
 Fourth, pro-poor welfare schemes, such as the MNREGA or PDS can potentially reduce the 
dependence of Musahars on landlords but the effectiveness of such schemes is in question, 
given the in-built deficiencies in their designs. While some studies have highlighted the 
importance of active civil society engagement in effective implementation of the MNREGA 
(see, Ambasta et al, 2008; Menon 2008), the design fallacies as explained in this paper (e.g. 
no payment for tree protection), hamper its effective implementation. Similarly, there is no 
incentive for the poorest to flag the issue of corruption in PDS because it actually results in 
denial of subsidized food grain for months. We suggest that unless alternative livelihoods 
possibilities are offered to Musahars along with educational opportunities there is not much 
that the anti-corruption struggles can offer to them on a sustainable basis.  
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Fifth, this study validates the assertion that political actors are instrumental in facilitating civil 
society interactions with state bureaucracies (see Evans 1996; Lavalle, 2006). What has 
worked in the favor of Musahars is the political strategy of the new regime to protect the 
rights of Mahadalits, and in turn, make inroads into the Dalit vote bank. This somehow 
checked the discretionary powers that the local bureaucrats often use against the poorest. Our 
findings are in line with the argument that adequacies of anti-corruption measures as well as 
the commitment of the political leaders are important factors in curbing corruption (Quah, 
2008). While the present regime is sympathetic to the cause of Mahadalits, it remains to be 
seen how the Musahars will be treated by the local officials under a new regime.  
Sixth, with regards to the future trends and challenges of civil society organization led 
mobilization of the poor for exercising their rights, the SSEVK case-study suggests that the 
issue of leadership is critical for its longevity. Primarily, the complete dominance of the 
SSEVK by a single individual poses a serious challenge. Studies on grassroots NGO in the 
context of South Asia highlight the importance of individual leaders in the success of these 
organizations (Smillie and Hailey, 2001). Furthermore, while individual leaders exhibit great 
ability to mobilize people, they are also criticized for dominating the entire organization 
(Hailey and James, 2004; Petras, 1999; Govinda 2009). In the case of SSEVK, we find that 
while the leader has played a crucial role in mobilizing the Musahars, but has failed to nurture 
a second rung of leadership. Another challenge comes in the form of excessive dependence of 
the community based organization, the MVM on the facilitating NGO, the SSEVK. What will 
happen to the MVM when the SSEVK pulls out?  
Overall, the story of the SSEVK shows that civil society organizations have considerable 
scope for engaging with the issue of corruption beyond the urban middle class milieu. This 
study suggests that amid various challenges as explained above, the poorest and outcastes are 
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able to reduce rent-seeking and avail the benefits of welfare schemes meant for them. This is 
made possible with concerted efforts of international donors to promote grassroots 
mobilization, political will of the ruling dispensation in favor of pro-poor governance reforms, 
as well as the ability of the activist organization to effectively mobilize the poorest in their 
struggle against rent seeking. The longevity of the struggle, though, is anyone’s guess.   
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3 Chapter Three: Can vigilance-focused governance reforms improve 
service delivery? The case of Integrated Child Development Services 
(ICDS) in Bihar, India  
 
Abstract 
Child undernourishment is a major challenge in India even though the government has, since 
1975, been running the ‘Integrated Child Development Services’ (ICDS), one of the world’s 
largest programmes for this cause. Ever since its inception, this scheme is marred with 
various governance challenges: widespread corruption, absenteeism, and targeting problems; 
more visible in states like Bihar than others. The present ruling dispensation in Bihar has 
instituted major governance reforms to tackle these problems. These include regular 
inspection of service delivery centres, strict monitoring of funds, swift disciplinary action, and 
vigilance through community participation. While these reforms are generally accepted as 
good in theory, research-based empirical evidence of their actual impact on ground is scarce. 
This paper tries to fill this gap on the basis of an in-depth case study of ICDS in Bihar. The 
findings indicate that contrary to conventional thinking about good governance, the 
vigilance-focused reforms along with community based monitoring have not been successful 
in curbing systemic corruption. The study concludes that alternative approaches are required 
to resolve the governance problems in ICDS. These include tackling the problems of 
understaffing and heavy work-load, and providing stronger incentives to the frontline service 
providers. 
Key Words:  Child Malnutrition; Good Governance; Corruption; Bihar; ICDS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Child undernourishment remains a serious problem in most low and middle income countries 
of the world. In India, the problem is more acute than in many of the world’s poorest 
countries. According to the official estimates, almost half of the children below the age of five 
are underweight and are suffering from varying degrees of malnutrition (see Arnold et al, 
2009). This is twice as high as the average percentage of underweight children in Sub-Saharan 
African countries (ibid). The problem gets further accentuated as prevalence of child 
underweight has increased in several provinces of India (e.g. Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Haryana and Gujarat) in the period between 1999 and 2006 (when the last National Family 
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and Heath Survey was conducted).
37
 Although India has achieved high economic growth in 
the past two decades, and has spent considerably on various different social welfare 
programmes, the failure to effectively tackle the problem of child malnutrition exposes the 
lacunae in country’s developmental policy and practice (Chatterjee, 2007; Planning 
Commission of India, 2010). This is paradoxical because both central and state governments 
have tried to address this problem for decades. Following the ‘Directive Principles’ of state 
policy enlisted in the Constitution of India, the central government, way back in 1975, 
launched the Integrated Child Development Services (hereafter ICDS), a flagship programme 
to address the health, nutrition and developmental needs of children (below six years of age) 
as well as pregnant and lactating mothers.
38
 All the services under this scheme are delivered 
through centres called Anganwadi (literally, courtyard) located at village/habitation level and 
managed by a team of frontline workers
39
. In the course of time, this programme has become 
one of the largest social nutritional programmes of the world, both in terms of the expenditure 
involved and the number of beneficiaries (Varma et. al, 2007). There are well defined 
objectives and well-structured machinery for the implementation of this flagship scheme. 
However, governmental auditors have raised serious concerns about its functioning. A recent 
report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG, 2012-13)
40
 has acknowledged 
                                                     
37
 While the last official survey was conducted in 2005-6, the Ministry of Women and Child 
Development in collaboration with the UNICEF, and under pressure from civil society actors, has 
conducted a Rapid Survey of Children (RSOC) in 2013 but its report is yet to be made public. 
However, the provisional data supplied by the ministry to the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) suggests that over eight years (2005-2013), the proportion of children classified as 
“stunted” declined from 48 % to 38.8 %. But these national level figures do not reveal what is 
happening in individual states (IFPRI, 2014).    
38
 Article 47 of the Directive Principles makes it the duty of the state to raise the level of nutrition and 
improve public health 
 
39
 Michael Lipsky  in his book ‘Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services’ analysis 
the roles of frontline workers, which he calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’, and emphasises their importance in 
policy implementation. 
 
40
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/our_products/audit_report/government_wise/union_audit/recent_
reports/union_performance/2012_2013/Civil/Report_22/Report_22.html  (Viewed on 7 April 2015) 
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major pitfalls in the programme in terms of inadequate delivery and weak financial 
monitoring. Moreover, the prevailing high level of child malnutrition also expresses the 
ineffectiveness of this programme. 
While the problems of corruption and poor service delivery in the ICDS are endemic, some 
states have performed worse than others in its implementation─ Bihar is one of them. The 
Planning Commission of India in its assessment of the ICDS found Bihar to be the least 
performing state in all the components of the programme (PEO Evaluation Report on ICDS, 
2011). This is corroborated by the fact that more than 82 % of the children covered under the 
ICDS in Bihar are underweight (followed by Andhra Pradesh, where approximately 38 % 
suffer from nutritional deficiency).
41
 For many observers, the governance situation in Bihar, 
not long ago was characterized by utter lawlessness, extreme poverty, and rampant corruption 
in public dealings (see Polgreen, 2010).
42
 The state also ranked lowest among the Indian 
states in terms of human and economic development indicators (Dreze and Sen, 2013).  
In 2005, with the change of government in Bihar, ‘good governance’ emerged as the key 
strategy and major goal for the new political establishment headed by Chief Minister, Nitish 
Kumar. The present ruling dispensation in Bihar claims to have taken measures for the 
effective delivery of welfare scheme by curtailing corruption and ensuring transparency. This 
includes the promulgation of the ‘Rights to Public Services (RTPS)’43. In fact, Bihar became 
the first state in India to institute RTPS, considered as the natural progression to the already 
existing ‘Right to Information’ (RTI) introduced by the central government in 2005.Taking a 
cue from the critical appraisals of the ICDS in the past years, the Bihar government has 
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 http://wcd.nic.in/icdsimg/Qpr0313-for-website-2-8-2013.pdf (Viewed on 7 April 2015) 
42
 Polygreen, Lydia (2010) ‘Turnaround of India State could serve as a Model’. The New York Times. 
43
 The Right to Public Service Act (RTPS) in Bihar came into force on the 15
th
 of August 2011.The act 
ensures that certain notified services would be given in stipulated time frame.  
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instituted various reforms for its effective implementation. These reforms mainly include 
decentralisation by means of active involvement of user-committees, web-based monitoring, 
timely inspection of Anganwadi centres, and strict disciplinary action against erring workers. 
Overall, these vigilance focused reforms appear to be improving service delivery as well as 
reducing leakages in the ICDS. These reforms are also in line with the common theoretical 
understanding in the ‘good governance’ literature that strict monitoring, swift punishment and 
involvement of user groups are all crucial for the effective delivery of public services (see, 
Klitgaard, 1988; Narayan, 1995; Sara and Katz, 1998). While there are strong theoretical 
arguments in favour of vigilance-focused reforms in order to curb petty corruption in welfare 
schemes like the ICDS, there is a dearth of empirical studies, which analyse the actual impact 
of these reforms on the ground. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing an in-depth 
empirical case-study of the effects of Bihar’s vigilance-focused reforms on the ICDS. 
The paper addresses the following questions: What happens when a poor performing state like 
Bihar adopts governance reforms for improving the services under the ICDS? How do 
frontline workers respond to these initiatives?  Can strict monitoring, reporting and inclusion 
of user-based committees ensure effective implementation of the ICDS? Or are there options 
for development agents to circumvent the system and still misappropriate funds in the new 
set-up? Overall, the paper focuses on how well-meaning reforms translate into practice in the 
context of ICDS in Bihar. These questions are addressed on the basis of an in-depth case 
study of the functioning of the ICDS in both urban and rural areas in north-western Bihar. The 
analysis of the findings indicate that the reforms, which focused on strict monitoring and 
vigilance by both the state officials and user groups, did not translate into a more effective 
delivery of services. On the contrary, the study provides evidence that the vigilance-focused 
reforms have aggravated the problems of corruption as more bribes are being demanded by 
increasing number of inspection teams. User-based monitoring also failed to curb corruption, 
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as the ‘monitors’ also became bribe-seekers. Moreover, the reforms did not address the 
problems of caste-based discriminations that lead to social exclusion. Based on this analysis, 
the study challenges the effectiveness of the most prevalent anti-corruption tools in delivering 
services under the ICDS and advocates for alternative approaches to resolve the governance 
problems in ICDS.  
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section presents the service delivery 
mechanism of the ICDS and introduces the debates on its functioning. This is followed by a 
short note on methodology and data collection. The third section provides information on how 
the reforms aimed at the effective functioning of the ICDS translate into practice. The fourth 
section focuses specifically on the frontline workers: how do they adopt, receive, respond, or 
challenge the reforms initiated from the top. The fifth section provides a discussion on the 
overall findings of the study. The main conclusions from this case study and some suggestions 
for alternative strategies to improving the services in the ICDS are presented in the end. 
3.2 ICDS: structure, functioning and challenges 
 
Integrated Child Development Scheme, with an overall objective of delivering nutrition to the 
children, offers a package of six services: supplementary nutrition, pre-school non-formal 
education, nutrition & health education, immunization, health check-up and referral services. 
The last three of the six services (immunisation, health check-up and referral services) are 
delivered through Public Health Infrastructure under the Ministry of Health & Family 
Welfare.
44
 The remaining services are delivered through Anganwadi centres, situated at the 
village/ habitation level, and managed by frontline workers called Anganwadi Sevikas 
(literally, workers) and their helpers Anganwadi Sahaikas (literally, helper). Both these 
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 http://wcd.nic.in/icds.htm (Viewed on 20 August, 2015) 
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frontline workers receive monthly honorarium from the government.
45
 Services under the 
supplementary nutrition include supply of dry food items, also known as ‘take home ration’ 
(THR) to the children between the age of six months to three years, pregnant and lactating 
mothers, and adolescent girls. Additionally, it includes supply of cooked meals as well as pre-
school facilities to children between three to six years.  
The Directorate of Integrated Child Development Services (under the Department of Social 
Welfare) at the provincial level is responsible for the implementation of various services 
under the ICDS. For the smooth implementation of the works, a cluster of Anganwadi centres 
is guided and monitored by a supervisor, who reports to the ‘Child Development Programme 
Officer’ (hereafter CDPO), the in-charge of this programme at the block level. At the district 
level, the office of the ‘District Programme Officer’ executes the programme in coordination 
with the CDPOs. At each centre, frontline workers (Sevikas and Sahaikas) provide the 
services to the beneficiaries. Over the years, various changes were made in the scope and 
implementation of this programme but Anganwadi centres have remained the focal point of 
delivery of services. As such, the roles of the Sevikas and Sahaikas continue to remain crucial 
in the success or failure of this scheme. The figure below depicts the services as well as the 
delivery structure of the ICDS. 
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Figure 1: Service delivery structure of ICDS in Bihar (source: http://www.icdsbih.gov.in) 
 
As far as funding of the programme is concerned, the budgetary allocation of the ICDS by the 
central government has increased nearly three-fold between 2003-04 and 2008-09. A sum of 
Rupees 18,544 crore (approximately 2.9 billion USD) was spent on the ICDS in the financial 
year 2013-14.
46
 In spite of such expenditure made by the government and the existence of 
well-structured machinery for the programme’s implementation, public auditors have raised 
serious concerns about corruption and leakages in the ICDS. In its audit report covering a 
timeframe from 2006-07 to 2010-11, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India reported a 
gap of 33-45 per cent between the number of beneficiaries identified for the Supplementary 
Nutrition (one of the key components of ICDS) and those receiving it.
47
 
Critical assessments of the ICDS by development researchers have attributed the failure of 
this programme to various factors. Absence of ‘political will’ on the part of the state 
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 http://wcd.nic.in/icds/finance.aspx# (Viewed on 7 April 2015) 
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governments has been cited as one of the major reasons for the poor performance in several 
states (see Rajivan, 2006; Sudararaman, 2006; Sinha 2006). Others make a case for the 
absorption of frontline workers as regular employees of the government because they are 
expected to deliver many services as part of the ICDS scheme.
48
 Lack of competent 
evaluation techniques and ineffective monitoring on account of faulty reporting by the Sevikas 
and the CDPOs have also been acknowledged as a bottleneck in the effective delivery of 
services under the ICDS (Khullar, 1998). There is also prevalence of large scale leakages and 
corruption in the absence of regular inspections by higher officials (Nayak and Saxena, 2006). 
It is suggested that strict monitoring of services under the ICDS is key to tackling ever 
growing problems of corruption (Ramachandran, 2005). Other critics advocate the active 
involvement of the locally elected village communities and user committees for the effective 
monitoring and functioning of this programme (Gragnolati et. al, 2006; Sinha, 2006).  
One of the acknowledged reasons for the failure of the services under the ICDS in Bihar is the 
prevalence of leakages and petty corruption (Fraker et. al, 2013; Nayak and Saxena, 2006). 
According to a survey conducted in 2005 by an international NGO, Bihar was identified to be 
the most corrupt state in India in terms of petty corruption in public services (Transparency 
International India, 2005)
49
. Even though Bihar, like other states in India, has had a structured 
delivery mechanism for welfare services, it is alleged that during the Lalu Prasad Yadav 
regime in the 1990s, there began a serious attempt to weaken the largely upper-caste 
dominated state bureaucracy by means of bolstering middle-men and local bahubalis 
(literally, henchmen), devoted to the ruling party (Roy, 2013). We find that during that period, 
the ICDS in Bihar suffered from the problems of underutilisation of funds, absence of 
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supervision by the CDPOs, and under-staffing (Nayak and Saxena, 2006). However, Bihar 
witnessed a change of regime in 2005, which initiated several governance reforms for 
effective and transparent delivery of welfare services. These reforms included the 
establishment of ‘fast track’ courts for the speedy trials of corruption cases against public 
officials; making services under the ‘Information Act’ (RTI) available by phone, and 
confiscating the properties of erring officials. Commentators on Bihar believe that governance 
reforms coupled with optimism on the revival of the state economy have created an enabling 
environment for development (see Mukherji and Mukherji, 2012; Singh and Stern, 2013). 
What is not known though is the effectiveness of these reforms in improving the service 
delivery at the ground level. Below, we summarise the key reforms initiated by the present 
regime with specific reference to the ICDS. 
3.3 Recent Reforms in the ICDS  
 
Apart from broader governance reforms, the state government, since 2005, has instituted 
certain changes in the structure and functioning of the ICDS for making its delivery more 
effective. First, in order to control absenteeism among the front line workers, web-based 
reporting was initiated and persistent monitoring by inspection teams was intensified since 
2010. This was to be performed as follows: 
 Mandatory random inspection of 10 Anganwadi centres every day by the District 
Programme Officer  
 Reports of these inspections to be sent to the higher official on the same day 
through email and mobile messages 
 Supervisors were required to inspect each Anganwadi centre at least four times 
in a month. 
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 The CDPOs were also instructed to conduct random inspections of Anganwadi 
centres from time to time.  
An important observation to make here is that the provisions of inspections were also there in 
the earlier set-up but the number of inspection visits was not specified, and the provision of 
sending the reports of these inspections to the higher officials the very same day did not exist.  
Second, the punishment for erring officials and workers was made quite stringent. The 
provision of immediate suspension in cases of noted irregularities was included. It is 
noteworthy that in the year 2009-10 a total of 250 Sevikas were suspended, and the figure 
stood at 167 in the year 2011-12 (Annual Reports, Social Welfare Department, Bihar). Third, 
without reducing the quantity of the ‘take home ration’, it was to be distributed once a month 
(instead of fortnightly) so as to ease the workload of the frontline workers. Fourth, for 
ensuring regular attendance of the children, an incentive of Rs 250 per annum (for school 
uniform) was to be provided to enrolled children at Anganwadi centres, under the 
Mukhyamantri Poshak Yojana (literally, Chief Minster’s Uniform Scheme). Fifth, with the 
overall objective of improving the infrastructure facilities, the government has encouraged 
people to donate land for Anganwadi centres as many of them continue to run on rented 
premises. Those donating land would have the centres known by their names.  
Finally, to enhance beneficiary participation in procurement and distribution of ration and 
cooked meals, user-based committees known as Poshahar Vitran Evam Kriyanvayan Samiti 
(literally, Nutrition Distribution and Implementation Committees) were further strengthened 
for giving effective representation to the parents of the beneficiaries. How these committees 
functioned and what challenges they faced, have been explained later in the paper. It is 
pertinent to note here that the government recognised their shortcomings, and decided in late 
2014 to replace them with Anganwadi Vikas Samiti (literally, Anganwadi Development 
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Committee), which were to be headed by a local school teacher. How have these reforms 
unfolded in actual practice? We address this question next on the basis of the insights from 
the functioning of the select Anganwadi centres. 
The purpose behind the formation of the users’ committees (Poshar Vitran Kriyanvan Samiti) 
was to plug the leakages in the procurement and distribution of food supplies. Reform aimed 
to empower the users-usually a good practice to complement the reforms on the services 
providers side. In fact, the present regime has certainly demonstrated the political will for 
‘good governance’, but the continuing dismal performance in terms of child malnutrition 
exhibits a developmental paradox. Several years after the reforms started, Bihar continues to 
struggle with the problems of undernourishment and remains at the top of ‘Child Under-
nutrition Index’ among all the states in India (Aguayo et al, 2014).  
While one could attribute this finding to an inevitable time lag between the start of the 
reforms and an effect in terms of nutritional outcomes, one should at least be able to observe 
some effects on the quality of program management. However, available evidence indicates 
the management of ICDS in Bihar continues to suffer from major governance problems. A 
recent study aimed to quantify the ‘missing expenditures’ in the delivery of ‘Supplementary 
Nutrition’ programme in Bihar, an important component of the ICDS (see Fraker et al, 2013). 
The data was collected through random visits to nearly 200 Anganwadi centres in the state. 
This study concluded that an estimated 53 per cent of funds were missing on account of 
leakages, causing an estimated loss of Rupees 581 crore (approximately 106 million USD) 
annually to the government (ibid). While the study presented a quantitative assessment of the 
leakages, it is equally important to understand why the vigilance-focused reforms 
implemented by Bihar’s new government were not more effective, even though they 
comprised a comprehensive set of measures, including regular inspections, strict monitoring, 
                                   
  
 
98 
 
the inclusion of user-based committees and swift disciplinary action. A qualitative case study 
approach, which is employed in this study, does not lead to statistically representative 
findings on the magnitude of leakages, but it is well suited to reveal the underlying problems 
of the leakages identified in the quantitative assessment quoted above. The case study 
methodology used for this paper, which is further detailed in the following section, aimed to 
throw light on the following questions: How do frontline workers respond to the changes 
initiated from above? Is there scope for the service providers to circumvent the new system? 
Did the reforms unintentionally create new ‘entry points’ for corruption? What changes are 
required to overcome the problems identified with the current reforms? This study aims to 
answer these questions to better understand what happens when governance reform policies 
“hit the ground”, and to suggest alternatives or complementary measures to vigilance-focused 
reforms for the effective delivery of services under the ICDS. 
3.4 Methodology and Data Collection 
 
The authors primarily relied on two sets of data for this paper. First, a review of primary and 
secondary material, which comprises the publications of the state as well as central 
government agencies, newspaper clippings, documents and policy guidelines on the ICDS, 
and official records and registers kept in Anganwadi centres. Second, primary data was 
generated by means of direct observation, semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations with respondents including frontline workers, members of the user committees, 
ex-Anganwadi workers, parents of the beneficiaries, and government officials. The research 
follows case-study methodology for it is helpful in ‘capturing the complexity of the object of 
study, through in-depth analysis of carefully selected cases’ (Stake, 1995). The authors 
avoided the use of formal interview schedules because government functionaries are either 
afraid of putting anything on record or tend to give set (readymade) answers to questions 
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posed to them in a formal manner. The authors didn’t start the conversations with a fixed set 
of questions. New questions emerged from within ongoing conversations; from previous 
conversations with the same respondents; from conversations with other officials and frontline 
workers, and from the information gathered through other sources (reports, publications, and 
visits to other Anganwadi centres). Further, participatory mapping exercises were conducted 
with select frontline workers for understanding the flow of funds as well as power relations 
among different stakeholders in the ICDS. Through these maps, points of leakages or bribery 
were located the respondents were asked to explain the attributes of corruption in greater 
details. These attributes become crucial for understanding the dynamics of corruption. All the 
conversations took place in Hindi and Bhojpuri and have been translated into English before 
quoting in this paper. The conversations were not recorded but notes were taken immediately 
after the interviews.  
The study was conducted in a district lying in the north-western part of Bihar. The choice of 
the district was dependent on two factors. First, the nutritional status of children in this district 
was close to the state average. This was ascertained on the basis of the district household 
survey (2002-04) on reproductive and child health. Second, the familiarity of the first author 
in terms of area and local dialect, which proved crucial in establishing rapport with frontline 
workers, government officials and members of rural and urban local bodies. The names of the 
district, villages, and localities have been withheld to protect the identity of the respondents. 
A total of 10 Anganwadi centres (7 urban and 3 rural) were selected purposefully on the basis 
of the frontline workers’ willingness to share information and insights into the functioning of 
the ICDS. The data collection spanned over four months in 2013 and one month in 2015. 
Three to five visits were made to each Anganwadi centre, and the respondents were explained 
in clear terms that the purpose of the research was solely academic. In the initial visits to the 
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Anganwadi centres, the frontline workers were only asked about the general functioning of 
the centres and the challenges faced by them in service delivery. Subsequently, and once 
sufficient rapport was struck, questions related to leakages and bribery were asked. 
The paper acknowledges the limitations of methodology involving ‘recalling of the events 
from the past’ (Patai, 1998). Also, a relatively small sample size of 10 Anganwadi centres 
from one district prevents us from making generalised statements about corruption and 
leakages in the ICDS in Bihar. Yet, close encounters with the respondents helped in 
unravelling the dynamics of service delivery under the reformed system, and in gaining an in-
depth understanding of its functioning from the vantage point of frontline workers. Wherever 
possible, the information was verified using triangulation for quality assurance but the authors 
recognize the limitation of gathering data on sensitive topics such as misappropriation of 
funds, corruption or dynamics of senior-subordinate relationships in governmental 
programmes. The authors acknowledge both the reluctance of respondents to speak freely 
about some of these issues and the problems in cross-checking the information provided by 
the respondents solely on the basis of official records or registers (which are often forged). In 
keeping with these limitations, the findings only claim to explain how developmental actors 
may circumvent the system, and explain why some well-meaning reforms may fail to improve 
service delivery. As the findings of the public auditors have not found significant inter-district 
differences as far as delivery of the ICDS is Bihar is concerned, it is authors’ conjecture that 
studies of similar nature, if conducted in other sites will not reveal a very different picture. 
We now turn to present in the following section, the effects of governance reforms on service 
delivery under the ICDS.  
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3.5 When policies hit the ground: the ‘reformed’ ICDS in Bihar 
 
In section 2 above, we have summarised the main reforms initiated by the present regime in 
order to improve service delivery as well as prevent leakages in the ICDS. How have these 
reforms unfolded in actual practice? We address this question on the basis of the insights from 
the functioning of the select Anganwadi centres. 
3.5.1 Do regular inspections reduce petty corruption?  
 
It is stated that for plugging leakages in the delivery of services, provisions of monitoring and 
punishment have to be put in place (see Klitgaard, 1999). However, our findings indicate that 
the provision of regular inspections, considered to be the most potent solution to check 
leakages as well as negligence of duty, has proven to be counterproductive. Our respondent 
Sevikas maintained that the paying of bribe has been a routine practice but with the recent 
changes in terms of strict vigilance, the CDPOs and supervisors have started extracting more 
money from the frontline workers. In seven Anganwadi centres (four urban and three rural), 
the Sevikas reported having paid a bribery amount ranging from Rupees 1100 to 1400 ( about 
10-13 per cent of the funds allotted under the ‘Supplementary Nutrition Programme’) to the 
CDPOs on a monthly basis. The remaining three Sevikas did not specify the amount, but 
stated that it differed from officer to officer. It was alleged that if they did not pay this money, 
the supervisors and the CDPOs in their inspection visits would find some faults for one reason 
or another, and threaten the Sevikas with disciplinary action. On the other hand, if the Sevikas 
pay a bribe to their superiors, the inspection visit goes past smoothly. In six out of ten 
Anganwadi centres, the money was reportedly extracted directly by the supervisors; in one 
centre through the clerk of the CDPO, and in the remaining three, the CDPOs collected the 
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money directly from the Sevikas. One of the Sevikas cited it as the key challenge in the 
effective functioning of the programme and remarked:  
                CDPO Madam to chalta phirta ATM machine hai. Fark bus itne hai ki, ye 
ATM kewal paisa leta hai par deta kuch nahi! [literally, Madam CDPO is 
like a portable Automated Teller Machine but this machine only extracts 
money and does not give any!]
50
 
In addition to these routine inspections by the CDPOs and supervisors, there are also flying 
visits by district level and state level teams. Although these inspections are not very frequent, 
but whenever they happen, the Sevikas feel that they need to bribe the inspection teams or 
otherwise, face suspension. In the case of noted irregularities at the Anganwadi centres, all the 
respondent Sevikas informed us that the present regime has made provisions for immediate 
dismissal from service. Given the situation, the Sevikas and the Sahaikas feel more obliged in 
bribing the inspection teams. In addition, it has also increased their dependence on the local 
leaders (municipal and Panchayat), who at times act as negotiators between the frontline 
workers and inspection teams.  
Furthermore, the respondent Sevikas argued that they had to maintain as much as eighteen 
different kinds of records and registers in their centres. These include registers of attendance, 
‘take home ration’, immunisation and health records, among others. The inspection teams 
check these registers whenever they come. Therefore, filling up these registers constitutes a 
top priority for the frontline workers and eats up a major chunk of their time. The funds left 
with them after the extraction by the CDPOs and other inspection teams are not sufficient to 
meet the stated requirements for procuring food. Therefore, they are left with no choice other 
than resorting to false reporting in the registers.  
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3.5.2 Distribution of ‘take home ration’ and school uniforms: potential entry 
points for corruption? 
 
In order to ease off the workload of frontline workers, a change in the distribution system for 
the ‘take home ration’ has been introduced. Unlike the previous practice of distributing the 
ration fortnightly, it is now distributed in the middle of each month. All the frontline workers 
we interviewed were happy with this change. Yet, the effects of the change have been 
different in rural areas when compared to urban. Our respondent Sevikas from the urban 
centres alleged that this policy change has been quite beneficial for the Sevikas in rural centres 
because they distribute only half the amount of ration than before. A Sevika from an urban 
centre narrated the following: 
 In villages, people are not aware about how much ration they should get each 
month. So, the Sevikas there distribute only about half the quantity than the 
actual entitlement. They are making money because of this change in 
distribution practice. […] There is no bandish [restriction] in rural centres. 
While we pour water into milk, they can get away with pouring milk into 
water!
51
 
Another change introduced in the recent years is handing out a sum of Rupees 250 per annum 
for school uniforms in order to incentivise centre attendance. We found that in seven 
Anganwadi centres (five urban and two rural), many of the families, who were not enrolled in 
the centres, have collected this money. Our respondent Sevikas alleged that local leaders gave 
them a list of families to whom they were asked to make this payment and it was difficult to 
overrule the recommendations of these leaders. Moreover, all the Sevikas alleged that other 
Sevikas do not even hand out the full amount but only a part of it. Therefore, the policy of 
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improving the attendance through incentives of the school uniform failed in the select centres. 
The Sevikas maintained that most parents do not send their children to the centres. And many 
parents we interviewed blamed the Sevikas for not opening the centres daily.  
3.5.3 Community ‘participation’ and monitoring: how does it work? 
 
A reform that aimed to empower the users was formation of ‘user-based committee’ known as 
Poshar Vitran and Kriyanvan Samiti in each Anganwadi centre. It was expected to plug the 
leakages in the procurement and distribution of food supplies. Each such committee consisted 
of five members including a president. The selection of members was supposed to be on the 
basis of elections, conducted in public meetings, organised by the Sevikas in their respective 
localities. However, in practice, the presidents were selected either by the Sevikas themselves 
or in other instances, on the recommendation of the elected representatives of the rural or 
urban local bodies (ward member or Panchayat member). Our interviews with the Sevikas in 
2013 reveal that in four Anganwadi centres, the presidents were relatives of the respective 
Sevikas, and in six Anganwadi centres, the presidents were selected on the recommendations 
of the elected representatives of the urban or rural local bodies. The role of the president was 
significant as she was jointly responsible (along with Sevikas) for the procurement and 
distribution of food items. She was required to sign the purchase register. During the course of 
our interviews in 2013, we witnessed that although there were no provisions for any payment 
of money to the presidents in lieu of their services, in seven out of ten centres, the Sevikas 
paid up to Rupees 500 per month (about 5 per cent of the total budget allotted for the food 
items) to the presidents. All the Sevikas considered users’ committees as ‘useless’ and 
claimed that they would have functioned better in their absence.  
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Why did the Sevikas need to bribe the committee presidents? Our interviews with three 
presidents of the users’ committees (one rural and two urban) revealed that there were several 
shortcomings in the procurement process as well as in the distribution of the ‘take home 
ration’ and cooked meals. The interviewed committee presidents claimed that the Sevikas 
misappropriate funds through using fictitious bills (money drawn without actual purchases), 
distributing a smaller quantity of the ‘take home ration’ than foreseen by the rules, and 
cooking a lower quantity of food than required. Furthermore, they rarely cook different 
varieties of food prescribed in the menu-list. As far as the role of ordinary members of this 
users committee was concerned, our interviews with four ordinary members (one rural and 
three urban) suggested that three of them did not even know that they were members of this 
users committee. The one, who knew about her membership, was not sure what the role and 
responsibilities of this committee were. However, all of them acknowledged that the Sevikas 
and the presidents work hand in glove. The situation was aptly described by one of the 
members in the following words: 
The Sevika and Adhyaksh [President] belong to the same caste and are also 
closely related to the Mukhiya [head of the Panchayat]. They consider the 
Anganwadi as their bapauti [literally, ancestral property]. People here do not 
even know what they should get. […] We can’t do anything about it!52 
In the subsequent round of data collection in May 2015, we found that the state government 
decided to broaden community participation by replacing users’ committees with another set 
of committees, the Anganwadi Development Committees. Apart from the inclusion of local 
elected representatives of municipal and rural local bodies as well as the frontline workers of 
the health department (Auxiliary Nurse Midwife), the most important role in these committees 
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was given the local school teachers. Although the frontline workers were not able to explain 
the reasons behind including teachers, an official from the directorate suggested that at that 
time, the top-most official overseeing this programme in Bihar was also in-charge of the 
school education department, and was of the view that the teachers would perform this task 
honestly. However, the nominated school teacher has come to occupy the same role as the 
president of the previous users’ committee. The Sevikas need to get her signatures on the 
‘purchase register’ for their centres. The challenges faced by the Sevikas with regard to the 
new committees were explained in the following words: 
              When I approached the teacher in the school in order to get her signatures on 
‘purchase register’, she asked me to come to her house. When I visited her 
house, her son said that she was not at home, and that all the official work 
should be done at the school and not in the house. After three or four failed 
attempts to reach her, I decided to offer her Rupees 500 for her signatures. 
She gladly signed the register and this practice is continuing.
53
 
The interviewed Sevikas also complained that during the summer breaks in schools, the 
teacher goes away to their respective home towns and the entire work of record keeping and 
procurement comes to a standstill. The challenges that the Sevikas face in the day-to-day 
functioning of the centres are presented in the next section, but the results  from the above 
discussion strongly suggests that the provisions of  community participation and monitoring 
may fail to plug leakages as well as ensure transparency.  
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3.5.4 How do ‘beneficiaries’ view the reforms? 
 
The effectiveness of reforms in welfare provisions is contingent upon the awareness levels of 
the beneficiaries. We asked some parents about their entitlements and the services they should 
get under the ICDS. A respondent beneficiary explained: 
The Sevika asks us to sign a register or give thumb impression and then join the 
queue for receiving ration. We do not know what we have signed against. Nor 
do we know how much ration the sarkar [government] gives us. We just take 
what they give.  
While six Sevikas (three rural and three urban) we interviewed stated that the beneficiaries are 
aware of their entitlements but they also understand how things work in governmental 
schemes. If a beneficiary raises any questions, we have answers to satisfy them. One of the 
Sahaikas from a rural centre narrated as to how they tackle uncomfortable questions from 
beneficiaries: 
We tell them that they should be happy with whatever they are 
getting. Daan ki bacchiya ke daant na ginal jaala [literally, you 
do not count the teeth of a calf you get as a gift]
54
 
The narrative above suggests that even if the beneficiaries are aware of wrongdoings they 
treat them as a ‘norm’ in all welfare schemes. Moreover, the beneficiaries are made to 
conceive the services under this scheme as ‘gifts’ and not entitlements. It is one of the most 
contentious issue in the delivery of public welfare services. Equally contentious is the issue of 
who will get the benefits in welfare schemes. Our respondent Sevikas complained that most 
Anganwadi centres are operating in rented premises and the landlords interfere in the selection 
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of beneficiaries as well as distribution of the ‘take home ration’. Many centres lack toilet 
facilities and the frontline workers at times have to depend on their landlords and neighbours 
even for basic needs. They also argued that governments’ appeal for donating land for 
Anganwadi centres is futile and even if it appeals to some donors, they are likely to interfere 
in the daily operations of the centres for which they have donated land. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the ICDS suffers from several structural problems and it is not justified to put the 
entire blame of poor service delivery and misappropriation of funds on the frontline workers. 
Below, we present their perspective on both the recent vigilance focused reforms and the 
general difficulties they face in the discharge of their duties under the ICDS. 
3.5.5 Responding to Reforms: the frontline workers and their challenges  
 
As stated earlier on, the role of the Sevikas and Sahaikas is crucial in the delivery of services 
under the ICDS. After all they are the ones who interact with the beneficiaries, and are 
responsible for the day to day operations in the Anganwadi centres. Our interactions with the 
frontline workers suggest that they face several challenges in running the programme. The 
studies on ICDS in other parts of India have also revealed multiple problems the frontline 
workers have to counter, including job insecurity, excessive paperwork, over-work and under-
payment, and difficulties arising from late release of funds (see Palriwala and Neetha, 2010; 
Desai et. al, 2012; Ghosh, 2004). Not surprisingly, the frontline workers in Bihar also need to 
live with these problems but the governance reforms initiated by the present regime, 
according to our respondent Sevikas and Sahaikas, have increased their vulnerability. In order 
to plug the leakages at the Anganwadi centres, the political leadership has taken the course of 
strict vigilance and swift disciplinary action. Our findings show that rather than solving the 
problem of petty corruption and leakages, these reforms have made the frontline workers 
more insecure.  
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Corruption in governmental schemes is systemic and for many functionaries, encounter with 
corrupt practices begin as early as the stage of their recruitment. Although the frontline 
workers are supposed to be recruited on the basis of a merit-list, four Sevikas (three rural and 
one urban) and five Sahaikas (three rural and two urban) informed us that they had to pay 
money for their recruitment, which in turn, incentivised these workers to indulge in corruption 
while discharging their duties. Furthermore, most of our respondent Sevikas stated that 
although funds were earmarked for general maintenance of the Anganwadi centres, they never 
receive this money, and alleged that senior officials misappropriate these funds. Yet, the 
inspection teams put the blame on the frontline workers in case of any shortcomings found in 
the centres. Moreover, stringent punishment coupled with multiple inspections has aggravated 
their problems, and they are under a constant fear of losing their jobs.  
There are also operational difficulties. All the Sevikas we interviewed complained about 
excessive reporting and recording that they needed to perform. They argued that the 
compulsion to maintain eighteen different types of registers and records encourages ‘false 
reporting’. For example, when they cannot buy the required amount of food articles with the 
allotted money, they are left with no other choice but to resort to false reporting, as indicated 
above. Also, they do not receive any money for the beautification of the Anganwadi centres 
but the CDPOs expect them to keep the centres well-maintained. Therefore, they have to 
somehow ‘adjust’ the expenses. One of the Sevikas explained: 
          We are required to perform all the tasks correctly but no one thinks about the 
costs incurred in doing so. I have to spend about Rupees 400 each month in 
                                   
  
 
110 
 
photocopying but we do not get a single penny for it. […] you tell me how can 
we perform our duties according to the rules?
55
 
Apart from the operational difficulties that the frontline workers face, the amount sanctioned 
for the procurement of food does not take into account the rise in costs due to inflation. By the 
time the funds reach the centres, prices of the food items increase and the frontline workers 
resort to curtailing the amount of ration distributed. Yet, they need to show in the purchase 
registers that they have distributed the sanctioned amount.  
Another challenge faced by the frontline workers is the lack of incentives. There are hardly 
any opportunities for career advancements or any rewards for better performance. All the 
respondent frontline workers were of the opinion that they should be promoted to the rank of 
‘supervisor’ on the basis of their work experience and performance. Furthermore, they also 
complained that even the meagre honorarium that they are entitled to is not provided 
regularly. The situation is accentuated further as for many of them it is the only source of 
income for supporting their families. Their grievances were aptly summarised by a Sevika in 
the following words: 
Bachchon ko padhaane, khana banane, bartan manjne se leker ke centre ka 
jharu-poccha bhi hum log karte hain. Phir bhi chaprasi wali haisiyat bhi nahi 
hai humari [literally, we do teaching, cooking, dishes and cleaning but even then 
our status is worse than that of a peon in governmental office].
56
 
Poor self-image and inadequate compensation are not the only factors hampering efficient 
service delivery on the part of frontline workers in Bihar. They also tackle the harsh realities 
of caste-based discrimination. Some of the Sevikas reported that when the Sahaikas and the 
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president of the users’ committee are from the same caste, they join hands in siphoning-off 
project funds. A Sevika from a rural centre complained: 
The president [of the users’ committee] was demanding more money from the 
funds for ‘Supplementary Nutrition Programme’ and was also asking me to pay 
more to the Sahaika. I complained to the Mukhiya [head of Panchayat]. Rather 
than helping me, the Mukhiya, along with the president and Sahaika, threatened 
to beat me up. They would not have done this had I been of their caste group.
57
 
Our respondent Sevikas argued that they are seen as chor (literally, burglar) by the larger 
society. This negative societal perception adds to their challenges. In case it is not possible to 
enrol more children due to infrastructural challenges or the prescribed threshold, people 
simply do not believe them. If they report this to supervisors or CDPOs, in most cases, they 
are asked to ‘manage it on their own’. These days, especially in urban areas, some (educated) 
people also threaten the Sevikas with the use of the Right to Information (RTI) application to 
know about the selection of beneficiaries. If an RTI application is filed, the Sevikas get 
scolded by the superior staff. A Sevika narrated the problems related to RTI in the following 
words:   
On the one hand we have to run the centre with inadequate funds. On the other, 
we have to bear the grudge of the people for not entertaining their requests to 
enrol additional children. […] The other day, a school teacher came to me and 
threatened that if I do not admit his maid’s child into the centre, he will file an 
RTI. I asked the supervisor what to do? She simply scolded me and said ‘kahe 
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nahi theek se manage kar rahi hain jee?’ [Why aren’t you managing the centre 
properly?].
58
  
The above narrative suggests that while the frontline workers in Bihar have to bear the brunt 
of any shortcomings in the delivery of ICDS, there are neither administrative safeguards at 
their disposal (unlike for other governmental functionaries) nor their superior officials are 
supportive in cases of the RTI applications filed against the centres. 
3.6 Discussion  
 
The recent governance reforms for effective service delivery under the ICDS in Bihar contain 
two main elements. First, policy reforms have tried to improve the delivery side of the 
programme by means of strict vigilance, monitoring and punishment. Second, efforts have 
been made to enhance the capacities of the beneficiaries by instituting mechanisms like the 
users’ committees. This study has evaluated the effectiveness of both the elements of the 
reforms in Bihar. Further, while there are quantitative evidence of leakages in the functioning 
of the ICDS (see Fraker et al, 2013; CAG; 2012-2013), this case-study has revealed several 
reasons of ‘why’ and ‘how’ of both the persistence of corruption and the challenges faced by 
frontline workers. Based on the findings on both the effects of vigilance-focused reforms at 
the ground and how the frontline workers respond to these reforms, the following points can 
be emphasized. 
First, the study found that although there are strong theoretical benefits of monitoring on the 
basis of users’ committees (see Gragnolati et. al, 2006; Sinha, 2006), in practice, these 
committees also have the potential to create additional entry points for corruption. The users’ 
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committees under the ICDS are a case in point. We see that the selection of presidents of 
users’ committees has been discretionary. They were chosen either by the frontline workers 
themselves or under the influence of the local leaders. These committees are likely to be 
ineffective in curbing petty corruption or misappropriation of funds by the frontline workers 
as well as the senior staff. Later on, when users’ committees were replaced by the Anganwadi 
Development committees (headed by a local school teacher), the situation does not seem to 
have improved much. Therefore, the very objective of improving the services of the ICDS, on 
the basis of monitoring through these committees has not been realised at our research sites. 
Furthermore, most of the respondent frontline workers felt that they would have worked more 
effectively in the absence of these committees.  
Second, the study shows that the lack of awareness among beneficiaries about their rights and 
entitlements as well as changes in the rules and regulations about service provisions are major 
obstacles in better functioning of the ICDS. The policy reforms and the consequent changes in 
rules and regulations need to be communicated well to the target population. Otherwise, the 
rules can be circumvented by the project functionaries to their own benefit. For example, it 
was demonstrated how a change in the rule of distributing the ‘take home ration’ (from twice 
a month to once a month) has been manipulated by the Sevikas, especially in rural areas where 
the ‘beneficiaries’ are not so well-informed. This study strongly advocates for awareness 
generation among the beneficiaries to ascertain their rights; and supports the claims made by 
the scholars in favor of the ‘rights based approach’ for the delivery of services under the 
ICDS (see Dreze, 2006; Kent, 2006). It is argued that creating awareness among the 
beneficiaries should be an essential element in the reform approach. 
 
Third, this study has analysed the impact of current ‘vigilance focused’ reforms in curbing 
petty corruption and leakages. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it found that the threat of 
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strict punishment and multiple inspections might become counterproductive in the context of 
Bihar. The monthly ‘cuts’ are continued to be paid to supervisors and CDPOs in most cases, 
and district-level inspection teams are also bribed by the frontline workers in order to avoid 
strict punishment or disciplinary action. Furthermore, the problem of bribery and corruption 
are exacerbated by some technical problems inherent in the programme. For example, food 
inflation, which is not accounted for when funds are released to the centers, leads to 
curtailment in the quantity of ‘take home ration’ and the quality of cooked meals served in the 
centers. The frontline workers also need to ‘manage’ funds for meeting the costs of 
photocopying or general maintenance of the centres. This leads to false reporting and fudging 
of records by frontline workers. In addition, the locally powerful people (including landlords 
and members of local bodies) influence the process of identifying the ‘beneficiaries’. All 
these factors make corruption systemic in the ICDS in Bihar. This case study recommends 
that until the root causes of corruption (e.g. unaccounted food inflation; undue interference by 
landlords and locally influential politicians, or lack of funds for paperwork maintenance) are 
tackled, vigilance focused reforms are not likely to yield results. 
Fourth, the problems plaguing the ICDS are well known for long. Critical observations in the 
past have highlighted the issues of meagre and irregular remuneration to frontline workers, 
excessive workload and paperwork, and leakages in procurement. While endorsing these 
critical observations in the case of Bihar, the study concludes that the strategy for overcoming 
these challenges in service delivery should focus more on the frontline workers and their 
problems than on vigilance and inspections. The study finds that the ‘volunteer model’ of 
delivering public services is not appropriate as the frontline workers lack incentive and 
motivation to improve service delivery. The study recommends regular remuneration and 
regularisation of services of the frontline workers, and providing them with greater 
opportunities of career advancement (e.g. promotion to the posts of supervisors) as well as 
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performance based rewards. Rationalisation of the workload and reducing paper work will 
benefit them in discharging their duties effectively and honestly. In addition, appropriate 
‘grievance redress’ mechanism should be in place, which would allow the frontline workers to 
report the cases of misappropriation of funds and demands of bribery by higher officials. 
These changes could go a long way in boosting their ‘self- image’, change the way society 
perceives them, and in turn, improve service delivery under the ICDS.  
3.7 Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper has analysed the impact of the recently instituted vigilance-focused reforms for 
reducing corruption and improving service delivery under the ICDS in Bihar. We have 
explained what happens when policies hit the ground, and how these reforms are accepted, 
resisted or reshaped by the frontline workers. While there is substantial evidence on the 
prevalence and magnitude of corruption in the ICDS in Bihar (e.g. assessments of the public 
auditors), our study identified some ‘entry points’ for corruption; unravelled its systemic 
nature; and explained its dynamics in select locations. We find that well-meaning strategies 
for reducing corruption (e.g. strict monitoring and regular inspection) may not achieve their 
desired results in the cases where corruption is systemic. On the contrary, these measures may 
end up in making the under-paid and over- burdened frontline workers more insecure.  
The reforms in the ICDS, as they have unfolded thus far have largely overlooked the root 
causes of petty corruption and leakages (e.g. food inflation, non-payment for photocopying 
costs, and partial or delayed payment for the maintenance of premises). These problems are 
easily fixable and will deter both the higher officials as well as community-based monitors 
from demanding bribes. As far as frontline workers are concerned, improving their service 
conditions, wages, and providing incentives for better performance will certainly enhance the 
quality of service provision. In the context of Bihar, where corruption is systemic and 
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frontline workers are not the only culprits, policy makers and enforcement officials need to 
ask, who will monitor the monitors? 
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4 Chapter Four: What do future bureaucrats think about 
bribery? A study of civil services aspirants from Bihar 
                                     
Abstract 
 
Civil services are the ‘backbone’ of the general administration in Bihar. The officials are 
engaged in the implementation of governmental policies and developmental programmes 
under the overall supervision of political masters, who keep changing on the basis of 
periodical elections. In the Indian context, civil servants are often seen as key elements 
responsible for systemic corruption. Taking recourse to the two dominant theories of anti-
corruption: the ‘principal-agent’ and ‘collective action’, this study aims to understand the 
attitude of the aspiring civil servants from Bihar towards bribery and corruption. It is a novel 
attempt to analyse the perceptions of future bureaucrats about the issues related to 
corruption: what deters the potential bribe takers from accepting bribes, and what do they 
think about corruption in public life? Bribery experimental games were administrated to 
examine the impact of varying degrees of ‘punishment’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘knowledge about 
public loss’ and their relation to the varying ‘bribery amount’. In addition, ‘focus-group 
discussions’ were initiated with these subjects to explore the dynamics of corruption. The 
findings suggest that high ‘public loss’ and high ‘severity of punishment’ were able to deter 
bribery even in the situations where bribe amount were high. On the other hand, the impact of 
high ‘monitoring’ was only effective in cases where the bribe amount was low. Focus-group 
discussions attributed the factors of ‘social acceptance’, ‘distorted parameters of successes 
and ‘no punishment for the guilty’ as the major reasons for ever continuing corruption in the 
public sphere. 
 
Keywords: Corruption; punishment; public loss; monitoring; civil services aspirants 
 
4.1  Introduction: 
 
The state of Bihar has a dubious distinction of being one of the most corrupt states in India. 
Just a few years ago, the state was adjudged to have the highest cases of petty corruption in 
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the country (Transparency International India, 2005)
59
. In its effort to curb corruption, the 
present regime of Bihar has instituted several governance reforms since 2005 with the overall 
aim of instituting transparent, effective and responsible governance in the state (see Stern and 
Singh, 2013). Some of the major reforms include provisions for stringent punishment, speedy 
trials of cases involving corruption and promulgation of laws ensuring timely delivery of 
public services. Coupled with these reforms, there is also a prevalence of campaign against 
corruption in the entire country, through national media and civil society activism.  In fact, 
these activisms resulted in the promulgation of transparency legislations way back in 2005
60
 
and most recently in 2012 with the formation of a political party
61
 based on anti-corruption 
plank. Therefore, in recent years, there exist a plethora of anti- corruption activities in the 
entire country. At the backdrop of these reforms and activism, both at the national and state 
level, it would be imperative to explore how the future civil servants from Bihar perceive 
corruption. After all, civil servants are the principal delivery agents of the state. Further, it is 
believed that perception has an impact on the corrupt behaviour (see Heidenheimer, 2006). 
While there are claims of significant improvement in the overall governance in Bihar (see 
Sing and Stern 2013), there is also a need to explore if it has also resulted into any attitudinal 
change on how corruption is perceived among the delivery agents of the state.  
There is unembellished dearth of studies which examine the attitude of the civil servants on 
the issues of bribery and corruption in India. One of most obvious reason for this gap is the 
enormous difficulty to empirically engage the serving civil servants into any academic 
exercise and examine their attitude towards corruption. This gap acquires critical status; given 
                                                     
59http://archive.transparency.org/regional_pages/asia_pacific/newsroom/news_archive2/india_corrupti
on_study_2005.  (Accessed 12 September 2014) 
60
 The Right to Information Act (RTI) is an Act of the Indian Parliament under which citizens can seek 
information from any public authority. The public authorities are required to provide the information within 
thirty days of inquiry.  
61
 Aam Admi Party was constituted out of a civil society activism against corruption better known as the ‘India 
Against Corruption’.  
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the fact that the success of any anti-corruption reforms is contingent upon the kind of impact 
it has on the mind-set of the delivery agents. Therefore, it becomes very important to 
understand and explore the attitude of the civil servants on corruption as it would be 
instrumental in redefining the anti-corruption endeavours of the country. This study is an 
endeavour in this regard. However, owing to the limitations on engaging the serving civil 
servants into any academic exercise, this study explored the attitude of the aspiring civil 
servant from Bihar. Overall, this paper aims to contribute to filling this literature gap by 
exploring the attitude of the aspiring civil servants from Bihar on corruption.   
Additionally, with the emergence of experimental research work on corruption (see Frank and 
Schulze, 2000; Abbink et al, 2002), an opportunity to empirically explore and understand 
various facets of corruption has been generated. As a result, there has been beginning of the 
experimental study on corruption in India (see Hanna and Yi-Wang, 2013).  Drawing upon 
the scope created by the experimental methods, this paper is an attempt to empirically study 
the bribery behaviour of the aspiring civil servants from Bihar through bribery games. 
Further, it tries to explore the underlying reasons for their propensity to engage in corruption 
through ‘focus group’ discussions. The bribery game tested the impact of some of the most 
dominant methods (stringent punishment and monitoring) of controlling corruption on the 
overall bribery behaviour. Further, focus group discussions unearthed some of the 
fundamental information which shaped the attitude of the civil servants. Overall, this study is 
an attempt to answer the following questions: How do the future civil servants perceive 
corruption in the public services? Can monitoring and the fear of stringent punishment curb 
bribery? What impact the knowledge about cumulative public loss have on the bribery 
behaviour? What are the major causes of corruption in the public services? What kinds of 
reforms are necessary for curtailing corruption? These are the major queries of this study. The 
paper is divided into five sections. The first deals with a brief introduction on the civil 
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services in India, the overall problem of corruption in the country and the major theoretical 
underpinnings on which the present anti-corruption is based. The second section introduces 
the objectives and the methodology of the study. Third section provides the designing of the 
‘bribery experiment’ along with the results. The fourth section narrates the outcome of the 
‘focus group’ discussion. The fifth section consists of a detailed discussion on the outcomes 
followed by an overall conclusion. 
4.2  Civil services and corruption 
 
The general administration of the government of Bihar is managed by a group of ‘generalist’62 
civil servants. They constitute the middle and the top level of bureaucracy which plays an 
important role in the governance of the state. Moreover, civil servants constitute the part of 
permanent executive as the political masters keep changing on the basis of the periodical 
elections. This permanency makes it the ‘steel-frame’ of the entire administrative machinery. 
The sources of recruitment of these officials are through two different independent 
constitutional authorities. The first group of officials are recruited through the Union Public 
Services Commission (hereafter UPSC) which conducts an annual examination for the entry 
into different types of services for the entire country. One among those services is the 
prestigious Indian Administrative Services (IAS). After recruitment into the IAS, the officials 
are allotted different state cadres. All the officials who are allotted Bihar cadre work for the 
government of Bihar as well as the government of India in turns. They hold the highest 
administrative posts in the state. The second group of the officials are recruited through the 
‘Bihar Public Service Commission’ (hereafter BPSC). These officials are allotted different 
services based on their merit and preferences. They hold the middle level administrative 
positions of the Bihar government. There is a famous German proverb- der Fisch stinkt vom 
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Kopf (literally, the fish rots from the head). Therefore, it is very essential to explore the 
dynamics of corruption from the perspectives of these officials. This study is an effort in that 
direction. 
 
Furthermore, with the absence of large opportunities in the private sectors, civil services are 
accorded the first career options for the millions of Indian youths. In states like Bihar, where 
the industrialisation stands very low, it emerged as the most sought after career option. In fact, 
the northern state of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar constitutes around 26 per cent of the total 
number of Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers in India.63 Therefore, by exploring 
the perception of the civil services aspirants from Bihar will also be helpful in conjecturing an 
overall picture of the entire bureaucracy of the country. While UPSC has been conducting the 
‘Combined Civil Services Examination’ annually, the BPSC has not been very regular in its 
examinations. The examination for both the services comprises of three stages and lasts for 
approximately ten months. Success in one stage leads to others, and consequently the 
unsuccessful ones are eliminated after the completion of each stage. The successful candidates 
are allotted services based on their merit in the overall examination as well as their personal 
preferences. Once recruited, they serve as permanent employee and retire at the age of sixty. 
In spite of such rigorous efforts for selecting the best candidates for civil services, there are 
numerous cases of corruption against them.
64
 It is suggested that for the selection into civil 
services, emphasis should be on the personality of the individuals rather than their academic 
(Hanna and Yi-Wang, 2013). Another line of argument is that selection should be based on 
merit as it reduces corruption (Dahlström et al. 2012). Therefore, it’s very important to 
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identify the attributes of corruption from the perspectives of the future civil servants. It can 
potentially contribute to the personality verses merit debate.  For the purpose of this study, the 
candidates who had passed their first screening test of the UPSC and were natives of Bihar 
were evaluated. Also, majority of these candidates expressed their keenness to appear for the 
examination conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission, if they failed in the current 
UPSC examination.   
4.3  The problem of corruption 
 
Corruption has emerged as an important element of the current political discourse in India. It 
is considered as the biggest challenge in terms of governance in contemporary India (Quah, 
2008; Gupta, 2001). Moreover, commentators of Indian polity have for long talked about the 
massive prevalence of corruption in almost all the spheres of public life (see Kohli, 1975; 
Vittal, 2012; Gouveal et al, 2013). There is a popular perception that corruption in India is 
deeply ingrained into the system of governance, and that rent–seeking by governmental 
machinery has become a rule rather than an exception. Vittal (2012) described the problem of 
corruption using the metaphor of ‘multiple organ failure’ for it involved almost the entire 
governmental machinery. In one of the recent admission to the prevalence of massive 
corruption by the government, the nexus between top bureaucrats and the politicians were 
revealed, and a need for changing the mind-set of the bureaucrats was emphasised upon.
65
 It is 
not that the government has not instituted reforms. As stated earlier in the paper, there is 
enactment of Right to Information Act (RTI) as a result of the continuous pressure from 
various civil society organisations. Also, the present regime of Bihar has implemented various 
anti-corruption reforms. However, reported cases of massive corruption every now and then 
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cast doubts on the efficacy of these anti-corruption legislations and reforms. It becomes 
crucial to explore why corruption cases are such a menace in developing countries like India. 
Some of the recent academic works sited surprizing attributes for the prevailing corruption in 
India. In one of the study it was stated how people condemned corruption but it did not 
influence their corrupt behaviour (see Marquette et al. 2014). The other one claimed that the 
students aspiring to work for the public sector in India had more inclinations towards 
corruption (see Hanna and Yi-Wang, 2013). Thus we find that the existing academic works on 
corruption in India conceived corruption as all pervasive with inherent contradictions in the 
ways it is perceived by the people and acted upon. Therefore, it becomes essential to 
comprehend these discrepancies by understanding the attitude of aspiring civil servants on 
corruption. Before doing so, it would be imperative to briefly comprehend two of the major 
theoretical reinforcements which have dominated the anti-corruption paradigm so far.   
4.4 Theoretical background 
 
Most of the contemporary policy makers as well as the academic have aligned their ‘anti-
corruption’ advocacies on the basis of the ‘Hong Kong’ model (Marquette et al, 2014). These 
are based on the tenants of the principal-agent theory. This theory’ attribute corruption to 
‘information –asymmetry’, where the principals66 have more information than the agents67 
(Klitgaard, 1998, Rose Ackerman 1978, Beseley 2006). For controlling corruption, they 
emphasise on limiting the discretion, and increasing the accountability of the public servants. 
It could be done by the way of reducing the value of bribes. The value of bribe can be 
significantly reduced if there are very high chances of being caught coupled with severe 
punishment (Klitgaard, 1998; Shah, 2007). There is a huge influence of this theory on the 
                                                     
66
 principals are basically embody of public interest  
67
 agents are the ones who perform the work and has the power to have an impact on others 
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prevailing global ‘anti-corruption’ efforts (Persson et al, 2013; Marquette et al. 2014). 
However, the critics claim that this model has failed in curbing corruption in countries which 
are infected with systemic corruption (Brinkeroff 2000; Johnston 2005; Lawson 2009). 
Instead, they contest that in these countries, corruption must be perceived as a ‘collective 
action problem’ where measures like punishment and monitoring becomes ineffective, as no 
one likes to hold others responsible for it. Consequently there is a need for changing the belief 
among individuals that others are not corrupt (Persson et al. 2013). Drawing on these two 
major theories, this study conducted an empirical analysis of the impact casted by the tools of 
the principal agent model (monitoring and severe punishment) on the bribery behaviour of the 
aspiring civil servants. Further, focus group discussions are conducted to supplement the 
empirical data and also to evaluate the problem of corruption through the lens of collective 
action theory.  
4.5 Methodology, Sampling and Data Collection: 
 
Data was collected through two methods: 
1. Bribery game 
2. Focus group discussion 
 
For the bribery games, 36 candidates were chosen from two different ‘coaching’ institutes in 
Delhi
68. For the purpose of the experiment, they are referred to as ‘X’ and ‘Y’. Delhi was 
chosen, as it is the most sought after city for the preparations of the civil services 
examinations. These coaching institutes offer specialised training and prepare the aspiring 
civil services candidates for the civil services examination. The candidates were among 
those who had passed their first level of screening test conducted by the UPSC. Initially, it 
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was very challenging to persuade the coaching institutes in Delhi for the bribery game. More 
than eight different coaching institutes were visited for this purpose and with several rounds 
of persuasion; two of the coaching institutes were groped in. Therefore, the selections of the 
coaching institutes were solely based on their readiness to engage into this experiment. 
Another herculean task was to persuade the students from Bihar for their participation. It 
was demanding as they were busy with their preparations for the second round of 
examination. They would not have liked to engage into any other activity. However, several 
rounds of visits were made on these coaching institutes, and with the influence of the staffs 
of these coaching institutes, candidates from Bihar were persuaded for this exercises. 
Therefore, the selections of the candidates were also based on their voluntarism. Bribery 
games were played on these two coaching institutes followed by the focus group 
discussions. The theme of the Focus-group discussion was ‘corruption in the civil services’. 
Deliberations were made on the broad topic of ‘why’ and ‘how’ of corruption.  Notes were 
made by the ‘observers’ during the course of discussion. 
 
4.6  Designing of the ‘Bribery Game’ 
 
The game is inspired from the papers ‘An Experimental Bribery Game’ (Abbink et al, 2002) 
and ‘Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of 
corruptibility’ (Schulze and Frank, 2003). It involves simplest act of bribery. In any act of 
bribery, there is involvement of at least two individuals. One is the bribe giver (e.g. contractor 
etc.) and the other is the bribe taker (i.e. public official). It involves transfer of money from 
the former to the later. In doing so, there are monetary profits made by both of them. At the 
same time, they harm the society though bribery. For example, the contractor will not supply 
quality goods thereby harming the beneficiaries. Drawing on this simple act of bribery, this 
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game was designed to be played in ‘pairs’. Each team consisted of two players: ‘A’ as the 
bribe giver and ‘B’ as the public official. Since, the civil servants in India constitute the 
middle and higher level of bureaucracy; they are not a part of the frontline workers. 
Therefore, they are more involved in supervisory roles and deal directly with the contractors 
and middleman for awarding contracts for the public goods. Therefore, they form a kind of a 
sustained relationship with them. In order to model this aspect of relationship, the players 
played the full session of the game with the same partners. Another matter of concern was the 
effect of the word ‘bribery’ on the participant’s behaviour. In some of the experimental 
games, it is found that the selection of words have an impact on the responses.  In two- player 
reciprocity game (see Burnham, McCabe and Smith, 2000), mere changing the word from 
‘opponent’ to ‘partner’ changed their co-operative behaviour significantly. At the same time, 
there are also claims (see Alm et al, 1992) that ‘neutral’ words do not make any difference. In 
order to keep the findings of this study free from such polemics, it was played as the ‘bribery 
game’ in one coaching institute and as the ‘decision-making game’ in the other. 
There were no differences in the ways both the games were played except for the names with 
which they were introduced among the players. In the ‘Decision making game’ the players did 
not know that ‘A’ modelled a bribe giver, and ‘B’ a public official. In contrast, in the ‘Bribery 
Game’, it was implicit for the players to identify ‘A’ as the bribe giver and ‘B’ as Public 
Official. The overall goal of this experimental game was to comprehend the impact of public 
losses, ‘probability of being detected i.e. monitoring’ and ‘severity of punishment’ on the 
bribery behaviour of the participants and how any increase in the bribe amount affects it.  In 
keeping with these goals, all the variables were manipulated at three levels. For nomenclature 
purposes they were classified as: low, moderate and high. Table no. 1 shows the values 
assigned to them under each category.                                                                                                                                               
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                                                          Table No.1 
   Treatment 
       Level 
Bribe Amount Loss to Public Risk of being 
Caught 
(monitoring) 
Severity 
Of Punishment 
 
         LOW 
 
      Rs.  25 
 
   Rs. 400 
Probability of 
0.34 
Penalty of Rs. 
150 
 
   MODERATE 
 
       Rs. 50 
 
     Rs. 800 
Probability of 
0.50 
Penalty of Rs.  
200 
 
          HIGH 
 
        Rs. 75 
 
     Rs.1200 
Probability of 
0.67 
Penalty of Rs 
250 and social 
loss 
 
During the games, some amount of money (the exact amount is narrated later in the 
paragraph) was credited to the accounts of every player. They had to play with this money. 
After the end of the game, their accounts were settled on the basis of their decisions made 
during the game. To start with, participants were randomly assigned into teams. Each team 
was provided with written instructions, specifying details of how the game is to be played, the 
treatments, and the options they could choose from. Each of the three teams was assisted by a 
trained person employed by the research team for conducting this game. In the written format, 
all the participants’ pairs were given a total of 28 treatments. For the first ten treatments, each 
of the payers was told that their account has been credited with Rupees 1000 each (enough to 
cover nearly 30-40 per cent of their monthly accommodation rental bills) and they have to 
play the initial 10 treatments with this amount.  
The first treatment aimed to establish ‘base-line’ behaviour of the players. Here, ‘A’ was 
given a situation where he or she could transfer Rs 50 to ‘B’. If ‘B’ accepted, it got added to 
his or her account and concurrently Rs.100 was added to the account of ‘A’.  If it was 
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rejected, the account of ‘B’ remained unaltered, but ‘A’ lost Rs 10 as the transaction cost69. 
Therefore, it was a win-win scenario for both the players. Also, it was overall efficient for ‘A’ 
to offer money and for the ‘B’ to accept as nobody was harmed in the entire process. This 
treatment acted as the control for the supplementary treatments.  
In the remaining 27 treatments (details of which are explained in later paragraphs), the 
element of ‘bribe’ in the form of ‘loss incurred to the society’ was introduced.  Bribe was 
operationalized as a negative externality inflicted upon the public (other players) arising from 
the reciprocal behaviour between the bribe giver and taker. This was done by imposing a 
fixed monetary damage on other players whenever the public official chooses to accept bribe. 
All the other teams played the role of the public for each other. There were nine teams playing 
at one given time. Thus, if a pair chooses to execute bribery, 16 other players (8 pairs) were 
damaged. Moreover, the total damage far exceeded the mutual gains realised by both the 
players of the team executing the bribe. Further, for the scoring purposes, if the money was 
offered and accepted a score of 1 was assigned; offered but not accepted a score of 0.5 and a 
score of 0 if it was not offered (see table no.2) 
4.6.1 Scoring:  
 
The treatments of the game were assigned the following score: 
                                                           Table No. 2 
                                         Conditions Score 
Bribe offered and accepted    01 
Bribe offered and rejected    0.5 
Bribe not offered     00 
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 Transaction cost modelled the cost an individual incurs in meeting the public official 
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The paper acknowledges its limitation of not being able to capture situations where the bribe 
was not offered, but had it been offered what would have been the decision of the bribe taker.  
As bribery is carried out secretly; no feedback regarding the decisions of a team was provided 
to the other team. Thus, the pairs did not know till the end of the game about the extent they 
were damaged by others. Consequently, they were also not informed about their current 
cumulative earnings at any stage of the game. They were also assured that even after the end 
of the game; no team will be told how other teams have played. Each of the teams would be 
given their money under closed doors. Therefore, secrecy was preserved even after the end of 
the game. 
The first 9 treatments among the remaining 27 treatments probed the impact of ‘public losses’ 
on the bribery behaviour and the way it got affected by increasing the bribe amount. The 
treatment was similar to the first treatment except the addition of public loss. Here, ‘A’ was 
given a situation where he or she could transfer money to ‘B’ and if it was accepted, both ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ benefitted, but in the process the remaining players in the room lost some money. The 
values of the money benefitting both ‘A’ and ‘B’ as well the ‘total loss incurred by others’ 
were manipulated at three levels. Therefore it had in total nine treatments as the following:  1) 
low bribe amount-low public loss 2) low bribe amount-moderate public loss 3) low bribe 
amount-high public loss 4) moderate bribe amount-low public loss 5) moderate bribe amount-
moderate public loss 6) moderate bribe amount-high public loss 7)  high bribe amount-low 
public loss 8) high bribe amount-moderate public loss 9) high bribe amount-high public loss. 
The next 9 treatments examined the relationship between varying ‘probability of being 
detected’ and the bribery amount on the similar ways how the earlier 9 treatments were 
manipulated. However, in these treatments, additional feature of ‘detection of bribery’ as well 
as ‘punishment in cases of detection’ were inserted. Since, the results of the earlier nine 
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treatments were not evaluated at this point of time; it was unknown for everyone how much 
money was there in the players account. Therefore, all the players were told that a sum of 
Rupees 900 was further credited to their account. Whether bribery was detected or not was 
determined by rolling a dice. The punishment was operationalized by the ways of monetary 
losses. Also, for all the nine treatments there was a constant value for the ‘public loss’ 
(Rupees 400) and ‘punishment when detected’ (loss of Rupees 100 by both the players of the 
team). The values of both the bribe amount as well as the ‘possibilities of detection’ were 
manipulated at three levels. For the probability of detection, the different values were 0.34; 
0.50 or 0.67; and for the bribe amount it was Rupees 25; 50 or 75.  Therefore, whenever 
bribery was executed, the total public loss was of Rupees 400 followed by the rolling of a 
dice. The dice was rolled by a trained person appointed by the research team. They were 
instructed to roll the dice after every treatment irrespective of bribe being accepted or not.  It 
was so done in order to prevent the teams from knowing what options others were making. In 
cases of the detection of bribery, a flat monetary penalty of Rupees 100 was levied on both 
the players of the team.   
The last nine treatments examined the impact of ‘severity of punishment’ and the way it was 
affected by the varying ‘bribery amount’. Again the treatments were manipulated in the 
fashion similar to the earlier treatments. In these treatments, the amount of public loss 
(Rupees 400) and the ‘probability of being detected’ (at 0.34) were kept constant. Only the 
values of the bribe amount and the ‘punishment when detected’ were manipulated. Further, 
punishment also involved social losses apart from the monetary losses in the extreme cases. 
For the social loss, the information regarding the bribery behaviour of the culpable was to be 
conveyed to other players after the end of the game. For the severity of punishment, the 
values were manipulated as: loss of Rupees 150; 200 and Rupees 250 coupled with the 
exposure of the bribery behaviour to two other teams, and for the bribe amount it was Rupees 
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25; 50 or 75. Since, the results of the earlier treatments were not evaluated at this point of 
time; it was unknown for everyone how much money was there in the players account. 
Therefore, all the players were told that a sum of Rupees 900 was further credited to their 
account. Further, they were also warned that if they were punished with over Rupees 900, 
they would not be allowed further treatments and they would continue to be seated in their 
place till the end of the game. 
Further, as each of the variables was judged through 9 treatments, the total scores were 
interpreted in the following ways: 
                                                           
                                                           Table No.3 
Total Score                                Interpretation 
      09                          A total corrupt situation 
      00                      A total honest situation 
                                                                                                             
4.7  Results  
            
The first treatment (involving no bribery) aimed to establish the base behaviour of the players. 
In this treatment it was found that all the players executed the deal. Therefore, it ascertained 
that all the players were economically rational. Below are the cumulative scores for the other 
27 treatments.        
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A. Treatments examining the impact of Public Loss and the Bribe Amount on the 
Bribery behaviour 
                                                   
                                                            Table No. 4 
 
                   
                                                       
                                                          Table No. 5 
 
                                    LBA: Low Bribe Amount       MBA: Moderate Bribe Amount   HBA: High Bribe Amount 
                                    LPL: Low Public Loss             MPL: Moderate Public Loss        HPL: High Public Loss           
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In both the coaching institutes, any increase in public loss resulted into a subsequent decline 
in the bribery behaviour.  Bribery is significantly reduced in treatments involving high public 
loss even when it has a high bribe amount. There is an incidence of a near total honest 
situation in coaching institute X ‘decision-making game’ (score of 1) when the bribe amount 
is low and the public loss is high. The situation in coaching institute Y ‘bribery game’ is also 
similar with the score of (2.5). Another observation is that whenever there is an increase in the 
bribe amount, it has resulted into a corresponding increase in the bribery behaviour. The most 
corrupt situation is witnessed in situations of high bribe coupled with low public loss (a score 
of 8.5 in coaching institute X and 7.5 in coaching institute Y). Thus, we find a kind of an 
inverse relationship between bribe amount and public loss in terms of their impact on the 
bribery behaviour of the players. These results are much on the expected lines. Thus, it can be 
inferred that high public loss has a potential to curtail bribery behaviour. The next two tables 
present the results on the impact of probability of detection i.e. monitoring on the bribery 
behaviour. 
B: Treatments examining the impact of Probability of Detection and the Bribe Amount 
on the Bribery behaviour 
                                                       Table No. 6   
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                                                        Table No.7  
 
                        LBA: Low Bribe Amount   MBA: Moderate Bribe Amount   HBA: High Bribe Amount 
               LPD: Low Probability of Detection   MPD: Moderate Probability of Detection   HPD: High Probability of Detection 
 
In contrast to the impact of high public loss on the bribery behaviour, high ‘probability of 
detection’ was not very effective in restraining bribery. Though, it had some impact when the 
bribe amount was low, a further increase in the bribe amount reversed it. In fact, in both the 
coaching institutes, players resorted to more bribery in treatments where high probability of 
detection was coupled with high bribe amount. There are also couple of interesting findings 
contrary to the expected behaviour. They are given below: 
 Coaching institute ‘Y’ (bribery game) witnessed more incidences of bribery when the 
probability of detection increased from moderate level to high level, even when the 
bribe amount was same at both the incidences. 
 Treatments involving high bribe amount witnessed more incidences of bribery in the 
‘bribery game’ (coaching institute ‘Y’) than in the ‘decision making game’ (coaching 
institute ‘X’). 
 In contrast to the above situations, in conditions of moderate probability of detection, 
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bribery behaviour occurred less frequently in the bribery game (coaching institute ‘Y’) 
than in the decision making game (coaching institute ‘X’). 
 
This paper could not find a suitable explanation for this contradictory phenomenon. It leaves 
it for the future research to unravel it.  One of the probable explanation could be the impact of 
the word ‘bribe’ which reduced the bribery behaviour in the situations of moderate probability 
of detection in the bribery game. But, then why was it not reduced and instead increased 
further in situations of high probability of detection stands enigmatic. Apart from these 
contrary outcomes, the results could only claim that the probability of being detected i.e. 
monitoring was only effective in controlling bribery whenever the bribe amount was low. 
Lastly, the result of the impact of punishment on bribery is presented below. 
B. Treatments examining the impact of Severity of Punishment and the Bribe 
Amount on the Bribery behaviour 
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                                                                Table No. 9 
 
                                    LBA: Low Bribe Amount       MBA: Moderate Bribe Amount   HBA: High Bribe Amount 
                                    LSP: Low Severity of Punishment   MSP: Moderate Severity of Punishment 
                                    HSP: High Severity of Punishment 
 
The high severity of punishment stands most effective in controlling bribery. Even any 
increase in the bribe amount could not reduce its impact significantly.  However, ‘low 
severity of punishment’ impacted both the coaching institutes differently. In coaching Y 
(bribery game), the severity of punishment deterred bribery more consistently than in 
coaching X (decision making game). May be, for what one is being punished for, influenced 
his or her bribery decision. However, in the situations of high severity of punishment, the 
overall bribery behaviour is reduced for both the variance of the games.  Over all, the results 
show that the high severity of punishment has the greatest impact on deterring bribery 
behaviour.  
4.8 Focus group discussion:  
 
The discussion’s main theme was to explore the dynamics of corruption in the public services.  
Enquiries with regards to the impact of the recent reforms and their efficacy were also 
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discussed. It was followed by a debate on what could be the best means to curtail corruption 
in India. Also, during the conversations, efforts were made to inquire how the choices were 
made by the participants in the bribery game. Below is a synoptic account of the most 
important conclusions from both the focus group discussions. 
One of the most ground-breaking information which emerged out in the course of discussion 
was the existence of an informal terminology to classify public services. This classification 
was based on the ‘bribe extracting potential’ offered in a service. At one end of the spectrum 
lied all those services which offered immense extraction potentials.  These services are 
informally referred as ‘plump or cream’. On the other end lied those services which offered 
very few opportunities for corruption and were referred as ‘shunting’.  Many of the 
participants were of the view that services derived their ‘prestige’ in society in terms of their 
placement on this wide spectrum. Those who lie on the ‘plump’ side commanded greater 
‘prestige’ and were most sought after by the youths. These are not only true for the federal 
services but also for the various state services. Participants were of the opinion that many of 
the job seekers prioritise their preferences for the services on the basis of this categorisation.  
An interesting feature of this categorisation is that it also exits within a service. For example, 
even in a service which is on the ‘plump’ end of the spectrum, have postings which are 
‘plump’ and ‘shunting’. The remarkable feature of this categorisation is that the ‘shunt’ 
posting in ‘plump’ services is better in terms of its exploitative potential than a ‘plump’ 
posting in ‘shunting’ services. Moreover, the prevailing administrative and political system 
abets corruption among officials on the basis of this categorisation. It is common 
understanding that 'honest’ officials are frequently transferred and placed in ‘shunting’ 
positions. The officials have to make a choice between corruption and transfer to shunting 
position. In either case, corruption does not stop. All the officials know that if they do not do 
it, someone else will do that. This dilemma among the civil servants is one of the major 
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causes of corruption. It further allures the civil servants to retain crucial ‘plump’ postings 
leading to the appeasement of their superiors and political masters. This is one of the reasons 
why there is prevalence of bureaucrats-politicians nexus. The discussion was supplemented 
by an affirmation on how any change in government is followed by massive reshuffling in 
bureaucracy.  Therefore, the participants were of the view that prevailing system abets 
corruption and officials succumb to it.  
Further, it was unanimously accepted that there is rampant corruption in public services of the 
country. Bribery was not an exception and everyone was aware of at least few corrupt 
officials, either in the family, friends, or neighbourhood. One of the interesting features of 
these phenomena is that corrupt officials are not looked down upon in the society. Instead, 
they are held in high esteem on account of wealth they possess. In families, they help other 
members with money. For example, they contribute in relative’s daughter marriage 
expenditure and dowry; pay high tuitions fees of relative’s children for the engineering, 
medical or management institutes. Even among friends, they earn special status. One of the 
participants explained the reasons for corrupt officials’ high status among friends and family 
in the following words: 
          They can arrange holidays for friends; give them costly gifts on birthdays. 
Further people also realise that their friends in the civil services are the only 
one, who can provide them soft loans at the time of need. Also, for any work in 
the government offices, these friends help them with their parravi (literally, 
recommendation) […….]70 
Moreover, the above stated attributes were more peculiar to the officials working in the 
‘plump or cream’ departments. In fact, they are expected to be like that. Many a times, if they 
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do not fulfil these illicit demands of their relatives and friends, they are considered as ‘miser’ 
and not ‘honest’. Everyone takes for granted that corruption is part and parcel of their jobs. In 
addition, not everyone in the family is financially secured, and thus it becomes the 
responsibility of the person employed in the cream department to help them in securing a 
better life.  Furthermore, it was also stated that people have become greedier in the recent 
times. There is tremendous rise of consumerism after the opening up of markets since 1990s. 
People are demanding electronics gadgets, cars and other commodities which keep updating 
every couple of months. It has redefined the ways success is perceived in the society. At 
present, success is only evaluated in terms of money one possesses. Further, few of the public 
officials consider their posting as ‘one time opportunity’ to amass wealth. Therefore, officials 
bribe their superiors to retain their ‘plump’ posting. It leads to the creation of a corruption 
web.  
Another important attribute for corruption which dominated the discussion was the way 
corrupt officials have been dealt with in the past. It is perceived that the post-independence 
history of India has favoured the corrupt. The participants believed that corrupt official were 
hardly punished for their graft. There were quite a few number of reported corruption cases 
which dominated the media attention for days but in the end everyone got acquitted.  It has 
the biggest influence on the mind-set of the public officials as well as the people at large.  It 
was unanimously accepted that severe punishment to these officials would have changed the 
way corruption is presently perceived in the society and would have deterred officials from 
indulging in corruption. Given the fact, how competitive it is to get into the public sector, 
officials would never risk it. The problem is that the government officials are hardly caught. 
Moreover, there is absence of speedy trials coupled with numerous channels of escape. 
Therefore, officials indulge in bribery discretely and do not fear any punishment. Drawing on 
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the leniency the corrupt officials have enjoyed in the past there is absence of ‘role models of 
honest officials’. One of the participants explained: 
We hardly find ‘role-models’ of honest officials. Though, there were few 
incidences in the past where some honest officials challenged the 
establishment, but in the end they could not achieve any success. These 
incidences have cemented the perception that it is very grim to fight corruption 
[……]71 
Beside the absence of ‘role models’, early exposure to the incidences of bribery by youths, 
shaped their perception about corruption. People start experiencing ‘bribery’ right form their 
initial stages of life and later imbibe it for ever. One of the participants explained this 
phenomenon by citing an interesting example which among others helps in cementing a belief 
that ‘bribery’ is the normal way of life: 
We all know how difficult it is to secure a seat in the trains. When someone 
bribes for getting a seat in the train, it further allures him to travel ‘without 
ticket’ and bribe whenever caught. In this way, the incidences of bribery 
become a way of life and later he exploits all the other public services through 
bribes […]72  
Further, on the discussion, why corruption continues to be prevalent in public services, given 
the background of a massive civil society led movement against corruption in the recent past.  
The participants produced some interesting conclusions. It was stated that it was not hidden 
from people that petty corruption was rampant in the delivery of public services, still nobody 
opposed it. On the contrary, people belonging to the middle class perpetuated petty 
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corruption. For example, they were happy not to appear for the ‘driving test’ and avail 
‘driving license’ by paying bribes. It became a way of life. Furthermore, in every society, 
middle class is the harbinger of any societal change but in the Indian context, petty corruption 
received the support of the ‘middle class’.  One of the participants narrated how middle class 
in India perceived petty corruption: 
          Bribe act as motivators for public officials to work. At the same time, people 
are also happy paying bribe. In fact, when they bribe, they are assured that their 
work will be accomplished [….]73 
Further, in response to the massive urban based civil society led ‘anti-corruption’ movement 
in the recent years, the participants attributed it to the exposures of  multimillion scams by the 
media houses. At that period of time, the country also witnessed high inflation. It so happened 
that people attributed inflation to these scams. As inflation affected the middle class 
negatively, it rose in opposition. Therefore, till the time corruption does not have any negative 
impact on the people, they do not revolt against it.  This is one of the reasons why, petty 
corruption has thrived for long without much opposition. Participants were of the opinion that 
petty corruption largely affected the poor and distorted the efficient delivery of various 
welfare schemes. Moreover, the poor do not possess the capability or potential to revolt 
against the government officials and therefore petty corruption thrives. 
With regards to the possible ways of curbing petty corruption, the participants attributed it to 
the overall change in the mind-set of the society. People need to socially boycott corrupt 
officials. Any group of services should not be accorded ‘prestige’ on account of its 
exploitative potential but on the basis of its contribution to the nation building. In addition, an 
overall belief that corruption is destructive has to be created among people. One of the best 
                                                     
73
 Excerpts from focus group discussion 27.10.2013 
                                   
  
 
146 
 
ways to create such a belief is through school education. Right from the school days, children 
should be taught about the ills of corruption. There should be story books for the children 
depicting corruption as the biggest form of treachery against the country and mankind. One of 
the participants aptly narrated the importance of societal perception in the following way: 
…. the government servants come from the society where bribery is perceived 
as a way of life. Any change in social perception, will bring a deciding change 
in the mind set of bribe-takers as well as the bribe giver [….]74 
Moving onto the ways the latest anti-corruption reforms have impacted the overall nature of 
corruption, the participants presented mixed responses. They largely conceived ‘transparency 
legislation’ as an important tool to bring about changes in the way people perceives 
bureaucracy. It has given the ‘educated’ people a sense of power vis a vis government 
officials. It is also through this legislation that many of the ‘scams’ were unearthed. However, 
few of the participants raised concerns about the punishment meted out to corrupt officials. 
They argued that transparency legislation could only expose corruption but it cannot punish 
the offenders. Until, the officials are punished for corruption, transparency legislation will 
stand ineffective. On the anti-corruption reforms instituted by the Bihar government, the 
participants were of the view that the efforts of the government are not very successful. It has 
to be supplemented by a corresponding change in the mind-set of the ordinary people. 
Moreover, the outcome of the next state assembly elections (due in November 2015) would 
also have an effect on the anti-corruption efforts.  If there is a change in the government, it’s 
not certain whether the new regime will follow the anti-corruption efforts.  
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With regards to the games and how choices were made, majority of the participants were of 
the opinion that monitoring in the absence of strict punishment could not deter bribery. One of 
the participants justified his action in the following way: 
Players knew for sure that all the others in the room accepted bribe every time 
the level of punishment was low. When the level of monitoring went high 
without any change in the punishment, it did not have any influence.  After all, 
detection would have cost only few Rupees […..]75 
Further, the participants also narrated that high public loss and high severity of punishment 
deterred them from accepting the bribe.  For the treatments involving high public losses, 
many of the participants perceived it as ‘mutually assured losses ’. Though any bribery would 
have harmed everyone, the participants were of the opinion that in situations where the loss 
inflicted upon others were not very high; they were not sure whether other would refrain from 
bribery. Additionally, an interesting feature was that majority of the participants agreed that 
they did not take into account the cumulative loss incurred by others while making their 
decision. Instead, the decisions were based on loss incurred to the individual.  Besides, all the 
participants agreed that the most effective deterrence to the bribery behaviour was the high 
level of punishment. It was because the punishment was solely on them and would have cost 
high economic loss. Therefore, indulging into the bribery behaviour amidst high punishment 
was not rational.  
4.9 Discussion  
 
In keeping with the overall aim of this paper, the results from the bribery games as well as the 
focus group discussions can be summarized as below: 
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Firstly, the study tried to explore whether public loss had any impact on the bribery behaviour 
of the civil services aspirants. The results found that high public loss acted as deterrence to the 
bribery behaviour. The participants viewed high public loss as mutually destructive. However, 
low public loss could not deter bribery as participants anticipated that others would accept 
bribe in these situations. The findings confirm the proposition made by Persson et al. (2013) 
that corruption can be controlled by changing the belief among individuals that others are not 
corrupt. Another thought-provoking finding was that very few participants calculated the 
cumulative loss inflicted upon others while deciding on their bribery behaviour, and moral 
connotations of not accepting ‘bribe’ did not even appear in the focus group discussion. 
Through this study it is claimed that the aspiring civil servants decisions on bribery are solely 
based on individual gains, economically driven, and devoid of any moral considerations. 
However, one of the limitations of making such a claim is that since all the players were 
known to each other, they might not have conceived their loss as public loss. 
Secondly, the study explored the impact made by the principal-agent model based anti-
corruption tools on civil services aspirants’ bribery behaviour. The impact of strict monitoring 
and severe punishment were evaluated. The findings revealed that strict monitoring was not 
very effective in controlling bribery. In fact, when monitoring and low level of punishment 
were introduced, the instances of bribery went up. These results are contradictory to the 
common sense understanding of bribery. One of the reasons of it could be the ‘excitement’ 
among players on account of throwing of dice. Another probable explanation could be based 
on the claims made by Schulze and Frank (2003) that monitoring reduces the intrinsic 
motivation for honesty for low level of corruption. Further, in both the version of the games, 
an increase in the bribe amount nullified the impact of any increase in the level of monitoring. 
Civil services aspirants did not perceived high level of monitoring risky until it also entailed 
very severe punishment. In contrast, when the level of punishment was raised, the bribery 
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behaviour was consistently reduced even in the conditions of low level of monitoring. Further, 
the results also showed that severe punishment deterred bribery even in the conditions where 
the amount of bribe was high.  For the civil services aspirants’ severe punishment made 
bribery unattractive. Overall, the study supports the assertion of the ‘principal-agent’ model 
that severe punishment potentially deters bribery. 
Thirdly, the study found that for the civil services aspirants from Bihar, there existed informal 
categorisation of the government services based on their exploitative potentials. Further, it 
was perceived that the services with most exploitative potential allured youths to be a part of 
it. No wonder, in one of the recent studies it was claimed that the students aspiring to work for 
the public sector in India had more inclinations towards corruption (see Hanna and Yi-Wang, 
2013). Another contradictory finding was that the aspiring civil servants believed that corrupt 
officials were not looked down upon in the society. On the contrary, they received special 
privileges among friends and family as they help them in securing any government related 
work by the virtue of their position. Therefore, the study explored the existence of social 
acceptance of corruption and how a civil servant becomes a source of ‘contact’ for the family 
members and friends, thus cementing a web of nepotism.  
Fourthly, the aspiring civil servants perceived that corruption was rampant in the public 
services. They attributed it to various interconnected factors. For them, amidst tremendous 
rise in consumerism, success was only evaluated in terms of money one possesses. Further, 
people got exposed to bribery at very early age of life and it became a part of life. Moreover, 
selective apathy of the educated and middle class perpetuated petty corruption as they 
benefited from them. On the other hand, the poor were the major victims’ of petty corruption 
but they did not have any effective voice in the society. Additionally, they attributed the way 
corruption cases have been dealt with in the past as the major perpetuator of corruption in 
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government offices. The perpetuators were hardly punished. It created a situation where 
corruption was perceived as a low risk affair. Furthermore, the way honest officers were 
transferred and manipulated by the politicians tainted the moral of the civil servants and 
allured them towards maintaining ‘status-co’ as far as corruption was concerned. Overall, this 
study explored the dynamics of corruption from the perspective of the civil services aspirants. 
Lastly, the civil services aspirants from Bihar perceived that the way society has conceived 
public offices has a profound impact on the corruption. Any anti-corruption reform has to 
bring about an overall change in the mind-set of the society. Corruption can be significantly 
reduced if speedy trial and punishment is accompanied with social boycott of corrupt officials 
and political accountability.  
4.10 Conclusion 
 
The paper tried to explore the perception of the civil services aspirants from Bihar on 
corruption. In doing so, it empirically analysed the impact of public losses, monitoring and 
severity of punishment on their bribery behaviour. It discovered that high public loss is 
effective in curtailing bribery as the participants perceived it as mutually destructive. It also 
established that severe punishment is the most effective tool for restricting bribery. Similarly, 
it showed how monitoring needs to be coupled with severe punishment for curtailing bribery. 
Further, it also revealed how social acceptance of corruption, apathy of the middle class, and 
the way corruption cases have been dealt with in the past has an impact on the overall 
perception of the civil services aspirants. The study concludes that well-meaning strategies for 
reducing corruption through strict monitoring and regular inspections might not be effective 
on their own. They have to be combined with an overall change in the ways society perceived 
corruption. Moreover, in the context of Bihar, where corruption has been systemic and the 
aspiring civil servants are exhibiting apparent signs of ‘bribery behaviour’, it is the time to 
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contemplate on the ‘carpet change reforms’ as far as the anti-corruption discourse of India has 
gone so far. 
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5  Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study set out to explore the dynamics of petty corruption in the delivery of public 
services to the poor in the Indian state of Bihar. As the state has constituted well- meaning 
anti-corruption mechanisms in the recent past, the study investigated how good governance 
reforms aimed at curbing corruption, unfolded at the ground level. In this pursuit, it has 
undertaken three important enquiries. First, it explored the potential as well as challenges 
faced by a civil society organisation in its efforts towards mobilising the marginalised rural 
poor against petty corruption. Second, it empirically investigated how recent the vigilance 
focused and anti-corruption reforms unfolded in the delivery of nutrition to the children under 
the state’s largest child nutrition programme. Third, the thesis made a novel attempt to 
unravel the perspectives of the future civil servants towards corruption and the way they 
would respond to bribery situations. All these three major objectives constituted a separate 
chapter of this thesis.  Bihar was chosen as the research site on account of its unique situation 
as far as corruption is concerned. About a decade ago, the state was identified as the most 
corrupt one in terms of petty corruption (see Transparency International Report, 2005)
76
 but is 
now claimed to be the best state in India for making efforts towards curbing corruption (see 
Debroy and Bhandari 2012). 
The academic relevance of this enquiry lies on the fact that the general theoretical literature 
on the subject of corruption in India and specifically in the context of resurgent Bihar is 
inconclusive on account of several vital questions. The thesis sought to answer three of these 
vital questions. First, how do civil society organisations mobilise the rural poor against petty 
corruption in the delivery of public services, the way they cope with the various complexities 
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of rural life interwoven around poverty, caste and power dynamics, and how do various 
stakeholders, specially the frontline bureaucrats, respond to these mobilization efforts?. 
Second, how the vigilance focused governance reforms aimed at curtailing petty corruption in 
the delivery of the nutritional services under the Integrated Child Development Scheme 
(ICDS) were implemented, received and contested by the frontline workers. Third, what do 
future bureaucrats (or potential bribe takers) think about corruption in public dealings, what 
are the factors that shape their attitudes toward corruption, and how do they respond to 
bribery situations as part of experimental games?   
The answers to these questions not only aim to serve as significant inputs for future anti-
corruption policies of the government of Bihar but are also likely to contribute to the debates 
on corruption and governance reforms in developing countries in general and India in 
particular. Overall the findings from this study serve to address the following identified gaps 
in the prevailing literature. First, the studies on anti-corruption struggle in India are largely 
urban middle-class centric (Harindranath and Khorana, 2014), and civil society led 
mobilization of the poor against petty corruption has received little attention either in the 
mainstream media or in academic literature. Second, while many studies advocate for 
vigilance focused reforms for curtailing petty corruption in the delivery of welfare services to 
the poor (see Gragnolati et al., 2006; Sinha, 2006), there is a dearth of empirical investigation 
of what happens when these policies hit the ground. Third, there is substantial academic work 
and international reports which problematize the magnitude of corruption in India (see Quah, 
2008; Gupta, 2001; Kohli, 1975; Gouveal et al., 2013); however, very little attention has been 
paid on understanding the future bureaucrats’ attitudes toward bribery and corruption. Fourth, 
while several scholars have claimed that through the policies of good governance, corruption 
can be curbed (e.g. Girishankar et al., 2001; Uddin and Joya, 2007) but there is dearth of 
empirically grounded work on how these reforms are accepted, contested or manipulated by 
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frontline workers. Finally, in the context of developing countries, it is argued that even the 
most efficient anti-corruption tools fail to curb corruption (see Khan, 2006) and ‘country 
specific’ investigation about what actually works at the ground level is necessary for the 
success of governance reforms (Grindle, 2004). This thesis endeavours to be one such 
enquiry in the context of Bihar. 
The thesis was guided by the theoretical frameworks of ‘demand and supply sides reforms’ 
and ‘social accountability’ for grounding its queries and analysing the results. The demand 
side reforms under the investigation included civil society led mobilization, involvement of 
users committees, community participation, the ‘right to information’ and public services 
legislations. On the other hand, the supply side reforms related to provisions of strict 
monitoring, severe punishment, and the perception of the delivery agents. With the help of 
these frameworks, the thesis aimed to explore the dynamics of petty corruption in the delivery 
of public services and identified the bottlenecks for the failures of anti-corruption efforts.  
5.1 Summary of the main results 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the three 
chapters of the thesis: Can grassroots mobilization of the poorest reduce corruption? A tale of 
governance reforms and struggle against rent-seeking in Bihar, India; Can vigilance-focused 
governance reforms improve service delivery? The case of Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) in Bihar, India; What do future bureaucrats think about bribery? A study of 
civil services aspirants from Bihar. This section synthesizes the empirical findings to answer 
the study’s main research questions. 
1. What is the potential and challenges faced by civil society organizations in mobilizing the 
rural poor against petty corruption in welfare schemes, and how do various stakeholders, 
especially the frontline bureaucrats respond to this mobilization? 
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a. Tactics of mobilization are crucial: The case study showed that the task of 
mobilizing the poor was neither easy nor quick for the civil society organization. Their 
strategy of dealing with the problems of utmost importance (alcoholism in this case) was 
instrumental in bringing together the womenfolk, which later translated into the formation of 
a larger community based organization (MVM). Furthermore, in the context of Bihar, 
working with a single caste group made the task of mobilization easier to some extent but it 
also escalated the hostility among other lower castes. 
b. Direct confrontation with the state is necessary: It was found that direct 
confrontation with the state, to some extent, was necessary for the poorest people to avail the 
benefits of welfare schemes meant for them. The Musahars, under the umbrella of their 
community based organization (MVM) and with the active support of the local NGO 
(SSEVK) confronted the state on several occasions, and at times, also resorted to violent 
protest. These confrontations with the state consolidated their power and created fear within 
the local bureaucracy. The street level bureaucrats refrained from demanding bribe from 
them. Furthermore, the symbolic power manifested in the form of bags with logo of their 
community organization (MVM) further infused confidence among them in their dealings 
with local officials. 
c. Rights-based legislations and the presence of civil society organization 
supported by the ‘political will’ of the regime stand crucial: The findings from the study 
reflected how the current international development policy environment (e.g. DFID’s 
emphasis on civil society led mobilization of the poor) as well as rights based legislations 
(e.g. RTI) prompted an active role for civil society organizations in mobilizing the poor 
against petty corruption. The study indicated that the political strategy adopted by the new 
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regime in Bihar to protect the rights of Mahadalits
77
, and in turn, make inroads into their vote-
bank favored the anti-corruption mobilization against petty corruption. It checked the 
discretionary powers that the local bureaucrats often used against the poorest citizens. 
d. Officials act selectively against anti-corruption mobilization: In the case study it 
was found that even though the civil society led movement helped the poor people from 
Musahars caste to get rid of petty corruption to an extent, it also allowed the officials to be 
selective in their bribery preferences and circumvent laws wherever possible. The local 
bureaucrats continued to extract bribe from other caste groups. The study showed that there 
are certain inbuilt design fallacies in major welfare programmes and the officials exploit it to 
their advantage.   
e. The movement is hijacked by a single leader: With regards to the future trends 
and challenges of civil society organization led mobilization of the poor for exercising their 
rights, the case-study suggested that the issue of leadership was critical for its longevity. In 
the study site, the entire anti-corruption mobilization efforts were completely dominated by a 
single individual. The absence of second rung of leadership would hamper the struggle in the 
long run. Another challenge came in the form of excessive dependence of the community 
based organization (MVM) on the facilitating NGO (SSEVK). 
2. How do vigilance focused anti-corruption governance reforms in the delivery of nutritional 
services to the children under the ICDS unfold at the ground level, and how do the delivery 
agents respond to these reforms? 
a. Multiple inspections and strict punishment appeared counterproductive in 
curbing leakages: Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it was found that the threat of strict 
punishment and multiple inspections appeared counterproductive in the study research sites. 
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While the supervisors and the block level officials continued to extract their monthly ‘cuts’, 
the various other inspection teams were also bribed by the frontline workers for avoiding 
strict punishment or disciplinary action.  
 
b. Inherent technical problems in the programme design abet corruption: The 
problem of bribery and corruption were exacerbated by some technical problems inherent in 
the programme. For example, food inflation, which was not accounted for when funds were 
released to the centers, led to curtailment in the quantity of supplied food to the beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the frontline workers also managed funds for meeting the costs of photocopying 
or general maintenance of the centers. This resulted into false reporting and fudging of 
records by the frontline workers. In addition, the locally powerful people (including landlords 
and members of local bodies) influenced the process of identifying the ‘beneficiaries’. All 
these factors made corruption systemic in the delivery of services under ICDS in Bihar. This 
case study endorsed that until the root causes of corruption (e.g. unaccounted food inflation; 
undue interference by landlords and locally influential politicians, or lack of funds for 
paperwork maintenance) are tackled, vigilance focused reforms were not likely to curb 
corruption and leakages 
 
c. Users committee create additional entry points for corruption in ICDS: the 
findings from the research sites showed that users committees in the ICDS had the potential to 
create additional entry points for corruption. Furthermore, the selections of the presidents of 
users’ committees were also discretionary as they were chosen either by the frontline workers 
themselves or under the influence of the local leaders. Later on, when these users’ committees 
were replaced by the Anganwadi Development committees (headed by a local school teacher), 
the situation did not improve either. Replacement of the users’ committees with ‘Anganwadi 
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Development Committees’, simply substituted the actors involved in the extraction of money. 
 
d. Awareness among the beneficiaries stand crucial for curbing leakages: The 
study revealed that the lack of awareness among beneficiaries about their rights and 
entitlements as well as the changes in the rules and regulations about service provisions were 
the major obstacles in receiving better service delivery. The policy reforms and the 
consequent changes in rules and regulations need to be communicated well to the target 
population. Otherwise, the rules can be circumvented by the project functionaries for their 
own benefit. 
 
e. The service conditions of the frontline workers are very important for 
effectives of welfare schemes: The study showed that for the better delivery of services 
under the ICDS, the service conditions of the frontline workers needs to be improved. The 
overworked and underpaid frontline workers need to be motivated through promotional 
avenues, and provided with adequate funds to manage the centres effectively and honestly. 
 
3. What do the future civil servants think about corruption in public services? How do the 
three factors, namely the impact of public loss, probability of being caught and severity of 
punishment affect the bribery behaviour of the future civil servants in India? 
a. Knowledge about high public loss deterred bribery:  The results from the bribery 
games showed that high public loss acted as deterrence to the bribery behavior of the future 
bureaucrats as they conceived it as mutually destructive. However, low public loss was not 
effective in deterring their bribery behavior as they anticipated that others would accept bribe 
in these situations. 
                                   
  
 
162 
 
b. Future civil servants’ decisions on bribery were devoid of moral 
considerations: None of the participants considered the ‘moral’ dimension of bribery as a 
decisive factor in their choice making. Arguably, the aspiring civil servants’ decisions on 
bribery were solely based on their individual gains, and were devoid of any moral 
considerations. 
c. Strict monitoring was ineffective in curbing bribery: The findings revealed that 
strict monitoring was not effective in controlling bribery. In fact, when monitoring and low 
level of punishment were introduced, the instances of bribery went up. These results were 
contradictory to the common-sense understanding of bribery. 
d. Severe punishment acted as deterrence to bribery behaviour: The participant 
civil services aspirants did not perceive high level of monitoring risky until it entailed very 
severe punishment. Whenever the levels of punishment were raised, the bribery behaviour 
consistently reduced even in the conditions of low level of monitoring and higher bribe 
amount. 
e. Corruption was perceived as socially acceptable: The participants were of the 
view that corrupt officials were not looked down upon in the society as they help their friends 
and relatives in times of need by extending favours. It was also the reason for the perpetuation 
of nepotism. Furthermore, the aspirants also tend to categorise services on the basis of their 
money extracting potential. The more ‘creamy’ a posting is, the more sought after it tends to 
be. 
f. Corruption is attributed to changing lifestyle and ‘apathy’ of middle class: The 
aspiring civil servants stated that with the tremendous rise of consumerism, money has 
become the sole criteria for success in the wider society. Moreover, the middle classes happily 
‘grease the palm’ for getting things done quickly. This was identified as one of the main 
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factors for the perpetuation of corruption in public dealings.   
g. No punishment for the corrupt official abets corruption: It was largely 
perceived that the ‘corrupt’ rarely get convicted and ‘honest’ officials were frequently 
transferred from one posting to another. The laxity in prosecution system and political control 
of civil servants’ postings breaks the morale of the serving officials and they, overtime, are 
likely to become complacent.  
5.2 Theoretical implications  
The thesis engages with the debates on governance reforms, the role of civil society in 
mobilization of the poor against petty corruption and societal underpinnings of corruption and 
bribery in public affairs. The main theoretical implications that can be drawn from Chapter 2 
of the thesis are as follows. First, the study shows that civil society organizations have a 
crucial role to play in mobilizing the poorest citizens in their fight against petty corruption as 
well as exclusion from welfare schemes. This is made possible with concerted efforts of 
international donors to promote grassroots mobilization, political will of the ruling 
dispensation in favor of pro-poor governance reforms, as well as the ability of the activist 
organization to effectively mobilize the poorest in their struggle against rent seeking. Second, 
the findings support the argument that along with anti-corruption measures, the commitment 
of the political leadership is necessary for both curbing corruption (see Quah, 2008) and 
facilitating civil society interactions with state bureaucracies (see Evans 1996; Lavalle, 2006). 
The study showed how ‘political consideration’ of the ruling dispensation in Bihar emerged as 
an important aspect for empowering the rural poor. Third, the study also supports the claim 
that individual leaders tend to dominate people’s mobilization in the context of South Asia 
(Smillie and Hailey, 200; Hailey and James, 2004; Petras, 1999; Govinda 2009). The findings 
exhibit the absence of a second rung of leadership, which might pose a potential challenge for 
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the continuance of the anti-corruption struggle. Fourth, the case–study of civil society led 
mobilization of Musahars in Bihar reveals the absence of ‘horizontal movement’ of the anti-
corruption reforms with regards to the bribery behaviour of the local officials. The officials 
stopped asking for bribes from the people who were mobilised but not from others (and 
equally vulnerable) caste groups. Sixth, the study also highlights the existence of in-built 
deficiencies in the designs of some of the major welfare schemes instituted for the poor. 
These deficiencies de-incentivized the citizens from raising any protest against the leakages in 
the delivery of services. Overall, by presenting a narrative account of an anti-corruption 
struggle of the rural poor, which has received little attention from researchers in the recent 
past (see Singh, 2013), the study has supplemented the literature on anti-corruption 
mobilisation. 
The third chapter of the thesis, built on the earlier critical assessment of the functioning of the 
ICDS (see Fraker, Neil, & Ronald, 2013; Nayak and Saxena, 2006), empirically investigated 
how some recent (mainly) vigilance focused reforms for curbing corruption and leakages have 
fared. Also, how do the frontline workers receive and contest the reforms initiated form 
above.The findings have contributed to the academic literature on streamlining the delivery of 
nutritional services to the children in the following ways. 
First, contrary to the strong theoretical benefits of monitoring welfare programmes on the 
basis of users’ committees (see Gragnolati et. al, 2006; Sinha, 2006), the findings suggest that 
users’ committees can also emerge as a potential point of corruption. Second, it supported the 
claim that welfare schemes are prone to elite capture (see Dreze and Sen, 1989) and that there 
is problem of community leaders’ incentives to deliver. In the research sites, the involvement 
of teachers in the monitoring committees did not stop leakages, and on the contrary resulted in 
making the under-paid and over- burdened frontline workers more insecure. Third, the results 
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are also in line with the claims made by the scholars that awareness of rights and entitlements 
among the beneficiaries is crucial for the delivery of services under the ICDS (see Dreze, 
2006; Kent, 2006). It was found in the study sites how the frontline workers exploited the 
ignorance of the beneficiaries to their own benefit. Fourth, the findings indicated that well-
meaning strategies for reducing corruption (e.g. strict monitoring and regular inspection) may 
not achieve their desired results in the cases where corruption is systemic. Fifth, the findings 
exhibited how prevalence of certain fundamental problems (food inflation, no money for 
photocopying, etc.) abetted the frontline workers to consider bribery as a safer option. Sixth, 
the findings pointed out that amid conditions of systemic corruption, vigilance focussed 
reforms tend to escalate the problems of leakages and bribery in the research sites. In spite of 
these vigilance focussed reforms, some of the fundamental technical problems need to be 
resolved. Overall, in response to the commentators on Bihar who have argued in favour of the 
recent governance reforms in creating an enabling environment for the efficient delivery of 
public services (see Mukherji and Mukherji, 2012; Singh and Stern, 2013), this study 
displayed how these recent governance reforms of the government of Bihar have been 
circumvented at the delivery level. 
The fourth chapter empirically investigated the impact of some of the most prevalent tools of 
anti-corruption on their bribery behaviour of future bureaucrats, and explored the ways they 
perceived corruption. In fact, the experimental (bribery) game conducted as part of this thesis 
is probably the first of its kind in the context of India. The main contributions from this 
chapter to the debates on corruption in India are as follows. First, the findings supported the 
assertion of the ‘principal-agent’ model that severe punishment potentially deters bribery. It 
further supported the assertion made by Klitgaard (1998) that corruption thrives on account of 
the easy way out with minimum risk. Second, the study claimed that severe monitoring in the 
absence of strict punishment failed to deter bribery among the civil services aspirants from 
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India. Although actual reasons for such behaviour could not be found, the study acknowledges 
that one of the probable reasons could be the claim made by Schulze and Frank (2003) that 
monitoring reduced the intrinsic motivation for honesty for low-level of corruption. Third, the 
study displayed that the aspiring civil servants’ bribery behaviour was devoid of any moral 
considerations. These findings are quite in line with the claims made by one of the recent 
studies that the students aspiring to work for the public sector in India have more inclination 
towards corruption (see Hanna and Yi-Wang, 2013). Fourth, the study exhibited that 
candidates resorted to bribery on the belief that others would also be accepting bribe. These 
findings confirm the proposition made by Persson et al. (2013) that corruption can be 
controlled by changing the belief among individuals that others are not corrupt. Fifth, the 
findings indicated how corruption was socially acceptable in the country. Any efforts for 
curbing bribery in public dealings have to focus on the overall change in the societal 
perception of corruption. Overall, by presenting the perspectives of aspiring civil servants, 
this study complemented the various academic enquiries which have, thus far, only quantified 
corruption in the country (see Fraker et al, 2013) but have not found a narration or explanation 
for the same. 
5.2 Limitations of the methods and recommendations for future 
research 
Data on sensitive topics like corruption is very difficult to collect as it requires a range of 
methods and techniques with their own limitations. This thesis also witnessed certain 
limitations with regards to the research tools employed for the data collection. These 
limitations are acknowledged with the belief that future academic works would make an 
endeavor to fill these voids. 
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For the research objectives in relation to chapter two, the study acknowledges the limitation of 
stakeholders’ reluctance to provide any information about bribery and embezzlement. 
Although, the study employed the methods of direct observation, net-mapping and semi-
structured interviews to minimize this factor, certain limitations could probably exist. The 
study acknowledges that even after convincing the respondents about the purpose of this study 
as solely academic, the possibilities of the interviewer effect cannot be completely ruled out.  
Though the study tried to find consistencies in the answers by asking the similar questions to 
many respondents, there were no other empirical ways to verify the authenticity of the 
collected data. Another limitation was that interviews could not be recorded as the 
respondents were not comfortable with it, and notes were made only after the interviews. It 
might have resulted in missing some information. Moreover, as many of the incidents narrated 
by the respondents were based on their memories, the study also acknowledges the limitations 
of methodology involving ‘recalling of the events from the past’ (Patai 1998). The process net 
map was used to identify the relative influence of the various actors in leakages in the welfare 
programmes but it could not involve the public officials for this exercise, and the map was 
drawn only from the perspectives of the volunteers and the leader of the civil society 
organisation.  
In chapter three, the techniques of semi-structured and conversational interviews with 
different stakeholders were employed. Apart from the limitations of these methods as stated in 
the above paragraph, the study faced an additional limitation with regards to its sample size of 
ten delivery centres. Furthermore, the reluctance of respondents to speak freely about some of 
the sensitive issues concerning them and the problems in cross-checking the information 
provided by them solely on the basis of official records or registers (which are often forged) 
also posed limitations.   
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For the third objective of exploring the perception of the aspiring civil servants on corruption, 
the tools of experimental bribery games and focus group interviews were used. The study 
acknowledges the following limitations of employing these methods for the data collection.  
To start with, the selection of the coaching institutes as well as the participants was solely 
based on their voluntarism. Moreover, though the experimental bribery games had its 
advantage of stealthy approach, its limitation lies in the fact that the participants might not 
perceive it as a real life situation, and play on the basis of their instincts and calculations. 
Moreover, the notion of public loss as a cumulative loss to the other participants might have 
the possibility of being perceived differently as all the participants were known to each other. 
Moreover, experimental bribery game was new to all the participants; therefore there are 
possibilities of more excitement for playing rather than exhibiting their true behaviour. 
5.3  Policy implications: 
In pursuit of its goal, the thesis evaluated the dynamics of petty corruption in welfare 
programmes as well as effective mobilization of the poor against rent-seeking, the effects of 
vigilance focused reforms for curbing corruption, and the future bureaucrats’ attitudes 
towards bribery and corruption in public dealings. The results presented in the three empirical 
chapters of this thesis provide a range of insights and corrective measures to tackle the 
problem of petty corruption and enhance delivery of welfare services to the poor. Over all the 
broad policy implications of the research can be viewed as below. 
 
a. International agencies and the government should facilitate mobilization of the 
poor for ensuring corruption free delivery of public services 
The results from the first chapter provide sufficient evidence for the necessity of a 
civil society led mobilization of the rural poor and making effective use of the anti-
                                   
  
 
169 
 
corruption tools provided by the state. In absence of effective mobilization, the 
governance reforms are likely to be circumvented by the local bureaucrats. More so 
ever, even in the presence of such mobilization, the officials continued to extract bribe 
from the section of poor who were not organized. The political will of the ruling 
dispensation for bringing about good governance can be complimented with the 
effective mobilization of the poorer citizens for exercising their rights and 
entitlements. 
b. The policy makers should plug built-in deficiencies in the welfare programmes  
This study suggests that the design fallacies in the welfare schemes hampers leave 
entry points for corruption. These design fallacies discourage the poorest to flag the 
issue of corruption (e.g. in the case of Public Distribution System) because it actually 
results in denial of subsidized food grain for months. Also, in the case of employment 
guarantee scheme (MNREGA), the system of protecting the sapling for months 
without any provision of physical guarding abets corruption. The government should 
take corrective measures to plug these loopholes.  
c. Donor agencies should  ensure that second rung of leadership is nourished 
Undoubtedly, for effective mobilization of the poor by civil society organizations, 
charismatic leadership is crucial. Yet, the findings from the study suggest that the 
donor agencies should ensure that a second rung of leadership is also nourished. In 
absence of second rung of leadership, the mobilization is likely to become 
unsustainable in the long run. 
d. The role of teacher in the Anganwadi Development Committees under the 
Integrated Childe Development Scheme (ICDS) should be reconsidered by the 
government 
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Making people’s participation a necessary component of welfare service delivery 
mechanism is a cherished goal. Wheat shape the ‘participation’ takes and whether it 
would help in curbing corruption is an open ended question. The research findings 
from Bihar suggest that the new community based committees headed by school 
teachers has not been effective in preventing leakages in delivery chain. Unless the 
root causes of corruption in the ICDS are addressed, the effectiveness of 
‘participation’ in curbing corruption remains questionable. 
e. Changes in the rules and regulations governing welfare programmes should be 
communicated well to the target population 
The findings from the study show how lack of information among beneficiaries about 
their rights and entitlements as well as changes in the rules and regulations about 
service provisions were major obstacles in better functioning of the ICDS. This study 
strongly advocates for awareness generation among the beneficiaries to ascertain their 
rights; and supports the claims made by the scholars in favor of the ‘rights based 
approach’ for the delivery of services under the ICDS (see Dreze, 2006; Kent, 2006). 
It is argued that creating awareness among the beneficiaries should be an essential 
element in the reform approach. 
f. Instead of Vigilance focussed reforms in the ICDS, the government should aim to 
address some of the basic problems at the delivery centres 
This study showed how existence of some technical problems in the programme (for 
example, food inflation, no funds for photocopying etc.) lead to false reporting and 
fudging of records by frontline workers. Furthermore, the locally powerful people 
(including landlords and members of local bodies) also influenced the process of 
identifying the ‘beneficiaries’. All these factors make corruption systemic in the ICDS 
in Bihar. In the wake of these problems, the current ‘vigilance focused’ reforms were 
                                   
  
 
171 
 
not able to put a check on bribery and leakages. The study recommends tackling these 
technical problems first, before any vigilance focused reforms are implemented. 
g. The working conditions of the frontline workers engaged in the ICDS need to be 
improved 
The study concludes that the strategy for overcoming the problem of corruption in the 
delivery of services under the ICDS should focus more on the frontline workers and 
their problems than on vigilance and inspections. The study recommends regular 
remuneration and regularisation of services of the frontline workers, and providing 
them with greater opportunities of career advancement (e.g. promotion to the posts of 
supervisors) as well as performance based rewards. In addition, appropriate ‘grievance 
redress’ mechanism should be in place, which would allow the frontline workers to 
report the cases of misappropriation of funds and demands of bribery by higher 
officials.  
h. Anti-corruption discourse should include the value based education in addition to 
strict punishment for erring officials. 
The study demonstrated how well-meaning strategies for reducing corruption through 
strict monitoring might not be effective on their own. They have to be combined with 
a change in the ways the wider society perceives corruption. The government need to 
contemplate on taking forward the anti-corruption discourse from its present fixation 
with strict legislation to imbibing the values of social good in public life. 
The issue of corruption is at the core the governance conundrum in developing countries. This 
thesis argues that good governance debates and anti-corruption mechanisms may benefit from 
empirically-rooted research on the dynamics of corruption in context specific situations. 
While the objectives of ‘good governance’ cannot be achieved instantaneously, unravelling 
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the ‘why’ and ‘how’ (and not just ‘how much’) of corruption, as attempted in this thesis, will 
go a long way in devising effective strategies for its curtailment, and  in turn, create 
conducive environment for effective governance and development. 
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Title: Introduction and Overview 
Courses Taught in India 
MKR Govt. Degree College, Ghaziabad                                        July 2005-September 2009 
Political Theory                                                                                                                      
National Movement and Constitution of India                                                                  
History of Western Political Thought                                                                               
Comparative Government                                                                                                  
International Politics 
Govt. Degree College, Talwari                                                            October 2009-June 2012 
Introduction to Political Theory                                                                                            
Indian Government and Politics                                                                                 
Comparative Government and Politics                                                                         
Introduction to International Relations 
 
Select Conference and Workshop Presentations 
Anti-corruption training course –“The Economics of Corruption: Seeking the Nudges for 
Reforms”, organised at University of Passau, Germany (September 27- October 4, 2014)  
Tropentag 2014 “Bridging the Gap between increasing knowledge and decreasing resources” 
organised at Czech University of Life Sciences, Prague (17-19 September, 2014) 
Presented a paper titled “Village outcastes, entitlements and the struggle against corruption: A 
case-study of Samajik Shodh Evam Vikas Kendra in rural Bihar, India” in BASAS Annual 
Conference 2014 organised at Royal Holloway, University of London (2-4 April, 2014) 
Let’s Feed the World: Millennium Express Workshop, Organised by Leibniz University, 
Hannover, Germany (27-28 February, 2014) 
The Cost of Food-Beyond the Price Tag: Workshop and Panel Discussion, Organised by 
Freiburg Forum on Environmental Governance, University of Freiburg, Germany (22 
February, 2014) 
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Cultivating Futures: Ethnographies of Alternative Agricultures in South Asian Landscapes of 
Crisis, Organized by Cluster of Excellence, Asia and Europe in a Global Context, University 
of Heidelberg, Germany (12-14 Dec, 2013) 
Tropentag 2012 `Resilience of Agricultural Systems against Crisis´, Georg- August 
University, Göttingen, Germany (19-21 September, 2012) 
Presented a paper entitled "Women Empowerment in India: The Way Ahead" in U.G.C. 
Sponsored National Seminar on Women Empowerment: Past Trends and Future Directions in 
Government P.G. College, Lansdowne, Uttarakhand (6-7, Mar 2009). 
Faculty Development Program in Pedagogy, Soft Skills and Evaluation, Jointly organized by 
Department of Higher Education, Uttarakhand and ICFAI University (Mar 2006) 
Completed Short Term Leadership Course Organized by Department of Psychology, E.C.C. 
Allahabad (Jan 1996) 
   
 
  
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                      
  Stuttgart / October, 2015                                                                         
   (Place/ Date)                                                                                                       Rajiv Verma 
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7 Affidavit 
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